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Populism is on the rise in many developed and developing countries and uprooting established 
party systems. In South Africa, research has shown that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 
can be seen as our turn towards populism, but what fuels the rise of the party? This dissertation 
argues that an anti-establishment stance entices citizens to vote for the EFF and economic 
inequalities and a cultural backlash makes our society fertile ground for a populist party. In this 
theoretical case study, international populism theory from especially Inglehart and Norris is 




The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice. 
- Martin Luther King, Jr
Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and 
do nothing. 
- John Stuart Mill
When they go low, we go high. 
- Michelle Obama
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On 20 January 2017 Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States of America 
(USA). Just a few months before his inauguration very few credible pollsters would have 
predicted a win for the businessman turned politician. It’s no hyperbole to say his election sent 
shockwaves through the world1 and many people had a deep psychological reaction to the 
event.2 French Ambassador to the USA at the time Gerard Araud foretold of a new world 
order.3 “A world is collapsing before our eyes,” he said. “After Brexit and this election, 
everything from now on is possible. It’s the end of an era, that of neoliberalism.” 
Araud was encapsulating a feeling of despair. Just a few months before Trump’s victory, the 
United Kingdom (UK) voted to exit the European Union, upending the status quo and release 
waves of consequences that Inglehart and Norris refer to as “profound and catastrophic”.4 More 
than it being exclusively symptomatic of the domestic situation in the UK, it was a strong 
indication of the rise of populism in Western democracies.  
Across the Western landscape populist leaders like Marine Le Pen (France), Geert Wilders 
(Netherlands) and Nigel Farage (UK) have been altering established political patterns and have 
upended societies in significant ways. This wave of populism is by no means the first indication 
of populism on the global stage. Over the past 150 years populism has grown from a small 
group in Russia and a broad, but an unorganised group in the USA to a global phenomenon.5  
1 World Reactions to US Presidential Election, ABC News, 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/photos/world-reactions-us-presidential-election-43399207/image-
hong-kong-43406580 (accessed 20 December 2018).  
2 A quarter of college students could develop PTSD because of the 2016 election, a new study 
suggests, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/10/24/quarter-
college-students-could-develop-ptsd-because-election-new-study-
suggests/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b5afdf01b61a (accessed 20 December 2018). 
3 World Reacts to Trump's Election Win: 'It's the End of an Era', NBC News, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/world-reacts-trump-s-election-win-it-s-end-
era-n681031 (accessed 20 December 2018).  
4 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” Unpublished working paper in Harvard Kenny School Faculty Research 
Working Papers, (2016), 6. 
5 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction (USA: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 40. 
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However, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump has brought the phenomenon to the 
foreground. The UK is a leader in Europe and the USA is perceived as a bastion of freedom, 
democracy, and liberal values. If political analysts did not foresee these substantial 
transformations in the most powerful nations, what are the chances of it spreading and 
impacting many other democracies?  
Inevitably this question is raised within the local context. In 2015 research from Mbete has 
shown that the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) can be seen as South Africa’s turn towards 
populism.6 However, observing the presence of the phenomenon and understanding the 
motivating forces behind its rise, are divergent academic and practical exercises. Research has 
shown that the EFF is populist, but this dissertation aims to understand why. A detailed outline 
of the research question will follow shortly.  
Is it thus possible that populism can spread in South Africa similar to the extent of many other 
developing and developed countries? If so, how is this possible? Can we simply blame 
politicians for the spreading and displaying of populist rhetoric and tendencies, or are there 
bigger societal influences at play that make a society vulnerable to populism not only spreading 
but also being influential and ultimately being the prevailing ideology? Are there lessons to be 
learnt from other countries where the theoretical perspectives are more advanced, and how can 
the local context benefit from these international theories?  
It is within this context that the current research is conducted. Populism is not merely an 
alternative ideology within a democracy. Many researchers such as Bryder7, Bang and Marsh8, 
Mudde and Kaltwasser9 and Müller10 are all in agreement that populism is a threat to liberal 
democracy. Müller argues that “populist should be criticised for what they are – a real danger 
to democracy.”  
6  Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 
Journal of African Elections 14, 1(2015), 35.  
7 Tom Bryder, “Populism – a threat or a challenge for the democratic system?” Unpublished working 
paper on University of Copenhagen website, (2009), 14.  
8 Henrik Bang and David Marsh, “Populism: A major threat to Democracy?” Policy Studies 39, 
3(2018), 352.  
9 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 95. 
10 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 102-
103.
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This research is essentially an attempt to identify the prominent and inconspicuous causes of 
populism within the EFF in South Africa, not only from the perspective of the political parties 
but also examining the factors present in society that would make us susceptible to populism.  
The methodological process that will be followed is as follows: 
In terms of the organisational structure of this dissertation the logical flow will be as follows: 
• Chapter 1: Introduction
This chapter will discuss the research question, hypothesis, literature review, and
problem statement. Ultimately it will raise the central issues, problems, or gaps that this
dissertation aims to address.
• Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
The second chapter delves into the theoretical framework of populism, with a specific
focus on anti-establishment, economic inequality, and cultural backlash. This theory
will then be used to answer the questions raised in chapter one.
• Chapter 3: Research Design
This chapter combines the questions, problem statement, and issues from chapter one
with the theoretical framework and sets out a road map for how the issues will be
resolved.
4 
• Chapter 4 (Anti-establishment), chapter 5 (economic inequality) and chapter 6
(cultural backlash)
These practical chapters will apply research design that was set out in chapter three and
apply theoretical foundations to the practical circumstances of South Africa.
• Chapter 7: Conclusion
The final chapter will present the main insights gained and how it relates to the question,
problem statement, and issues raised in the first chapter. Theoretical insights will be
weaved into a coherent new anti-establishment theory and recommendations for future
research will be made.
1.1 Research question and hypothesis  
The central question of this dissertation is: 
Why is populism on the rise in the form of the EFF for the years 2013-2018? 
In essence, this dissertation aims to understand the reasons for the support of the populist EFF. 
Mbete’s research has already established that the EFF is indeed South Africa’s turn towards 
populism; now the aim is to interrogate relevant and neglected reasons behind this rise in 
populism.  
What would constitute “neglected reasons”? Simply put, these are factors that the current 
research has not examined and will be pointed out in the literature review below. With regards 
to “relevant reasons”, it is a value judgement based on observation of the political landscape. 
It is impossible to examine all the neglected reasons, but to narrow the scope of this thesis, we 
will look at reasons that the author felt are relevant to the local context. As will be indicated in 
the research design, this subjective approach does pose a risk to reliability and validity but also 
offers advantages – all of which will be addressed in the research method.  
The timeframe of 2013 to 2018 was chosen for the following reasons: 
The EFF was formed in 2013 as direct opposition to the ruling party. It is for this reason that 
the start date of this dissertation was chosen as 2013. The end-date of 2018 was determined 
based on the fact that Jacob Zuma stepped down as president of South Africa. It will be shown 
5 
in chapter four that he was a significant part of the EFF’s rebellion against the establishment, 
thus fuelling support for the party. When he vacated office the EFF lost a significant subject of 
its anti-establishment stance. 2018 is also the last year before the general elections of 2019, 
thus chronologically a valid demarcation.  
The parameters of the central question have now been established and subsequently, this 
dissertation will answer the following secondary questions:  
1. How prominent is opposing the ruling party a factor in the rise of populism within the
EFF?
2. Are there conditions in society – specifically the economic circumstances of supporters
and a hostile attitude and anxiety towards minorities – that can lead to support for the
populist EFF?
Both of these secondary questions relate to the reasons behind the rise of populism pertaining 
to the EFF. The first one sets the scene for supply-side factors (reasons for populism originating 
from within political parties) and the second one sets the scene for demand-side factors (reasons 
for populism originating from within society).   
1.1.1 Hypothesis 
Simplistically the hypothesis is an “educated guess” of what the answer to the research  
question will be. It must be a.) testable, b.) falsifiable and c.) specifies the variables that can be 
measured.  
In light of these basic criteria, a hypothesis for this research is: 
Populism in on the rise pertaining to the EFF, mainly because of an anti-establishment 
stance, economic inequality, and a cultural backlash that is present in society. These reasons 
were present in the years 2013-2018. 
This hypothesis is testable because it can indeed be seen if these factors are present in the 
context of the EFF (both internally and externally). These reasons are not foreign to the existing 
research (thus testable) and are not concepts that can’t be examined. The hypothesis is also 
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falsifiable: One can, for instance, indicate that the supporters of the EFF are not economically 
worse off than the elite if the indicators point out there is no economic inequality. Lastly, this 
hypothesis identifies the variables that can be measured: anti-establishment, economic 
inequality, and a cultural backlash.   
 
It is perhaps an opportune time to now indicate what is meant by all three of these concepts. 
All three will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, but a basic, rudimentary 
understanding is necessary at this point to understand the meaning of the hypothesis. 
Explanations for the concepts are: 
 
• An anti-establish sentiment refers to being against the elite.11 This concept will be 
interrogated in chapters two and four, but the theory argues that voters support populist 
parties, because the party portrays an anti-establishment stance.  
• Economic inequality is perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for 
populism.12 It postulates that supporters of populist parties are economically worse off. 
This concept will be interrogated in chapters two and five. 
• The cultural backlash thesis refers to the reaction against cultural change – a notion of 
“them” changing “our” culture; “they” are infringing in “our” space.13 This is then seen 
as a reason for supporting a populist party. Chapters two and six will elaborate on this 
concept. 
 
Now that the central and secondary questions have been outlined, it’s imperative to show how 
the existing research has attempted to answer these questions – if there is an attempt at all.  
 
1.2 Literature review 
Very few scholars have conducted research on populism in South Africa. Most of the current 
research was written before the formation of the EFF in 2013 and therefore doesn’t focus on 
this political party and falls outside the scope of the current dissertation. Mathekga’s research, 
for instance, focusses on the ANC during the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, and the subsequent 
 
11 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
12 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 2. 
13 Robert Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western 
Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 42.  
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change of leadership to Jacob Zuma.14 At that time there was a “resurgence of populism” in 
the form of Zuma from within the establishment. 
 
Vincent’s research also illustrates the populist tendencies within the ruling party, specifically 
pertaining to the time when Malema was the leader of the Youth League.15 This gives us a 
perspective of the “outsider” that emerged from within the establishment to become a 
“maverick”, as Barr would refer to it.16 This concept is interrogated in chapters two and four 
with reference to the anti-establishment sentiment. Malema had populist tendencies whilst he 
was part of the establishment and Vincent alludes to this. This might have contributed to the 
formation of the EFF, but it remains irrelevant to the current dissertation due to it falling outside 
the timeframe.  
 
Considering the timeframe of the existing research, it is thus understandable that the EFF is 
left out of much of the existing research – they didn’t exist at that time and could therefore not 
be analysed.  
 
After the formation of the EFF researchers such as Mbete17 and Hurt and Kuisma18 have 
analysed the importance the party plays in our political context. Inevitably, it often lacks focus 
and depth, with a more holistic framework required.  
 
It will be shown below how the existing literature does not answer the central or secondary 






14 Ralph Mathekga, “The ANC ‘Leadership Crisis’ and the age of Populism in Post-apartheid South 
Africa,” in Joelien Pretorius (ed.), African Politics: Beyond the Third Wave of Democratisation (Cape 
Town: Juta, 2008), 131.  
15 Louise Vincent, “Seducing the People: Populism and the Challenge to Democracy in South Africa,” 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29, 1(2011), 4.  
16 Robert Barr, “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics,” Party Politics 15, 1(2009), 34. 
17 Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 35. 
18 Stephen Hurt and Mikko Kuisma, “Undermining the ‘Rainbow Nation’? The Economic Freedom 
Fighters and Left-wing Populism in South Africa,” Unpublished working paper for 66th Political 
Studies Association Annual International Conference, (2016), 2.    
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 It can be argued that the existing research: 
 
1. lacks international context;  
2. has limited theoretical orientation; and 
3. fails to recognise, integrate, and discuss relevant factors.  
 
Each of these three observations will be henceforth be deconstructed to illustrate how the 
current research will fill the theoretical and practical gaps and ultimately enhance our 
understanding of populism in the South African context.  
 
Observation 1: The current research lacks relevant international theoretical context 
 
Mbete argues that the EFF fits into the global pattern of rising populism and examines it 
through the lens of the political style approach.19 She, however, exclusively uses Moffitt and 
Tormey’s approach (which will be briefly explained in the next chapter) to analyse the local 
context. Whereas this might be useful to a certain extent, it doesn’t account for the complexities 
of the local context and how parallels can be drawn between different international theories 
and the South African situation.  
 
Hurt and Kuisma also uses this approach but expands on it with the economic strategy of the 
EFF.20 However, their approach gives prominence to the supply-side: The EFF has adopted 
their economic policies and that is the driving force for populism. It does not account for the 
demand side: Can the economic inequality in society lead to support for the populist EFF?  
 
Both Mathekga and Vincent’s arguments almost exist within a vacuum. With the exception of 
brief mentions of the work from international scholars, both local theorists attempt to analyse 
the manifestation of populism as a phenomenon that is almost unique to our context. There is 
very little attempt to apply international theory, creating the impression that South African 
conceptions about populism is unique and voided from the global context.  
 
 
19 Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 35. 
20 Stephen Hurt and Mikko Kuisma, “Undermining the ‘Rainbow Nation’? The Economic Freedom 
Fighters and Left-wing Populism in South Africa,” 14. 
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The present research will argue that populism in South African not only follows international 
trends, but theories of populism can indeed be applied to the local context. Theoretical concepts 
of anti-establishment, economic inequalities, and a cultural backlash can indeed be used as a 
map to analyse the local context. In particular, international theory from Inglehart and Norris 
will form the backbone of the economic inequality and cultural backlash discussion. Anti-
establishment theories from Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr, and Hartleb will be consolidated to 
form a coherent theory of the local context.  
 
Furthermore, as useful as Moffitt and Tormey’s approach is, this study will utilise the ideational 
approach. Besides Mudde and Kaltwasser, other international researchers such as Stanley, 
Akkerman, and March have all adopted this approach, making it the most dominant approach 
in the field.21 In essence, this view defines populism as follows:  
 
A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
people.22 
 
In the next chapter, the rationale behind choosing this approach will be explained, but to 
identify gaps in the existing literature, it’s imperative to note that the current dissertation will 
apply international theory to the local context and show that the rise of populism pertaining to 
the EFF can’t be understood in a vacuum. 
 
Mbete rightfully equates “the people” to “black Africans”, or “the powerless black majority”, 
to the working class (evident of the ideational approach) but that is where the applicability 
ends. She mentions the ideational approach, but dismisses it, saying there is a “wide variety of 
populist organisations that do not fit the archetype in [this category]”.23 She finds the approach 
problematic because of its “simplistic rather than holistic terms”, claiming it’s “emotive 
politics”, and that populism seems to be merely a convenient label used to discuss those whose 
 
21 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 18.  
22 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
23 Sithembile Mbete, “The Economic Freedom Fighters: South Africa’s Turn Towards Populism?” 37. 
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politics we do not agree with”.24 Mbete thus uses the concept of “the people”, but fails to 
properly interrogate the ideational approach.  
 
Hurt and Kuisma’s research, however, recognises the three elements of the ideational approach 
(“the people”, “the elite” and the “general will”), but it does not extensively expand on these 
concepts and how it relates to especially the anti-establishment stance.25 
 
Mbete’s failure to provide substantial evidence for her claims renders her assumptions moot 
and Hurt and Kuisma do not interrogate any of the three abovementioned concepts. The current 
dissertation will illustrate how the ideational approach can indeed be applicable to our context, 
especially with reference to an anti-establishment stance. As seen below, this dissertation will 
also consider populism in South Africa in more holistic terms than any of the current research, 
proposing that a label of being “simplistic” is indeed a fallacy.  
 
Observation 2: The current research has a limited theoretical orientation 
 
The vast majority of the current research focusses on supply-side arguments to explain 
populism within the South African context, but this is by no means a full account of the causes 
of the phenomenon. With the exceptions of brief mentions, none of the South African research 
acknowledges the demand-side factors, especially that of economic inequality and a cultural 
backlash.  
 
Beinart comes closest to an alternative explanation when he refers to popular protests post 
1994.26 Whilst this account implicitly recognises populism originating from within society, it 
mentions it fleetingly and does not apply any demand-side theory to our situation. It also falls 
outside the timeframe of this dissertation. Hurt and Kuisma also recognises this, but similarly 
to Beinart do not delve into a discussion, neither is it applicable to the EFF.  
 
 
24 Ibid.  
25 Stephen Hurt and Mikko Kuisma, “Undermining the ‘Rainbow Nation’? The Economic Freedom 
Fighters and Left-wing Populism in South Africa,” 8-9. 
26 William Beinart and Marcelle Dawson, Popular Politics and Resistance Movements in South Africa,  
(Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2010), 21-2. 
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Demand-side theories are often neglected in analysis and Mudde and Kaltwasser explains: 
“Many people reduce populism to an elite-driven process, centred on charismatic leaders, who 
have the ability to enchant [trick] the masses.”27  
 
However, as Mudde and Kaltwasser point out, populism is found in societies across the 
political spectrum, even without the presence of a populist leader. “[The activation of populist 
attitudes] depends on specific sets of conditions, under which ordinary people might become 
fervent populists.”28 It is for this reason that it is important to incorporate the demand-side 
argument in understanding why there is support for a populist party. 
 
This dissertation will show that demand-side factors are not only relevant but essential in 
understanding populism in South Africa. Furthermore, Mbete’s supply-side argument centred 
around the political style approach, which is limited in its scope. It does not account for anti-
establishment, for instance. It has minimal reference to other supply-side lenses through which 
one can look at the situation, one of which is an anti-establishment stance within opposition 
parties. Her criticism of the ideational approach as “simplistic” is problematic within this 
context, since a single theorist from the political style approach, can, be seen as rudimentary 
and indeed a lack of acknowledgement for the larger context.  
 
Observation 3: The research fails to recognise, integrate and discuss relevant factors 
 
It has already been established that the existing research is selective in its approach and there 
are several neglected areas that the current research dissertation will delve into, two being the 
cultural backlash in society and the economic inequalities that are present. These are key 
aspects of several international theories and it is virtually non-existent in local research.  
 
In essence, the cultural backlash thesis builds on the “silent revolution” theory of value change 
and can be seen as anti-globalisation. The rise of progressive values, such as LGBT rights, 
gender equality, and inclusiveness with immigration and accepting refugees, are often pushed 
back at.  
 
 




According to Inglehart and Norris, there are two main characteristics of the cultural backlash: 
a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and anxiety 
that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.29 Betz30 argues that the reaction to racial 
minorities is often expressed in the form of a.) open racism and b.) xenophobia.  
 
Ample research exists on xenophobia (such as that from Claassen, Solomon and Kosaka and 
Dumani) and open racism (such as Nyar and reports from the South African Human Rights 
Commission) in society, but the present research will take it a step further. It will illustrate how 
these concepts and phenomena can’t be studied in isolation but are symptomatic and causally 
linked to the rise of populism within the political opposition in the form of the EFF.  
 
The economic inequalities will be studied through a similar lens. Economic inequality is 
perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism, Inglehart and Norris argue.31 
There are many indicators of inequality and this research will focus on income, race, 
unemployment, education, and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet). Each 
one’s manifestation within the local context will be addressed. Currently, researchers such as 
Makgetla and reports from Statistics South Africa indicate economic inequality, but no existing 
research has linked this phenomenon to support for the populist EFF.  
 
Naturally, these concepts (cultural backlash and economic inequality) are complicated ones, 
especially in our context. Apartheid and colonialism both had severely detrimental effects on 
society; our definition of populism will be different from other countries, but according to 
Mudde a working definition would have a thin veneer of overlap in each situation.32 This 
dissertation will thus clearly indicate how the concepts of economic inequality and a cultural 
backlash are relevant to support the populist EFF, something with the existing research has 
failed to do. 
 
 
29 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15. 
30 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1994), 15.   
31 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 2. 




1.3 Problem statement  
A problem statement is the description of an issue currently existing which needs to be 
addressed. It is usually a short statement “about an area of concern, a condition to be improved 
upon, a difficulty to be eliminated, or a troubling question that exists in scholarly literature, in 
theory, or within existing practice that points to a need for meaningful understanding and 
deliberate investigation”.33 Furthermore, the statement does not offer a solution to the said 
problem but merely highlights the issue that is to be examined.  
 
In light of this theoretical knowledge and the abovementioned literature review, the problem 
statement for this research is as follows: 
 
The current research into populism pertaining to the EFF is lacking in its international 
theoretical context and its theoretical orientation, and it fails to recognise, integrate, and 
discuss relevant factors. There is subsequently little information into the party’s anti-
establishment stance, or the economic inequality and cultural backlash present in society. 
This leads to an insufficient understanding of why the EFF has been enjoying support for its 
populist stance and rhetoric during the years 2013-2018. 
 
1.4 Conclusion on the way forward 
In this chapter, an outline of the research rationale, the central research question, and the 
hypothesis was presented. A literature review was conducted to highlight key shortcomings in 
the current research and problem statement was derived to frame the central issue of the 
dissertation.  
 
In the next chapter, an overview will be given of the theoretical foundations underpinning the 
three central concepts of anti-establishment stance, economic inequality, and a cultural 
backlash. This will, in turn, be practically applied to the local context in chapter four (anti-




33 Anonymous, Organising Your Social Sciences Research Paper, University of Southern California, 
https://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/introduction/researchproblem#:~:text=A%20research%20pr




Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
 
In 1967 the London School of Economics held a large conference with the lofty aim of 
“defining populism”.34 Despite two days of deliberation, debate, and attempting to form a 
coherent theory, the forty-three participants could not agree on a definition. More than five 
decades later, we might have more published work on the subject that shines a light on pivotal 
areas, but we still do not have a universally accepted definition of the ideology, or even agree 
that it is indeed an ideology.  
 
However, there is little uncertainty amongst most theorists and political analysts that there has 
been a surge in populism in many countries during the past few years, altering established 
political environments and uprooting the status quo.35 This is, nevertheless, where the 
accordance ends; the reasons for said political shifts are divergent and broad, and even a precise 
definition, just like in 1967, eludes us.  
 
This chapter provides the theoretical foundation on which the rest of this dissertation will be 
built upon. First, a discussion of the definition of populism will follow. Mudde and 
Kaltwasser’s influential ideational approach will be covered in-depth, as this is the lens through 
which we also approach the South African context. This will be followed by a concise 
discussion of the general causes of populism. Since the focus of this research is on anti-
establishment, economic inequality, and a cultural backlash, these causes will receive detailed 
attention in this analysis, and the theories set out in the method will be explained. Ultimately, 
the theory will then form the underpinning of the practical analysis of the South African 
context, which is to follow in the next few chapters.  
 
2.1 Towards a definition  
Despite a metaphorical multifurcation in defining populism, it is by no means futile to attempt 
establishing the parameters of a definition or to assume that scholars have not made great 
strides towards defining populism. Mudde and Kaltwasser acknowledge that the term’s broad 
 
34 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, 7. 
35 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 2. 
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usage “creates confusion and frustration”, but that it is indeed possible to arrive at an 
interpretation that is “broadly shared, but far from hegemonic”.36 
 
In this chapter, an outline will be given of the contestation around the topic, specifically 
pertaining to ascertain a definition, which will be followed by a discussion of Mudde and 
Kaltwasser’s ideational approach. In essence, they define populism as: 
 
A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic camps: ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
people.37 
 
This approach and subsequent definition are widely-recognised to encapsulate the core 
concepts of populism and many scholars have attempted at elucidating their approach, 
enriching the overall theoretical framework.38 Müller, for instance, also sees populism as two 
antagonistic groups, but it is ultimately a “moralistic imagination of politics”.39 “The people” 
are seen as morally pure; “the elite” is corrupt and morally inferior. This antagonism to the 
existing establishment, argues Vincent, includes values, hierarchies or orthodoxies and 
regardless of the lens through which we view a particular context, the antagonism will always 
be present.40 In this research, arguments will thereafter be raised as to why the ideational 
approach is the preferred one. 
 
It is perhaps also prudent to distinguish between left-wing and right-wing populism. The 
encompassing term “populism” is used to describe both sides and in the ideational approach 
does not make a significant, underlying distinction between the two. In general, left-wing 
populism is populism combined with left-wing politics (such as socialist ideals and state 
intervention) and right-wing populism is populism combined with right-wing politics (such as 
 
36 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 1. 
37 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
38 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 
18. 
39 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, 19. 




tradition and a market-economy). This creates the scope for a left-leaning politician such as 
Julius Malema and a right-leaning one such as Donald Trump to be labelled “populist”.  
 
Over the past 150 years populism has grown from a small group in Russia and a broad, but an 
unorganised group in the USA to a global phenomenon.41 What theorists saw in the 1800s, we 
are seeing in contemporary times; we just can’t settle on what exactly it is we are seeing.  
 




2.1.1 Different interpretations  
It has already been established that “populism” is a convoluted term, but to what extent is it 
swathed in disagreement, and in which aspects of the current theories would one find this 
 
41 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 40. 
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disagreement? Wiles even describes these disagreements as to the ground for “derision and 
hostility”.42 
 
As stated above, this research will follow the ideational approach in defining populism, and 
whilst it is the most popular approach, it is by no means the only approach. Moffitt argues there 
are other lenses through which the concept can be studied: political logic, strategy, discourse, 
and style. It should be noted that the literature refers to different terms for these approaches, 
but in essence, the underlying meaning stays the same. 
 
2.1.1.1 Political logic 
Within this approach, populism is seen as an emancipatory force. Liberal democracy is 
considered an inherently poor and ineffective system and through populism, a society can move 
closer to radical democracy, through conflict (whether physical or otherwise) and mobilise 
neglected sectors of society.43 It could be argued that this concept is potentially too broad to 
allow meaningful application. Essentially, it can be applied to any political context.44  
 
2.1.1.2 Strategy 
One must be short-sighted to not notice that there is often a notion in the popular media that 
portrays politicians as inherently dishonest and hungry for power. The so-called “strategy 
approach”, in reference to populism, plays on this concept and states that “a personalistic leader 
seeks [...] power based on direct, unmediated, institutionalised support from large numbers of 
mostly unorganised followers”.45  
 
Unfortunately, the usability of this definition is limited. Moffitt highlights a few problems, first 
of which is that it doesn’t account for manifestations that we would not refer to as “populism”.46  
Secondly, and arguably one of the strongest criticisms, is that populism can thrive in highly 
organised environments, and not just in instances of low institutionalism.47 Thirdly, Moffitt 
 
42 Peter Wiles, “A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism,” in Ghita 
Ionesco and Ernest Gellner, (eds.), Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 166-179. 
43 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 3. 
44 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 25. 
45 Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,” 
Comparative Politics 34, 1(2001), 14. 
46 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 20. 
47 Ibid.  
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raises the arduousness of defending this position in the face of the absence of stylistic and 
ideational components of populism.48 Lastly, an important stumbling block to this approach 
having universal appeal is that it offers no explanation of the referent of “the people”. It solely 
concentrates on the leader.49 
 
2.1.1.3 Discourse 
The approach that views populism as a discourse of “the people” against “the elite” or oligarchy 
has gained significant popularity recently. Moffitt describes this approach quite accurately: 
“Here, rather than being a feature of a set of political beliefs, populism is seen as a particular 
mode of political expression, usually evident in speech and text.” In contrast to the 
abovementioned approaches, this one sees populism as a constant state of fluctuation, it’s not 
an “either/or” situation, but rather a “more/less” situation.50  The strength of this approach lies 
in its gradational quality, and the importance of speech and rhetoric in populism; the message 
is, after all, often what the media reports on and what voters react to. Nonetheless, it still does 
not account for the performative and aesthetic elements of populism, which is notorious for 
attracting charismatic and controversial leaders.51 
 
2.1.1.4 Political style 
Mudde and Kaltwasser allude to the so-called “performance” aspect of populist parties.52 There 
is often an aversion to a political convention with “amateurish” and “unprofessional” behaviour 
present; often little regard is held for dress code or language manners and the leaders position 
themselves as different from the elite. They are courageous enough to stand up against the 
establishment and truly represent “the people”.  
 
Moffitt expands on this by citing “bad manners” as a key element, also referred to as a “tabloid” 
style of politics.53 Moffitt strongly argues that the stylistic approach is the most effective one, 
and even the ideational approach, which is to follow, is to “thin” and “empty”.54 He claims that 
 
48 Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 40. 
49 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 21. 
50 Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research 
Agenda,” Weatherhead Working Paper Series 13, (2013), 8.  
51 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 22. 
52 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 4. 
53 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 44. 
54 Ibid., 49. 
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rhetoric and style are often more important than substance in populism, and that style can affect 
and interact with content, drawing to the conclusion that we should not see this approach as 
superficial. However, defining a political approach exclusively based on the style and rhetoric 
alone, provides no account of the underlying concepts and issues, even if the style plays such 
a pivotal role in the approach.  
 
2.2 Populism as an ideology  
It is palpable that populism is predominantly seen as an ideology in the literature55, and its 
strength lies in its ability to transcend different political contexts, especially if the definition is 
succinct – not so minimalistic as to exclude certain case studies, but to be analytically useful 
in permitting differentiation.56 It has to, after all, converge the views and stances of Marine le 
Pen in France, Donald Trump in the USA, Hugo Chávez from Venezuela, and ultimately Julius 
Malema from South Africa.   
 
Mudde and Kaltwasser have been instrumental in this regard with their “thin-centred” 
definition, cited earlier in this chapter. Besides Mudde and Kaltwasser, other international 
researchers such as Stanley, Akkerman, and March have all adopted this approach, making it 
the most dominant approach in the field.57 
 
According to them, an ideology is “a body of normative ideas about the nature of man and 
society, as well as the organisation and purpose of society”.58 Examples of an ideology are 
socialism, nationalism, and liberalism and they map the political and social world to an extent 
that we can make sense of complex phenomena.59 Unlike “thick-centred ideologies”, a “thin-




55 Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 30. 
56 Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 30. 
57 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 18.  
58 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
59 Michael Freeden, Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2. 
60 Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” Political Studies 46, 4(1998), 750.  
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Mudde argues thin-centred ideologies such as populism do not offer specific views on political-
institutional and socio-economic issues the same way a full-scale ideology does.61 Populism is 
thus accompanied by a “host ideology”, such as socialism. In Nazi Germany, for example, 
populism was used in conjunction with nationalism; the two were interconnected, but the latter 
was the foundation on which the former was built. In South Africa, the EFF itself identifies 
with socialism62, even though opinion-shapers are arguing that they are leaning more towards 
fascists principles.63 For this research, the focus is not on the “host ideologies”, but on populism 
as a thin-centred ideology.  
 
Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that this allows populism to take on many different shapes, but 
the core principles always relate to a particular setting in a contingent manner that’s not based 
on if, but rather how. Simply put: The core principles will always be present, but how they will 
present themselves in a specific political climate is dependent on the localised environment.64 
 
The implication is that populism can be applied to a wide variety of situations, bearing the core 
concepts (“people”, “elite” and “general will”) in mind, as well as how they relate to other 
concepts within a particular concept.65 It can be seen as a “mental map” with which to interpret 
the political world and, simply stated, one could use this map to identify the core concepts, 
which coexists with many other ideologies.  
 
Moffitt argues that the thinness of this ideology makes it susceptible to lose conceptual validity 
and usefulness.66 He also points out that it implies a transitory phenomenon: it will either fail 
or transform into a full ideology, with the initial stages filled with “subtypes” of populism all 
reliant on full-body concepts closely aligned to the morphology of populism, but that would 
ultimately overshadow populism and become the dominant ideology. Whilst this might be the 
 
61 Cas Mudde, “Populism: An Ideational Approach,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 30. 
62 EFF Statement on Karl Marx’s Birthday, EFF Online, https://www.effonline.org/5-may-2016-eff-
statement-on-karl-marx (accessed 28 March 2018). 
 
63 Vishwas Satgar, The EFF’s wrecking ball politics is fascist rather than left, Mail and Guardian 
 https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-04-the-effs-wrecking-ball-politics-is-fascist-rather-than-left 
(accessed 28 March 2018). 
64 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
65 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 




case it is never a matter of “transforming” or “morphing” into the latter. Populism is still 
present; it is partly because of this thin-centred ideology that authoritarianism can thrive. It’s 
a parallel action, and not one of replacement, as Moffitt argues.  
 
Another critique against the ideational approach is that the scope is too prodigious and could 
subsequently apply to all political actors and situations, but Mudde and Kaltwasser’s rebuttal 
accentuate the existence of non-populism.67 Their definition includes what is to be defined and 
exclude everything else, and on this basis, they pose elitisms and pluralism as divergent views.  
Finally, Espejo reasons that this approach does not take a so-called “blind-spot” into account: 
“While Mudde’s definition is useful for distinguishing among party ideologies within settled 
electoral systems, it has a blind when dealing with popular mobilisations that lead to a 
constitutional crisis.”68 These mobilisations occur outside the established (legal) channels 
within a political system where a significant proportion of the population believes the 
government to be illegitimate, and faith in the institutions is lost. In such a situation, Espejo 
believes the movement would have to appeal to “the people” and express the general will to 
have a liberal democracy, hence there is no differentiation between populism and a liberal-
democratic movement.  
 
One can refute this reasoning by accentuating that Espejo assumes that populism and the fight 
for democracy share common components such as “the people” and “general will”, but how 
one defines these terms will determine whether it is populist or not. As will be discussed 
shortly, populists see “the people” in a particular way and define who belongs to that group; 
this is removed from the fight of a democratic movement whose definition would be far more 
inclusive.  
 
In light of these criticisms, it is probably apt to end off with the advantages of using an 
ideological approach, before discussing the use of the core concepts.  
 
Firstly, the thin-centred ideology goes accord with the pliability of populism in the real world 
where populism goes hand-in-hand with other ideologies such as nationalism, fascism, 
 
67 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 7. 
68 Paulina Espejo, “Power to whom? The People Between Procedure and Populism,” in Carlos de la 
Torre, The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global perspectives (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2015), 63.  
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socialism, and agrarianism.69 The utility of this approach lies with its practicality: One could 
recognise and identify the populism of Trump and Chávez with this thin-centred approach, 
whilst acknowledging nationalism and conservatism present in the former and socialism in the 
latter.  
 
There is also little discrimination in the type of mobilisation and leadership within the 
ideational approach. Populist leaders and organisations have come in various forms, from the 
more structured confinements of a Le Pen in France and Julius Malema in South Africa, to a 
more ground-up movement present in Latin America. They do, however, all claim to be the 
vox populi.70 
 
Important to the current research, an ideational approach allows us to account for both supply 
and demand-side arguments, whereas existing accounts focus exclusively on the supply-side: 
the style, rhetoric, and organisation of the political parties and leaders.71 Embracing a more 
holistic approach is comprehensive and takes more factors into account; it aims to explain the 
interaction between the supply and demand-side arguments and the vital role that both sides 
play in understanding the phenomenon. Moffitt is thus wrong to argue that populism is hollow 
and not well-developed.  
 
Despite the differences between the approaches to populism, there is consensus that it is 
essentially “the people” versus “the elite”. Barr underscores “us versus them” and states it is 
universally accepted in most discussions on populism.72 Other researchers such as Stanley, 
Akkerman, and March have all adopted this approach, making it the most dominant approach 







69 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 19. 
70 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 19. 
71 Ibid., 20. 
72 Robert Barr, “Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment Politics,” 31. 
73 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, 18. 
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Schematic representation of the ideational approach: 
 
 
2.2.1 The people 
The concept of “the people” is abstract and researchers such as Müller argue the construction 
of “the people” is ultimately a fictional exercise.74 Laclau embraced the vagueness of the term, 
pointing out that populism’s power lies within this nebulous construct: The capacity for the 
term to embrace different constituencies with variance in demands creates a shared identity 
that forms a large base for mobilisation.  
 
According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, virtually all manifestations of populism embraces at least 
one, if not all three, of the following concepts of “the people”: the people as sovereign, the 
common people, and people as the nation.75 The distinction between “the people” and “the 
elite” is still present in each interpretation, but in a different format: political power, 
socioeconomic status, and nationality respectively.  
 
2.2.1.1 The people as sovereign  
The first concept of the people as sovereign is firmly entrenched in the words of former US 
President Abraham Lincoln: “a government of the people, by the people and for the people”. 
It is in direct opposition to Plato’s aristocracy and the notion is closely linked to the French 
Revolution where the aim was to set up a democratic order. Even though the people are in 
charge, they elect leaders to represent them; these are the ones with political power, but there 
 
74 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, 19-20. 






are a stern warning and implication: The ultimate source of power in a democracy lies with the 
people and in populist terms, if they feel their representatives are not succeeding in fulfilling 
their demands, the struggle begins to “give the government back to the people”.76 In South 
Africa the EFF has repeatedly evoked the Freedom Charter’s call for the people to govern and 
that  no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people.”77 
 
2.2.1.2 The people as a group that is forgotten  
Mudde and Kaltwasser’s second manifestation of “the people” is often cited in the literature, 
with the cornerstone being economic status and specific cultural traditions meshed to form the 
group.78 Populist leaders and parties latch onto the markers considered “inferior” by the 
dominant culture; they focus on those who are excluded due to their socioeconomic and 
sociocultural status. In the USA Trump focussed on the forgotten coal miners, the ones who 
were excluded from an economy that was turning towards clean energy. In Argentina Perón 
spoke to marginalised groups, the so-called “shirtless ones” (descamisados) or “blackheads” 
(cabecitas negras); and in South Africa Malema proclaims he is for the black South Africans 
whose “humanity has been taken away by an evil system of capitalism that produces racism. 
Blacks are not human. Blacks are subhuman.”79 
 
This meaning of the people aims to mobilise and unite the “angry”, “forgotten” and “silenced” 
against the common enemy, the elite. A critique and distrust of organisations, parties, and 
institutions accompany this notion, hence there is a distrust of and attack on traditional media, 
as we have seen in the USA and South Africa.80 
 
2.2.1.3 The people as a nation 
The last interpretation of “the people” refers to the national community of a political context, 
but it is more convoluted than simply regarding the population living within a particular region 
 
76 Ibid., 10. 
77 The Freedom Charter, SA History, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/freedom-charter (accessed 
28 March 2018). 
78 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 10. 
79 Nico Gous, Black people do not have human rights: Malema, Times Live, 
https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-21-black-people-do-not-have-human-rights-malema 
(accessed 28 March 2018).  
80 SA editors' forum condemns Malema's 'inflammatory' attack on eNCA, eNCA, 
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/sa-editors-forum-condemns-malemas-inflammatory-attack-on-
enca (accessed 28 March 2018). 
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as “the people”. The parameters of the latter are determined in certain civic or ethnic terms, 
even when it seems to be a collective.81 For example “the people of France” according to a 
populist leader such as Le Pen is not simply people living in the country but excludes legal 
immigrants, refugees, and those who came to the country to “steal” the jobs of the ordinary, 
hard-working French citizens. In South Africa Malema has repeatedly referred to black people 
as the only true citizens and emphasising that the country is not the home of white people.82 
 
2.2.1.4 Tying all three together 
In all three of these constructions of “the people”, argues Müller, there is a core claim of 
populism: Only some of the people are really the people. For instance, in the Brexit vote in the 
UK populist Nigel Farage claimed it was a “victory for real people”, but that implies the 48% 
of the British electorate who voted to stay in the European Union are less “real”.83 The same 
goes for the EFF, as can be seen in the above example.  
 
So, what separates populism from an ordinary appeal to the people? Is it necessarily when one 
criticises the elite? Müller argues that these two factors are not sufficient; populist leaders claim 
that a part of the people is the people and that only the populist party or movement represents 
the true people.84 Fighting for the plight of “the people” is not populism per se but fighting for 
a section of the people and only legitimising them as true people, is a sign of populism.  
 
2.2.2 The elite 
Less has been written about “the elite” than “the people”, but Mudde and Kaltwasser argue the 
former is presented as homogeneous; they are the corrupt elite who is against the prosperity of 
the people, and in essence, most populists definitions of “the elite” hinges on a moral 
evaluation, as mentioned with “the people”.85  
 
 
81 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 11.  
82 We welcome white people, even though it's not their home – Malema, Politicsweb, 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/we-welcome-white-people-even-though-its-not-
their- (accessed 28 March 2018).  
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2.2.2.1 The elite’s power is for their benefit 
It’s not just the political establishment who is considered morally bankrupt, but also the 
economic, cultural, and media elite. The variation is that perceived power is not important, but 
the notion that the power is exclusive and to the benefit of the few is a central concept.86 This 
excludes those in power who are sympathetic to the cause of the populist, and obviously, it also 
precludes the populist with power – they are after all not there for their own benefit, but to 
represent the will of the people. This is why it is acceptable for the billionaire Trump to have 
a cabinet full of billionaires, and why alternative news sources such as Breitbart and Fox News 
are not viewed in the same antagonistic way as, for example, CNN or The New York Times.  To 
the same token Malema has said his own lavish lifestyle does not bother his supporters.87 
 
Populists can also redefine “the elite” once they are in power because the qualifiers for “the 
elite” are not situational in nature, but rather moralistic.88 Former Slovak Premier Vladimir 
Meciar and Chávez from Venezuela both continued their attack on the elite, even when they 
were in power, claiming sinister outside forces were still holding a grip on the people and 
positioned them as illegitimate powers.  
 
It would be a misconception that populists are necessarily anti-elitist per se, especially when 
they are part of the elite.89 The distinction here would be that they are the “proper” elite who 
will not betray the trust of the people.  
 
2.2.2.2 The elite are not “real politicians”  
History is filled with examples of populist leaders claiming the system is against them, or 
“rigged”. Consider Victor Orbán who lost the Hungarian elections and claimed, “the nation 
cannot be in opposition”, the Tea Party claiming the president (who with empirical evidence 
won most of the votes) is “governing against the majority”, or Geert Wilders from the 
Netherlands calling the Dutch parliament “fake” with “fake politicians”90. 
 
 
86 Ibid., 12. 
87 Malema: My money is nobody's business, News24, 
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2.2.2.3 The elite is part of the faulty system 
Populist parties often present the elite as being representative of a faulty system. The 
implication is that the system allows the elite to maintain their privileged positions. For 
instance, both right-wing and left-wing populists can relate to a vague socialist element: an 
attempt to move beyond classes, to do away with the current connection between the political 
and economic elite. This is not necessarily anti-capitalist; they just believe capitalism in its 
current form (thus the system) is benefiting the few to the disadvantage of the many.  
 
In the current system, the elite is being constructed as working against the economic interests 
of the country. In Germany, the opposition party Alternative for Germany (AFD) is accusing 
government (the establishment) of putting EU interests above those of Germany and in Latin 
America populists have a long history of accusing the elite of siding with the interest of the 
United States above those of the individual countries.  
 
Müller agrees with this sentiment and claims that populism can often be aligned with a form 
of a system of “producerism”; the pure people are hardworking, and the corrupt elite does 
minimal work only when it benefits their interests (linking to the previous concept).91 Malema 
has even called out black billionaires Patrice Motsepe and Cyril Ramaphosa for “selling out 
their black skin” out of self-interest.92 
 
2.2.2.4 The elite as foreign  
Finally, Mudde and Kaltwasser are of opinion that the elites are often not just seen as 
representing foreign power, they are considered to be foreign themselves.  
 
This stance is more prevalent in Latin America as seen in the case of Bolivia where president 
Evo Morales made a distinction between “pure” people and the corrupt “European” elites. This 
approach was also evident in Nazi Germany where the ruling party viewed Jews to not only 
steal the jobs of ordinary Germans but to also be foreign, a race that is not pure and does not 
belong in Germany.  
 
 
91 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, 23. 
92 Marvin Meintjies, Motsepe, Ramaphosa "sold their black skin" to become rich: Malema, Times 
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Resnick argues that Malema and the EFF have equated “the elite” with white people (a racial 
interpretation).93 “Even highly competent white South Africans with liberation credentials have 
been criticised by [Malema] for bureaucratic positions that should have instead gone to ‘an 
African child’.” Even the predominantly black leadership of the ANC is seen as representatives 
of the “white monopoly capitalism”, thus making them part of “the elite”.94 
 
In South Africa white people are thus viewed to be foreign by the EFF (as we have seen earlier), 
but in this regard, reference is not made to black people who are grouped with the elite.  
 
2.2.3 The general will 
The last core concept of populism highlights the relevance of the general will. Philosopher 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work can shed light on this concept. He postulated a difference 
between the general will (volonté générale) and the will of all (volonté de tous), with the former 
referring to the general and common interest of a group of people and the latter denotes the 
simple sum of particular interests. Many populists employ Rousseau’s concept of the general 
will, claiming a representative government is aristocratic in nature and the people are treated 
like passive entities.95  
 
2.2.3.1 Symbolic representation  
The difference, however, between Rousseau’s concept of the general will and the populist’ 
conception of it, is that the former requires participation by the people and the latter conjures 
up the identity of the real people, hence making it a symbolic representation.96 Both populist 
representation and democratic representation make moral claims, but the latter’s claims can be 
empirically verified; the populist leader will persist even after being disproven. In the USA for 
example, Donald Trump persists with his argument that illegal immigrants voted for his 
opponent without any concrete evidence.  
 
 
93 Daniele Resnick, “Populism in Africa” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and 
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In South Africa Malema has made many accusations such as the one that all private schools 
with white people are racist.97 He also claimed that the 2014 election was rigged and that the 
ANC had lost in Johannesburg and all of Gauteng.98 There’s simply no empirical evidence for 
these claims, but Malema has repeated similar claims on several occasions.  
 
Political theorist Nancy Rosenblum’s concept of “holism” is firmly within the realm of 
populism, argues Müller: It is possible for the people to be one and all of them can have one 
true representative.99 Another aspect of populism enshrined in this notion comes to the fore – 
it is essentially anti-pluralism and based on a pars pro toto argument.  
 
2.2.3.2 Common sense 
Instead of the rational, evidence-based process that is entrenched in democracy, populism often 
employs “common sense”: “By appealing to the general will of the people, populism enacts a 
specific logic of articulation, which enables the formation of a popular subject with a strong 
identity (‘the people’) which is able to challenge the status quo (‘the people’).”100 From this 
perspective, populism is seen as a means to give power to those who feel left out; the people 
who are not considered part of the elite. Furthermore, if it is presented as common sense, it 
makes opposing it much more difficult. Who would want to argue with the “common sense” 
of the general will of the people?  
 
2.2.3.3 Not against representation 
It is imperative to note that populists are not against representation; they are just endorsing a 
particular version. As long as they are in power, the representation is fair and just and to the 
benefit of the people.101 This may seem like they espouse a democratic representation, but in 
essence, it is a symbolic representation of the “real” people, and if it fails at the polls it is often 
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not because their message did not resonate with the majority, but the majority has not yet dared 
to speak out.102 
 
Müller described this representation as “meta-political illusion”.103 Firstly, a truly democratic 
government realises it is there to serve all the people of the country, not just constituents. 
Secondly, even the whole people constantly change; people are born, people die, people change 
their views and opinions, etc. The completely coherent, singular “popular will” is thus a 
fantasy, one that a populist leader will not acknowledge. Instead, they often employ referenda 
(such as Brexit) that allows for once-off participation. Continuous participation is a cornerstone 
of democracy and a danger to a populist party or movement as it implies that “the people” can 
change its mind and stance on issues.104 
 
2.3 Causes of populism  
The electoral successes of populist parties are open to a multitude of reasons and 
interpretations. It’s often impossible to provide a singular cause when there are so many factors 
at play. The degree of importance of a specific facet might differ in various political contexts, 
but the success of a populist party can never be singular in origin. Inglehart and Norris argue 
all the possible explanations can be divided into three broad categories: the electoral rules, 
supply-side arguments, and demand-side arguments.105 Mudde groups the first two together as 
the “internal supply-side” and the “external supply-side”, but in essence, the concepts refer to 
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Schematic representation of the causes of populism: 
 
 
In this chapter, a brief overview will be given of the three arguments and how each one can be 
seen as a legitimate cause of populism. Since this research focusses on anti-establishment (a 
supply-side argument) and economic inequality and a cultural backlash (both demand-side 
arguments), these concepts will receive attention in this analysis. The theory will then form the 
underpinning of the practical analysis of the South African context, which is to follow in the 
next few chapters.  
 
2.3.1 Electoral structures  
Democracy is often thought of as an unambiguous phenomenon, but in reality, there are many 
forms of democracy.107 One just has to compare South Africa and the United States to see the 
stark comparison: The latter has an electoral college system, whereas we use the popular vote, 
but both are seen as a legitimate form of democracy. If the USA changed its system to align 
with ours prior to the 2016 presidential election and voters cast their ballots similarly to what 
it was, Hillary Clinton would probably have been president. This simple, but practical example 
illustrates how the rules of the electoral process can help or hurt a populist candidate.  
 
107 Andrew Heywood, Politics (Cape Town: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 93. 
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Norris outlines these structural changes, saying: “Electoral laws and regulations structure 
opportunities for party competition within each country. Far from being neutral, these can 
provide formidable constitutional, legal and administrative barriers . . .”108 Factors that are at 
play include those in the nomination stage, the campaign stage, and the election stage.  
 
During the nomination stage party registration fees or deposits, as well as a requirement to get 
a certain number of signatures. Some countries also have legal bans on extremist organisations 
that advocated violence or use terrorist tactics.  
 
Furthermore, minor parties, which are most often the case with populist parties initially, tend 
to perform better in egalitarian conditions of party competition where there is equal access to 
direct public funding and open media attention.109 In contexts where public resources (both 
financial and material such as media airtime) are more tightly controlled and manipulated to 
favour the dominant parties, populist parties are less like to breakthrough.  
 
The effective vote threshold is often imperative to the electoral success of populist parties (as 
mentioned above in the case of the USA). Proportional representation has been linked to radical 
parties’ success, especially where the electorate is grouped into electoral units or 
constituencies.110  
 
2.3.2 Supply-side arguments  
Traditionally, the supply-side arguments have been the focus of theoretical explanations of 
political populism. These are reasons that focus on the political party and its leader and how 
they exploit the socio-economic and cultural issues in society.111 Berman shares this sentiment 
and says populist parties should not be seen as “hapless victims of their economic or 
demographic environments but as . . . the active shapers of their fates”.112 
 
It is within this paradigm that theorists have argued that leaders and parties play an important 
part in their electoral success. Factors that encompass the supply side include leadership, party 
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organisation, and the positioning of an ideological stance. The latter encapsulates the anti-
establishment stance, which will be discussed in detail. 
 
2.3.2.1 Leadership 
The impact of leaders’ personalities and how it translates into voting, has long been a focus for 
some political analysts. King notes that the impact of personalities “will be the greatest when 
voter’s emotional ties to parties are their weakest . . . and when voters can discern few other 
grounds – whether grounds of performance or policy”.113 The current research on populism 
acknowledges the presence of these circumstances and emphasises the charisma as a pertinent 
characteristic of a populist leader.114 
 
Mudde argues that this charisma is often paramount in the breakthrough phase, whilst 
organisational structures (discussed below) are more important for persistence.115 Research 
also points out that charismatic leaders almost always have polarising personalities “because 
the symbolic logic of charisma hangs upon binary coding and salvation narratives”.116 This 
means voters are either in favour of or against their stances and some commentators have noted 
that this can be seen as “refreshing” within a political context – they are unapologetically not 
looking for the favour of all the people.  
 
Using “charisma” as a cause of populism does pose a conceptual problem, however. What is 
considered “charismatic”, and who decides what constitutes charisma? Van der Brug et al 
refers to the “inherent tautological nature” of the concept, but others argue it should not be 
viewed in absolute terms.117 Charisma is not a definite list of characteristics, but rather how an 
electorate receives and perceives a certain leader. Eatwell refers to this as the “charismatic 
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bond”; it all depends on political culture and how susceptible that culture is being influenced 
by what they perceive to be a charismatic leader.118 
 
Besides being charismatic, other aspects of a leader that could appeal to a constituency are bad 
manners (which includes theatricality) and a sense of extraordinariness.119 Moffitt explains that 
coarse discourse is an essential part of populist rhetoric and that sets you apart; you are not 
simply another politician part of the decorum of the establishment.120 The political style 
approach (discussed earlier in this chapter) is pertinent to this aspect of leadership.  
 
The term “bad manners” often refers to the language used by populists, but can also refer to 
political incorrectness, the use of slang and self-presentation (even in fashion) that goes against 
the “usual practices of respectable politics”.121 Populists present themselves as “closer to the 
people” because they don’t use the formal language of other politicians; the implication being 
they are “telling it like it is” versus establishment politicians who are restrained and formal in 
their approach. 
 
Mbete’s research is paramount to understanding this aspect of supply-side arguments within 
the South African context. The EFF was formed out of a crisis after Malema was expelled from 
the ruling ANC Youth League.122 The Marikana massacre, anti-government protests spurring 
up across the country, the Nkandla saga, and the capturing of the state by the Gupta family 
were all crisis’s that the EFF (and indeed other opposition parties) has latched unto. The EFF’s 
disdain for Parliamentary decorum and their theatricality is indicative of their “bad 
manners”.123 
 
Populists often expand this view and portray themselves as the embodiment of perfection, 
sometimes quite literally. They present themselves as tough, daring, and decisive; Ostiguy even 
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refers to them as metaphorically having “big balls”.124 Abdalá Bucaram from Ecuador has even 
referred to his opponent’s “watery sperm” and Chávez has made crude sexual jokes about 
former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.  
 
2.3.2.2 Party organisation 
The enigma of a charismatic leader may be important for electoral performance, but Mudde 
argues the internal leadership and party organisation is the other side of the coin that analysts 
often neglect.125 He suggests that party organisation is vital to populist parties, not to the 
formation, but rather the sustainability and persistence of the parties.126 Carter, however, 
believes party organisation is crucial to the electoral success of populist parties, and not merely 
the continuation and long-term prospects.127 Albeit a difference of opinion on the role of party 
organisation, there is a consensus about the aspects that constitute party organisation, of which 
three of the main ones will henceforth be discussed.  
 
Firstly, Eatwell distinguishes between “centripetal charisma” and “coterie charisma”, with the 
former referring to the appeal of the leader to the electorate and the latter emphasising the 
“leader’s appeal to an inner core”.128 This can prevent factions from splitting the party and it 
can keep members disciplined.  
 
Secondly, populist parties tend to have a minimalistic organisational structure with few 
members whose roles are hierarchical and centred around the charismatic leader.129 This is, 
however not always the case as parties are often distrustful of academics and making their 
internal workings public is sometimes not an option. 
 
Thirdly, Segert notes that populist parties often employ the principle of “democratic 
centralism”, with a strong authoritarian and centralist structure.130 Some parties do not even 
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pretend to uphold democratic values and let go of the façade completely, whilst others (perhaps 
required by the laws governing the registration of political parties, such as in Germany) have a 
relatively democratic constitution. Even though this is not a universal truth, many of these 
parties have little transparency and democratic values entrenched in the practical running of 
the party.  
 
2.3.2.3 Ideology  
Most scholars refer to the ideological stance of a populist party and how they frame or present 
that to voters as the key factor in achieving electoral success.131 As mentioned in previous 
chapters, populists position themselves against the mainstream or established politics of the 
day. This anti-establishment stance is a key supply-side factor that will be discussed below.  
 
2.4 Anti-establishment  
As mentioned previously, populists position themselves as against mainstream or established 
politics of the day, to advance the interests of previously excluded or alienated sectors.132 As 
mentioned before, the theories from Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr, and Hartleb will be 
consolidated to form a coherent theory of anti-establishment within the EFF.  The detail of this 
theory will be discussed below and will be applied in chapter four. 
 
• Mudde and Kaltwasser’s ideational approach will be applied throughout the study, 
especially concerning the anti-establishment argument. Within this framework “the 
people” are pitted against “the elite”, thus creating an anti-establishment stance.  
• Barr’s concepts of the “outsider” or “maverick” breaking away from the establishment, 
lends further interpretation to anti-establishment sentiment. A so-called “crisis of 
representation” is present if the ruling party’s (establishment) actions lead to a breaking 
down of linkages with voters, creating an anti-establishment stance. This will be 
explained in more detail in chapter four.  
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• Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment party are also very useful and he 
describes traits that are common amongst anti-establishment parties. In chapter four it 
will be explained fully and applied to the local setting.  
 
2.4.1 Ideational approach: Mudde and Kaltwasser 
Roberts rightfully points out that almost all conceptions of populism encapsulate some aspect 
of this antipathy towards the establishment, in essence pitting “the people” against “the elite”. 
 
This space is often created by die failure of established parties to effectively address the 
concerns of certain voters. As Roberts put it: “Populism thrives where mainstream parties are 
in crisis, or at least where they exclude or ignore major currents of opinion that are denied 
institutionalised channels of expression.”133  
 
Mudde and Kaltwasser’s work on the ideational approach is essential in this discussion and the 
three interpretations of “the people” and the four of “the elite” that have been discussed earlier 
in this chapter forms the backbone of this section. It would be redundant to repeat the argument 
of “the people” versus “the elite” when it was addressed a few pages ago, but it does indicate 
one important element: Anti-establishment is such a strong element of populism that it is 
encapsulated in the very definition of the phenomenon.  This also contributes to the 
development of the new theoretical framework for anti-establishment. Previously, the elements 
of the ideational approach were not incorporated as functionally into anti-establishment theory, 
but this research does exactly that and thus contributes to the current literature.  
 
It should however be accentuated that it’s not just a push against established political parties 
(although it nearly always includes them), but also the so-called extensions of the parties, for 
example, public institutions, the private sector, the cultural elite, etc. In South Africa the 
scenario is often in the form of an inverse: The ruling establishment (ANC) is seen as an 
extension of the white, capitalist, imperialistic minority.  
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Before we continue attempting to identify anti-establishment as a cause for populism, it’s 
perhaps sagacious to briefly pause and interrogate the definitions of concepts such as 
“outsiders” and “anti-establishment”. 
 
2.4.2 Outsiders versus mavericks: Barr 
Barr emphasises the rise of populism within “contexts of high public discontent”, but also 
explains a more nuanced version of the so-called outsider status.134 He considers an “outsider” 
as someone truly independent; someone who emerged from outside the establishment and 
enters the space to create an alternative.  
 
Novelty is not a requirement for the status of “outsider”, one can be on the periphery of the 
system for a very long time – so long as you are not considered to be part of the nation’s 
“effective” parties.135 The problem with this conceptualisation lies within the definition of 
“effective”.  Would this amount to voter percentage, or steering the national conversation? 
Often populist parties receive a relatively small percentage of the vote (8.3% of the vote for 
the EFF in the 2016 Local Government Elections) but can be very effective in policies and the 
conversation (petitioning against Jacob Zuma and standing in the epicentre of the “land 
expropriation without compensation” debate).136 
 
Barr henceforth introduces a new category, called a “maverick”. This is someone, like Julius 
Malema, who was previously part of the establishment but has since broken away.137 It is also 
important, argues Barr, to differentiate between “anti-establishment” and “anti-politics”. He 
considers the latter to be a challenge to the political system as a whole; the crisis of 
representation is not caused by the establishment, but by the system through which they rule.138  
 
Anti-establishment appeals can be labelled as “semi-loyal” opposition.139 These outsiders or 
mavericks advocate for the dismantling of the status quo, but not of the political system of 
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democracy per se. They might offer alterations and eventually edge towards authoritarianism 
(such as in Venezuela), but their presentations are to give the power back to the people; thus 
keeping the system intact. The EFF, for instance, do not advocate for the fall of democracy, 
but rather a different version of it where the state controls the resources; the people still elect a 
government.  
 
2.4.3 Breaking down linkages: Barr 
The next logical step would be to dissect the “crisis of representation” that would allow 
outsiders and mavericks to appeal to these voters. Lawson refers to the relationship between 
political actors and constitutes a linkage.140 What would cause the linkage to essentially break 
down?  
 
Lawson, and subsequently Barr, identifies four different linkages: clientelistic (the exchange 
of material benefits for support), directive (selective benefits to a targeted group), participatory 
(supporters play a role in government) and electoral (only exchange during specific points in 
time, such as during elections).141 
 
Whereas a breakdown in these linkages can alienate citizens, it’s not holistic. Not providing 
social grants (clientelistic) or tax cuts for the rich (directive) might cause the citizens to relocate 
to the populist organisations, but linkages are not always a direct quid pro quo relationship. 
Many voters never interact with the government in a meaningful way but are still supporters 
of the establishment.  
 
A fifth linkage, representational, can thus be introduced. This is an extended version of the 
participatory linkage but without direct interaction. Many citizens only interact during 
elections, but this does not mean that they are not symbolically invested throughout the tenure 
of an established party. They still want their interest to be represented – they expect their 
limited participation to last, not just when they are interacting, but also during the times when 
they are not interacting.  
 
 
140 Kay Lawson, “Political Parties and Linkage” in Kay Lawson, (ed.), Political Parties and Linkage: A 
Comparative Perspective (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980), 5.  
141 Kay Lawson, “When Linkage Fails” in Kayeter Merkl and P, (ed.), When Parties Fail: Emerging 
Alternative Organisation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 35.  
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This brings us to the research of Roberts who suggests performance failures on the part of the 
establishment is a key factor in migrating support towards populist parties.142 Many other 
researchers such as Mudde and Kaltwasser, Halkjelsvik and Moffitt also agree on this 
approach, albeit in different varieties.143 
 
Citizens are more likely to have confidence in, and maintain linkages to the establishment, if 
their perception of the ruling party is positive. If they feel their interests are being represented 
and that government is effective, responsible and capable, voters will likely have a strong 
linkage with the establishment.144 These linkages break down in times of crisis, whether it be 
systemic corruption, prolonged economic hardships or a generally-perceived incompetent 
leadership. These performance failures create political capital for populist parties who can 
appeal to the plethora of disconnected and alienated voters. In Venezuela, it was corrupt 
politicians who squandered the country’s oil wealth and in South Africa systemic corruption 
within the ANC with special emphasis on its then-President Jacob Zuma alienated many voters 
from the ruling party.  
 
In chapter four it will be argued how the breaking down of linkages with the establishment can 
be traced to six specific events: 
 
1. Declining voter support for the ANC  
2. Firing of Nene 
3. Nkandla 
4. Corruption charges against Zuma  
5. Marikana  
6. Protest action 
 
 
142 Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 292. 
143 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 99.; Albertine 
Halkjelsvik, “From Anti-establishment Social Movement to Successful Political Party Following the 
Emergence of the Five Star Movement in Italy, Thesis for Master’s Degree at University of Bergen, 
(2016), 26; Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and 
Representation, 119-121. 
144 Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 292. 
41 
 
2.4.4 Characteristics of anti-establishment party: Hartleb 
The failure of the establishment to govern effectively and represent the interest of the people 
might cause a crisis of representation and thus an anti-establishment sentiment amongst voters, 
but the process is more dynamic than the linkage between the ruling party and voters 
weakening. Populist parties don’t apathetically wait for the disconnection and the subsequent 
convergence to them; they actively promote the anti-establishment stance, sometimes to such 
a degree that it might even be stronger than the effect of the weak performance of the 
government on voters. Simply put: Without populist parties and organisations using an anti-
establishment strategy, many voters would become despondent and either vote for another 
mainstream party or opt-out of the democratic process.  
 
It is thus imperative to an analysis of anti-establishment to realise that the supply-side is not a 
unipolar process; populism can rise amongst the electorate both due to the mainstream parties 
and the populist parties.  
 
How would a populist party utilise the ineffectiveness of government? What would the anti-
establishment characteristics of a populist party be? Take note, the degree of the ineffectiveness 
of government is not always relevant, although the greater the ineffectiveness, the more likely 
it is to garner support for a populist party.  
 
Hartleb argues populist parties are more often defined by what they are not than what they 
are.145 He proposes that the following are characteristic of a party’s anti-establishment stance:  
 
1. the construction of “the people” as homogenous and a front-line against the political, 
cultural and economic elites; 
2. an image of being the so-called underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like the 
people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media); 
3. a claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable 
establishment);  
4. the simplification or trivialisation of issues that are often more complex than relates to 
the establishment; 
 
145 Florian Hartleb, “Here to stay: Anti-establishment parties in Europe”, 41. 
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5. often a claim to represent the “silent majority”, the people who input are stifled by the 
establishment; 
6. the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues – “we are exactly the 
opposite of the establishment” notion; and 
7. aggression towards political adversaries (“the establishment uses consensus and proper 
channels, but that is not effective”).  
 
Hartleb adds that anti-establishment parties often form fairly quickly, and often without solid 
leadership structures in place.146 Their representatives on the ground have not undergone 
proper training, resulting in the parties being enveloped in a scandal. When the media exposes 
these scandals, it often strengthens the party’s position as an outsider – the media is seen as 
being in cahoots with the establishment, thus not treating the populist party fairly.  
 
In chapter four evidence will be presented as to how, the EFF in South Africa fits the criteria 
of an anti-establishment, populist party. In many respects, they fit the mould of Hartleb's 
theoretical perspective.  
 
2.5 Demand-side factors 
Populist parties can devise and implement many ways to gain support, but in many cases, 
developments in the mass electorate must facilitate this populist rhetoric and strategies. Mudde 
refers to it as “the perfect breeding ground”147 and Norris argues that the right circumstances 
must be present to fuel the popularity of populists.148 In essence, demand-side factors are those 
events and change happening and taking place in society that would allow the populist message 
to resonate with voters. Mudde divides the demand-side into three categories:  
 
• macro-level explanations (including economic inequality and a cultural backlash);  
• meso-level explanations; and  
• micro-level explanations. 
 
 
146 Ibid., 45. 
147 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 201. 
148 Pippa Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 129. 
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2.5.1 Macro-level explanations  
Nedelcu explains that structural or macro-level arguments are “among the most powerful 
demand-side explanations” and they refer to broad economic, social and historical processes 
which take place at the global or national level.149  
 
Mudde argues that modernisation, the presence of a crisis, an authoritarian legacy, economic 
inequality and a cultural backlash are all plausible macro-level arguments that have yielded 
empirical results after being applied to various political contexts.150  
 
In almost all prominent studies of developed countries modernisation is directly linked to the 
rise of populist parties, which are generally opponents of the process.151 Norris argues that 
populist supporters are perceived as the “losers of modernisation”; they low-skilled, low-wage 
casual workers with minimal job security and are “forgotten” in the process of 
modernisation.152 Mudde, however, is not convinced that the modernisation-thesis is a valid 
explanation: “How does the macro-level process of modernisation exactly lead to the micro-
level action of voting for a populist party?”153 
 
The underlying argument of the crisis thesis is that a “crisis” on the macro-level leads to 
populist support, but many authors have vague interpretations of what constitutes a “crisis”.154 
Most accounts focus on an economic crisis, but a refugee or political crisis can also be present.  
 
2.5.1.1 Economic inequality  
Economic inequality is perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism, 
Inglehart and Norris argue.155 Globally, the economic inequalities perspective has mostly been 
applied to developed countries where industrialisation has reshaped the workforce and resulted 
in greater income inequality, especially in conjunction with the rise of the knowledge economy. 
 
149 Harry Nedelcu, “Anti-establishment Radical Parties in 21st Century Europe,” 99. 
150 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 202. 
151 Harry Nedelcu, “Anti-establishment Radical Parties in 21st Century Europe,” 99. 
152 Pippa Norris, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, 132. 
153 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 203. 
154 Ibid., 205. 
155 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 2. 
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In the 2016 election in the USA, the economically marginalised, coupled with the decline in 
industries such as coal and manufacturing, has partially led to populist support for Trump.156 
 
2.5.1.1.1 International context 
The argument, however, is not confined to post-industrialised, wealthy societies; in Venezuela, 
the politicisation of the inequality in the social and economic spheres has led to populist support 
for Hugo Chávez. Falling oil prices and ever-increasing public debt, has undoubtedly trickled 
down to the lives of citizens with 50.4% living below the poverty line in 1998.157 In Western 
countries, the origins of these inequalities often occur as a result of globalisation, but there is 
by no means an exclusive causality to this argument. In Greece, for example, the global 
financial crisis created unprecedented unemployment in the country which rose to 25% in 2015 
when the populist party Syriza was voted into government.158  
 
2.5.1.1.2 Local context 
There is ample research to illustrate the inordinate economic inequalities in South Africa, 
which can be directly linked to the “separate development” policy of apartheid. For instance. 
figures from Statistics South Africa's states that during the quarter of October to November 
2017, the national level of unemployment stood at 26.7%.159 An estimated 30% of the black 
workforce was unemployed, but actively looking for a job, compared to just 6.7% of the white 
workforce. Recent data from the World Bank shows that South Africa is the most unequal 
society in the world with the top 1% of South Africans that own 70.9% of the country’s wealth 




156 Ibid., 1 
157 Kevin Voigt, Chavez leaves Venezuelan economy more equal, less stable, CNN, 
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26 March 2018).  
158 Jon Stone, Syriza: Everything you need to know about Greece’s new Marxist governing party, 
Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/syriza-everything-you-need-to-
know-about-greece-s-new-marxist-governing-party-10002197.html (accessed on 26 March 2018). 
159 Quarterly Labour Force Survey – QLFS Q4:2017, Stats SA, http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10884 
(accessed on 26 March 2018).  
160 Fiscal policy, poverty and redistribution in South Africa, World Bank, 
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Schematic representation of economic inequality 
 
 
The present research will argue that the above-mentioned scenario of our socioeconomic 
context can be understood within the economic inequality thesis. The origins of our economic 
inequality are expectedly different from, say Venezuela, but the argument does not require a 
singular cause to be applicable. As has been proven in the cases of diverse nations such as the 
USA and Venezuela, the presence of the resulting economic inequality can be the fertile ground 
for populism to grow in society.  
 
2.5.1.1.3 Applicable theory: Inglehart and Norris  
 In 1960, one of the fathers of political sociology Seymour Lipset argued that the appeal of 
fascism in Weimar Germany could be ascribed to an authoritarian reaction to the economic 
hardships of modernity.161 He described how small entrepreneurs, merchants, shopkeepers, 
manufacturers and small-scale farmers were pushed aside by industrialisation and suffered 
economically, giving rise to extremist movements. 
 
161 Seymour Lipset, “Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics” in Daniel Bell, (Ed.), The Radical Right 




Reverberating and refining this original argument, Inglehart and Norris have expanded the 
range showing that populism often resonates with the “low-skilled, blue-collar underclass”.162 
Those with little or no income are susceptible to populist policies and rhetoric, and even the 
employed with minimal job security often support populist parties. These people are also more 
vulnerable to social risks and very often depend on welfare from the state.  
 
Whilst these conditions are appalling at the best of times, it’s not sufficient to comprise the 
economic inequality argument; there must be a stark comparison between the so-called 
“winners” and “losers” of the economy.163 Some part of the society must be perceived as the 
“economic haves” and some part as the “economic have-nots”. There is an in-group solidarity 
present amongst the former, making the latter feel like outsiders.164 
 
Betz suggests that the economically marginalised often blame ethnic minorities and migrant 
populations for their dismal conditions.165 The underlying sentiment is one of resentment; a 
‘they are the reason why we don’t have jobs or adequate welfare services’ approach is often 
followed. This fuels a cultural backlash, which will be explained in chapter six.  
 
This also implies an inadequate response from established parties to alleviate socio-economic 
hardships.166 They are not just seen as perpetuating the problem by not acting decisively, but 
significant in being the problem. The “elites” are equated to the “haves”, and it is often seen as 
a singular cause of economic inequality; contextual circumstances are left out of the picture in 
this antagonistic, inimical and unmodulated approach. In essence, supporters of populist parties 
have lost faith in mainstream parties to adequately and effectively respond to the mounting 
economic crisis.  
 
 
162 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 10. 
163 Simon Bornschier, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western 
Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 35.  
164 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 11. 
165 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe, 40. 
166 Kirk Hawkins, Madeleine Read and Teun Pauwels, in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 350. 
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2.5.1.1.3.1 Evidence in local context 
What evidence would support this argument in a particular context such as South Africa? 
Inglehart and Norris argue the support for populist parties (in our case mostly the EFF) would 
be “concentrated among the economically marginalised sectors”; they would be considered 
“losers” in the economy.167 Generally, unskilled workers, the unemployed, and those lacking 
tertiary education will support populist parties. Households with few material gains (such as 
housing and transport) are also more likely to support a party such as the EFF. Antithetically, 
the “elite” minority will generally be employed, earn significantly more, are more educated 
and have the necessary resources in their households. 
 
As mentioned before there are many indicators of inequality and this dissertation will focus on 
income, race, unemployment, education and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, 
internet). Each one’s manifestation within the local context will be addressed below, and how 
it is likely to relate to populist support.  
 
1. income (international theory shows those will less income are likely to support a 
populist party such as the EFF) 
2. race (in the USA white people are more likely to support a populist party, but in SA it 
will be shown that is overwhelmingly black people who support the EFF) 
3. unemployment (supporters of a populist party are more likely to unemployed, similar 
to EFF supporters) 
4. education (international theory also shows that those who are less educated are more 
likely to support a populist party such as the EFF)  
5. resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet) (supporters of populist parties 
such as the EFF have generally fewer resources) 
 
2.5.1.1.4 Criticism of economic inequality theory 
It should be noted that scholars such as Mudde and Thieme are sceptical of exclusively using 
the economic inequality thesis to explain populism.168 After all, the ideology has arisen in 
egalitarian societies such as Denmark and Sweden, and the theory seems “too vague” to explain 
a specific phenomenon. Modernisation, argues Nairn, will undoubtedly give rise to different 
 
167 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 12. 
168 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 204. 
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cultural and political mobilisation – it’s just that this mobilisation is populist in some cases, 
liberal nationalist in other cases and even non-nationalist in other societies.169  
 
The current dissertation keeps these concerns in mind but will argue why the economic 
inequality thesis is indeed relevant in South Africa, specifically with regards to the rise of 
populism. It is also by no means the only, or even the most important, explanation of populism 
in our context, but remains relevant to support for the EFF. This takes us back to the thin-
centred ideology that was discussed earlier; the core concepts of “the people”, “the elite” and 
the “general will” are present within this approach, and it does not exclude the use of additional 
theories to explain populism.  
 
2.5.1.2 Cultural backlash 
In his 1977 seminal work, The Silent Revolution, Inglehart warns of a cultural value change 
that was happening in society. In an industrialised society, there was an increasing emphasis 
on the need for “belonging”, leading to the rise of “elite-directed political mobilisation.170 More 
than 30 years later he published an article in 2008, based on the intergenerational change 
happening in society and indeed found that the “silent revolution” is becoming ever-present.171  
 
Today, the phenomenon is more prominent than ever before: A nostalgic reaction (especially 
amongst older sectors of the electorate) who feel forgotten and left behind by the so-called 
progressive cultural tides.172 They have traditional values and norms and tend to feel 
overlooked in their yearning for belonging to their group. In a multicultural, postmodern 
society, identity is paramount for them and retaliation is often seen as the only way to confront 
these seismic changes.  
 
Whereas this general theory might not entirely be relevant for every society (including South 
Africa), some form of the cultural backlash thesis is present in most theories examining the 
 
169 Tom Nairn, “Breakwaters of 2000: From Ethnic to Civic Nationalisation,” New Left Review 214, 
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causes of populism. According to Norris the cultural backlash thesis described by Inglehart is 
mainly present in developed countries173, but their concept of “cultural protectionism” is more 
common than economic approaches and is present in nearly every populist society. A 
manifestation of the cultural backlash is thus present in nearly every country with radical or 
populist support. Inglehart and Norris argue that “cultural values, combined with several social 
and demographic factors, provide the most consistent and parsimonious explanation for voting 
support for populist parties”. 
 
Schematic representation of the cultural backlash 
 
2.5.1.2.1 Demographics: Inglehart and Norris 
In essence, the group experiencing the cultural backlash is more likely to feel like “they have 
become strangers from the predominant values of their own country”.174 In a Western context 
this group is older white men who were the cultural majority during the 1950s and 1960s and 
now “their dominance and privilege [has] eroded. The silent revolution of the 1970s appears 
to have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today.” 
 
 
173 Pippa Norris, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, (New York: Cambridge 
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Inglehart and Norris note there are four important demographic indicators of populist 
supporters: Age, education, gender, religion, and ethnicity.175 There is “a large body of 
empirical evidence” to indicate that post-war developments have triggered a cultural backlash 
among: 
 
• the older generation; 
• predominantly men; 
• the less educated sectors; and 
• the ethnic majority in a country.176 
 
This dissertation will show that we follow the same lines on gender and education, but in the 
South African context, it’s typically the younger population who support a populist party such 
as the EFF. In other countries, such as Austria young people are also increasingly supporting 
populists, and in Italy, the populist Five Star Movement won the youth vote in 2018. It will be 
shown through demographic data how local supporters of the populist EFF are generally young, 
black men with little education. 
 
How will it be shown that supporters of the EFF follow this demographic profile? Research 
from Ipsos and Wazimap will be used to illustrate that EFF supporters are generally younger, 
black men who are less educated. According to Inglehart, this cohort is more likely to 
experience a cultural backlash and if one can indicate this group is supporters of a populist 
party, they are more likely to experience a cultural backlash. 
 
2.5.1.2.2 Hostile attitude toward minorities: Inglehart and Norris 
As mentioned before, hostility is often felt towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities. 
These feelings of resentment are not only linked to material factors but also generally low 
levels of existential security. For example, in Italy, the migrants and refugee minorities are 
seen as a threat, not only to job security but also not national identity.177 Within this context, it 
is understandable that a populist party such as the Five Star Movement gained the majority of 
the votes in the 2018 elections.  
 
175 Ibid., 16. 
176 Ibid., 3. 
177 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
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Betz explains that especially in Europe the reaction to immigrants and refugees is “an outburst 
of xenophobia and open racism”.178 Open-mindedness towards migrants, refugees and 
foreigners are seen as part of the establishment and De Cleen even argues that populism and 
nationalism have always been closely related; some of the most prominent examples of 
populism can firmly be placed within the realm of nationalism (many Latin American 
countries) and vice versa.179 Stewart goes as far as referring to populism as “a kind of 
nationalism”. 
 
Measuring the cultural backlash in the local context is complex and a multitude of sources will 
be used. Insights from the Institute of Race Relations, the Human Sciences Research Council 
and other researchers will be used to show general open racism against minorities (research 
from Nyar and the SA Institute of Race Relations). Especially white and Indian South Africans 
are subjected to open racism and it will be shown that especially EFF supporters experience 
this cultural backlash against the racial minorities.  
 
Research from Claassen, Dumani and Solomon and Kosaka will be referred to when discussing 
xenophobia. This dissertation will indicate the presence of xenophobia in South Africa. EFF 
supporters do express xenophobia, but it will be shown how this element of the cultural 
backlash is less prominent in the local context.  
 
Social media comments from Twitter and media articles will substantiate it from a supporter 
point of view, as well as first-person comments from EFF supporters (more detailed 
information on this will follow in chapter six).  
 
2.5.1.2.3 Anxiety around pervasive culture 
There is also a cultural backlash against Western values, with the latter perceived as a threat to 
“our” way of living (anxiety that the minority culture is dominant). Malema encapsulated this 
sentiment when he said: “This country is still in the hands of the colonial masters. This country 
 
178 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe, 60. 
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is still in the hands of white people. This country is controlled from London. White minorities 
be warned.”180 
 
In South Africa it can be argued that this anxiety manifests itself as a backlash against Western 
values. The latter is seen as a threat to “our” way of living. Not only is minority culture seen 
as different, but as foreign and not part of “us”.  
 
As mentioned, there is a fear or anxiety that African culture is eroded by the pervasive minority 
cultures from especially white and Indian South Africans. This results in the latter groups not 
being seen as South African and the “us” versus “them” narrative is a strong indicator of this 
phenomenon.  
 
In a country with black people being the majority, one would naturally expect their culture to 
be the dominant one, but many years of oppression under first colonialism and then apartheid 
created a space where black people’s culture is indeed significantly less prominent that Western 
culture, embodied by white South Africans.  
 
Existing research, social media posts on Twitter, media articles and first-person comments will 
be used to illustrate the backlash from EFF supporters against the “other”, “foreign” minority.  
 
2.5.2 Meso-level explanations  
Very little research has been done on the meso-level, which Eatwell defines as “the level 
concerned with local organisations to which individuals belong, or through which they gain 
knowledge and norms, such as the family, school or party.”181 Some studies show that populist 
radical right supporters often originate from a populist radical right family, but for practical 
reasons, this thesis has been difficult to study on a broader and more representative level.182  
 
 
180 SA still in hands of colonial masters: Malema, eNCA, https://www.enca.com/south-africa/sa-still-
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The influence of schools, churches, and other organisations has been poorly researched and 
Mudde argues more resources should be invested in studying the meso-level, as the social 
context is closer to the individual than macro-level explanations.183  
 
2.5.3 Micro-level explanations  
Many studies have been done on the micro-level, which assesses the individual and how his or 
her personality and psycho-social make-up translates to voting behaviour. One of the main 
traits that researchers have illuminated is a populist radical attitude.184 The logic is that the vote 
for a populist party is not a “protest vote”, but rather an “affirmation vote”. The ideologies of 
the populist party go accord with the political attitude of the voter.  
 
Dehousse argues that the preoccupations of the populist voters can be encapsulated in one 
word: insecurity.185 The argument is that populist parties are mainly supported by insecure 
people; their insecurity is a result of the macro-level developments (economic crisis, refugees, 
etc.) and they are susceptible to the simplistic messages of the populist party. Ultimately, they 
are being protected against the changing world with their identity clearly defined and promoted.  
 
2.6 Conclusion and the way forward 
In this chapter a theoretical understanding of populism and its causes, specifically pertaining 
to anti-establishment, a cultural backlash and economic inequalities were provided. A brief 
definition and the different interpretations were provided to motivate why populism is better 
suited to be seen as an ideology.  
 
It was argued that populism as an ideology is the best lens through which to view the current 
research and henceforth the concepts of “the people”, “the elite” and “general will” (all three 
integral parts to the ideational approach) were discussed.  
The second part of this chapter dealt with the causes of populism, specifically supply- and 
demand-side arguments. The general supply-side theories were briefly mentioned, but the 
specific focus was put on anti-establishment as a cause of populism as this is one of the key 
analytical points of this research.  
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In chapter four the theoretical framework provided in this chapter will be applied the opposition 
EFF politics in the South African context, thus merging the theory and case study to ultimately 
form a new, coherent theoretical approach. (This approach will be outlined in chapter seven.) 
 
The demand-side causes of populism were divided into three strata: macro-, meso- and micro-
levels, each widening in scope about the origin of the cause. The last two levels were briefly 
discussed, and the macro-level got detailed attention since the causes of economic inequalities 
and a cultural backlash are (together with anti-establishment) key concepts in this research. 
This basic theory with regards to economic inequalities and a cultural backlash will 
respectively be applied to the South African context in chapters five and six.  
 
In the next chapter, an outline will be provided as to how the research question (presented in 
chapter one) will be answered, based on the theoretical approach (stipulated in this chapter). 





















Chapter 3: Research methodology 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation discussed the primary research question (and the secondary 
questions). A literature review highlighted the gaps in the current literature to arrive at a 
problem statement.  
 
The previous chapter laid out the theoretical foundations with which the research question will 
be answered, as well as the problem statement addressed.  
 
Now that the abovementioned gaps have been identified, and it was illustrated what the 
contribution of the current dissertation will be, the focus shifts to how this dissertation will go 
about addressing the research shortcomings and subsequently answer the central research 
question.  
 
3.1 The case study 
The research will be conducted from a qualitative perspective. To answer the central question, 
the theoretical case study method will be utilised. According to Stake case study research “run 
the gamut from the most microcosmic to the most macrocosmic levels of political 
phenomena”.186 
 
The dependent variable (what is being tested) of this study is the concept of populism within 
the EFF and the independent variables (what is manipulated to test the dependent variable) 
would include anti-establishment, economic inequality and a cultural backlash.  
 
The concept of a case study has an extensive range and especially in the social sciences, the 
scope is significantly bigger than in natural sciences. A “case study” does not have to be a 
person. Stake argues it can be a “bounded system” – an institution, a country, a programme or 
even a population.187 Yin echoes this sentiment when he explains that “how” and “why” 
questions are explanatory and difficult to confine to a constricted approach.188 They are “likely 
to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the preferred research methods”.  
 
 
186 Robert Stake, Multiple Case Study Analysis (New York: The Guilford Press, 2006), 65.  
187 Robert Stake, Multiple Case Study Analysis, 66. 
188 Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2009), 8. 
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The current research aims to understand how and why populism is present within the EFF in 
South Africa. This inquisitive, explanatory nature of the central question makes the case study 
method the favourable one – not just in terms of being congruous with the parameters of how 
and why, but also fit the criteria of focusing on a central unit (in this case South Africa).  
 
Jolobe argues that the strength of the case study lies in its nature to accommodate a manifold 
of evidence such as “documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations”.189 Indeed, this 
research will make use of current theories and applying them to the South African context. 
Other sources include existing research on the subject, social media posts from Twitter, media 
articles, evidence reports, documents, speeches, and calculated inferences to draw conclusions, 
form arguments and ultimately answer the central research question.  
 
The limitations and the critique of the case study design does not go unnoticed. Individual cases 
and single objects or entities are seldom the focal points for social inquiry, and it is exactly 
within this premise that the critique lies, according to Stake.190  
 
Stake’s counterargument is the distinctiveness of research in the social sciences. “In the social 
science(s), most case studies feature: descriptions that are complex. Comparisons are implicit 
rather than explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to 
the understanding of the case.”191 
 
Implied in the above argument is the distinctive nature of a case study; its colossal scope of 
reference, its holistic nature, and its application render “generalisation” in the traditional sense 
of scientific inquiry moot.  
 
An analysis of anti-establishment, economic inequality and a cultural backlash in South Africa, 
is limited in the sense that it is only a few of many perspectives and thus can’t be generalised 
as a universal, inexhaustible theory of why populism is on the rise in the country. These three 
concepts might be the overarching factors, but it is by no means the only factors at play. 
 
189 Zwelethu Jolobe, “Getting to Codesa: An analysis on why multiparty negotiations in South Africa 
began: 1984-1991,” Thesis presented for Doctoral Degree at the University of Cape Town, (2014), 7. 
190 Robert Stake, Multiple Case Study Analysis, 73. 
191 Ibid.  
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However, by covering a vital or core part of the subject, it can’t help but be a good 
representation or generalisation.   
 
The benefits gained from a case study analysis outweighs possible criticism regarding the lack 
of generalisation. The method for each of the three independent variables will henceforth be 
outlined below and will serve as a guide and roadmap for the practical application in chapter 
four (anti-establishment), chapter five (economic inequalities) and chapter six (the cultural 
backlash). It will all be brought together in the final chapter where conclusions will be drawn, 
and recommendations will be made for future research.  
 
As a roadmap for this dissertation, the following schema should be useful. It maps out the three 
central concepts, what international theory will be used and how it will be measured in the 







3.2 Anti-establishment  
As mentioned before, the theories from Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr and Hartleb will be 
consolidated to form a coherent theory of anti-establishment within the EFF and therefore the 
local context.  The detail of this theory was discussed in chapter two and will be applied in 
chapter four. 
 
• Mudde and Kaltwasser’s ideational approach will be applied throughout the study, 
especially concerning the anti-establishment argument. Within this framework “the 
people” are pitted against “the elite”, thus creating an anti-establishment stance.  
 
In this theoretical approach three interpretations of “the people” will be applied: 
 
1. The people as sovereign  
2. The people as a group that is forgotten  
3. The people as a nation  
 
The four elements of “the elite” that will be applied are: 
 
1. The elite’s power is for their benefit  
2. The elite are not real politicians 
3. The elite is part of the faulty system  
4. The elite is foreign   
 
• Barr’s concepts of the “outsider” or “maverick” breaking away from the establishment, 
lends further interpretation to anti-establishment sentiment. A so-called “crisis of 
representation” is present if ruling party’s (establishment) actions leads to a breaking 
down of linkages with voters, creating an anti-establishment stance. This was explained 
in chapter two. 
 
In chapter four it will be argued how the breaking down of linkages with the establishment can 





1. Declining voter support for the ANC  
2. Firing of Nene 
3. Nkandla 
4. Corruption charges against Zuma  
5. Marikana  
6. Protest action 
 
• Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment party are also very useful and he 
describes traits that are common amongst anti-establishment parties. In chapter four it 
will be explained fully and applied to the local setting.  
 
The main characteristics of an anti-establishment party that will be applied to the EFF include:  
 
1. The construction of “the people” as homogenous and a front-line against the political, 
cultural and economic elites; 
2. an image of being the so-called underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like the 
people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media); 
3. a claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable 
establishment);  
4. the simplification or trivialisation of issues that are often more complex than relates to 
the establishment; 
5. often a claim to represent the “silent majority”, the people who input are stifled by the 
establishment; 
6. the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues – “we are exactly the 
opposite of the establishment” notion; and 
7. aggression towards political adversaries (“the establishment uses consensus and proper 
channels, but that is not effective”).  
 
Ultimately the argument is that a significant number of citizens lose their trust in the 
establishment and are available to be swept up by populist parties and movements.192 
 
 
192 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 137. 
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How will this then be applied to the local context? As mentioned earlier theoretical case studies 
use a variety of documents and this discussion on anti-establishment will utilise speeches, 





The three anti-establishment theories will then be incorporated into a single anti-establishment 
theory that will possibly serve as a newly-formed theory on the issue.  
 
3.3 Economic inequality  
This case study research will cite relevant studies on economic inequality, but to argue that it’s 
relevant as a demand-side factor to facilitate the rise of populism, we need to demonstrate that 
the supporters of a populist party (the EFF) are economically marginalised.  
 
The main international theory that will be utilised is that of Inglehart and Norris where they 
indicate: 
 
a.) the typical supporter profile; and  
b.) the key indicators of economic inequality.  
 
This theoretical perspective will be applied to the local context. We will thus look at both the 




Research from Ipsos breaking down the supporter profile of EFF supporters will be used193 to 
illustrate the voter profiles of EFF supporters. This will be followed by data from the 
Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa and Media Monitoring Africa (Wazimap). 
By breaking downwards where the EFF has had electoral success one can get a picture of their 
staunch supporters.  
 
Five aspects of economic inequality, as indicated by Inglehart and Norris, will be discussed, 
namely:  
 
1. Income  
2. Race  
3. Unemployment  
4. Education  
5. Resources 
 
These economic indicators will be analysed and compared to that of “the elite” – white, DA 
supporters (a detailed explanation on this rationale can be found in chapter five). This 
comparison is important because it’s not economic hardships that drive populism, but rather 
the inequality. 
 
What outcome will validate the economic inequality argument as support for populism in South 
Africa? The EFF strongholds will be economically marginalised, and an analysis of the five 
indicators will show their dire circumstances. Antithetically, the DA strongholds will be 
economically more prosperous with the abovementioned indicators forming a stark contrast 
with those of EFF strongholds.  
 
193 The supporter profiles of SA's three largest parties – Ipsos, Politicsweb, 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-supporter-profiles-of-sas-three-largest-partie 
(accessed 17 April 2018) . 
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3.4 Cultural backlash  
The cultural backlash argument is germane to analyse populism in South Africa, but it is no 
easy task to accomplish. Resnick argues that Malema and the EFF have equated “the elite” 
with white people (race).194 The identity displacement, the “us and them” stance and the 
antagonistic view of racial minorities are all indicators of a cultural backlash.  
 
The main international theory that will be applied, is the cultural backlash thesis from Inglehart 
and Norris. They identify two elements of the cultural backlash theory:  
 
1. a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and  
2. anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.195  
 
Additionally, research from Inglehart and Norris has shown that in Western countries the 
cultural backlash is strongest among: 
 
1. the older generation; 
2. mostly white people; 
3. particularly men; and  
4. less educated sectors.196 
 
As the manifestation of the cultural backlash is different in South Africa (and indeed in many 
other countries), supporters of the populist EFF will generally be younger (antithetical to 
Western democracies), black men who are less educated.  
 
 
194 Daniele Resnick, “Populism in Africa” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Espejo and 
Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 
112. 
195 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15.  
196 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 





Measuring the cultural backlash in society involves a multitude of sources. The demographics 
of the EFF will be analysed via research from Ipsos in the form of the supporter profile.  
 
Insights from the Institute of Race Relations, the Human Sciences Research Council and other 
researchers will be used to show general open racism against minorities (research from Nyar 
and the SA Institute of Race Relations), and research from Claassen, Dumani and Solomon and 
Kosaka will be referred to when discussing xenophobia.  
 
Social media comments from Twitter and media articles will substantiate it from a supporter 
point of view, as well as first-person comments from EFF supporters (more detailed 
information on this will follow in chapter six).  
 
3.5 Conclusion and the way forward  
In the next chapter, anti-establishment will be applied to the local context. Firstly, a discussion 
on “the people” versus “the elite”, will allude to the anti-establishment sentiment and policies 
expressed by the EFF. It will be shown how each of the three interpretations of “the people” 
(“the people as sovereign”, “the forgotten ones” and “political context”) can contribute to the 
anti-establishment populist context.  
 
Similarly, the concept of “the elite” will also be addressed. The establishment is considered 
part of the elite and several relevant aspects that tie in with the anti-establishment sentiment 
will be discussed, for example, the elite being portrayed as not “real” politicians and calling 
for a change to the current political system.  
 
Barr’s definitions of “outsiders” versus “mavericks” will furthermore be applied to the local 
context to indicate positioning towards the establishment, as well as how a crisis of 
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representation forms when the linkages between voters and the establishment break down. 
Several factors led to the anti-establishment stance of local voters, such as the Firing of Nene, 
Nkandla and Marikana amongst others.  
 
Lastly, Hartleb’s characteristics of a populist, anti-establishment party will be practically 
applied to the EFF – it will be argued that they are a populist, anti-establishment party to its 





























Chapter 4: Anti-establishment 
 
Many observers agree that anti-establishment parties have grown substantially in the past few 
decades.197 Not surprisingly, this phenomenon coincides with a rise in populism, and as 
discussed before, populist parties often position themselves against the mainstream parties.  
 
Returning to Mudde and Kaltwasser’s central definition of populism, it is imperative to 
understand that there is a divide or separation between “two homogenous and antagonistic 
camps”, namely “the people” and “the elite”, with the latter being equated to the establishment 
and its extensions.198 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical foundations of anti-establishment, as discussed in the previous 
section, will be applied to the South African context. This will be achieved in reference to the 
EFF, emphasising that international populism theory can indeed be applied to the local political 
landscape (thus expanding the current limitations of local theory).  
 
The international theory that will be applied include: 
 
• Mudde and Kaltwasser’s ideational approach;  
• Barr’s concepts of the “outsider” or “maverick” breaking away from the establishment;  
• Barr’s so-called “crisis of representation” and the subsequent breaking down of 
linkages; and  
• Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment party.  
 
Firstly, a discussion on “the people” versus “the elite”, will allude to the anti-establishment 







197 Florian Hartleb, “Here to stay: Anti-establishment parties in Europe”, 41. 
198 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
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Schematic representation of the ideational approach: 
 
 
This will be followed by applying the general anti-establishment theory (as discussed in chapter 
two), as well as the conceptual parameters. Barr’s concept of linkages will also form part of 
the analysis and ultimately Hartleb’s characteristics of a populist party will form a core part of 
the discussion.  
 
Speeches, policy documents, manifesto’s and statements made in the media will be analysed 
and used as evidence to support the anti-establishment stance of the opposition.
 
4.1 Ideational approach: the people  
Previously, Mudde and Kaltwasser’s three conceptualisations of “the people” have been 






national community.199 All three will now be discussed concerning the specific South African 
landscape regarding the anti-establishment sentiment of the EFF.  
 
4.1.1 First interpretation: the people are sovereign  
The very first “freedom” or “right” in the Freedom Charter is “The people shall govern!” and 
refers to the right to vote, the right of people to take part in the administration of the country 
and the abolishment of all bodies of minority rule that “shall be replaced by democratic organs 
of self-government”.200 In essence, it’s the sovereignty of “the people” that establishes a 
democratic political order.  
 
In the EFFs founding manifesto, it states it draws inspiration for “a radical, working-class 
interpretation of the Freedom Charter”201 and subsequently on the 62nd anniversary of the 
adoption of the Freedom Charter, the party proclaimed that document “has since been betrayed 
and abandoned by the ANC government”.202 It goes on to say:  
 
With the Gupta Capture phenomenon, the people no longer govern. Those who have been 
elected have sold the people's mandate in exchange for corrupt money and properties in 
Dubai; essentially, the people do not govern under Zuma's ANC. The EFF is the only 
political party prepared to realise the true aspirations of the Freedom Charter.203 
 
Resulting from the above, it can be argued that the EFF believes “the people” are not in control 
of the country anymore; the ANC has no mandate to govern and the establishment (the ANC 
and what it represents) has failed the people of South Africa. The implicit warning is that the 
ultimate source of power lies with the people and that the establishment has betrayed them, 
leading to a government that will ultimately be given back to the people.  
 
199 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 11. 
200 Congress of the People, Freedom Charter (Kliptown, 1955).  
201 Economic Freedom Fighters EFF Founding Manifesto (2013), 7. 
202 Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, Only the EFF government will realise the aspirations of the Freedom Charter, 
Official EFF website, https://www.effonline.org/single-post/2017/06/26/ONLY-THE-EFF-
GOVERNMENT-WILL-REALISE-THE-ASPIRATIONS-OF-THE-FREEDOM-CHARTER (accessed 29 May 
2018). 
203 Mbuyiseni Ndlozi, Only the EFF government will realise the aspirations of the Freedom Charter, 
Official EFF website, https://www.effonline.org/single-post/2017/06/26/ONLY-THE-EFF-




4.1.2 Second interpretation: The forgotten ones 
The second interpretation of “the people” is one who has economic and cultural status as a 
cornerstone. Populist leaders and parties latch onto the markers considered “inferior” by the 
dominant culture; they focus on those who are excluded due to their socioeconomic and 
sociocultural status. This meaning of “the people” aims to mobilise and unite the “angry”, 
“forgotten” and “silenced” against the common enemy – the elite or establishment.  
 
This manifestation is so ubiquitous in the South African context; it is not difficult to find 
examples, especially concerning the EFF. Below are some instances of framing “the people” 
as the “forgotten” ones or even constructed as being ostracised from society. These statements 
were made by EFF leaders: 
 
• “[Black people’s] humanity has been taken away by an evil system of capitalism that 
produces racism. Blacks are not human. Blacks are subhuman.”204 
 
• “We are fighting for black people. Why is it only the black community which is left in 
poverty, are we a cursed nation, are we a defeated nation, are we a hopeless nation? 
Why are we rejected, why are we killed when we speak the truth?”205 
 
• “We are not going to allow anyone to use the colour of our skin to humiliate us, to 
exclude us. We are black we are proud; we are black we are beautiful. We are black, 
and we are not ashamed of being black.”206 
 
• “Black people remain a conquered nation 20 years into democracy.”207 
 
 
204 Nico Gous, Black people do not have human rights: Malema, Times Live, 
https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-21-black-people-do-not-have-human-rights-
malema (accessed 28 March2018). 
205 Molaole Montsho, WATCH: EFF only party fighting for black people in SA – Malema, IOL, 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/watch-eff-only-party-fighting-for-black-people-in-sa-malema-
14746880 (accessed 29 May 2018). 
206 Koketso Motau, Malema: We make no apology for what EFF members did at H&M stores, EWN 
http://ewn.co.za/2018/01/13/malema-we-make-no-apology-for-what-eff-members-did-at-h-and-m-
stores (accessed 29 May 2018). 
207 EFF leads latest anti-government protest, MoneyWeb, 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/eff-leads-latest-anti-government-
protest/  (accessed 29 May 2018). 
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In the following section, it will be demonstrated that the EFF equates “black people” to “the 
people” (thus a racial interpretation of “the people”) and from the statements above it is clear 
that the party and its leaders frame black people as “being conquered”; they are the “rejected” 
ones who are considered to be “subhuman”. The party defines “the people” as those being side-
lined, humiliated or excluded. In turn, the establishment promotes the values of the minority 
or elite, or rather those who are not viewed as the “real” or “true” people.  
 
4.1.3 Third interpretation: A national context 
The last interpretation of “the people” refers to the national community of a political context, 
but it is more convoluted than simply regarding the population living within a particular region 
as “the people”. The parameters of the latter are determined in certain civic or ethnic terms, 
even when it seems to be a collective.208  
 
In South Africa, Malema and the EFF have repeatedly referred to black people as the only true 
citizens and emphasising that the country is not the home of white people.209 In November 
2016 Malema appeared in court after being charged with contravention of the 1956 Riotous 
Assemblies Act, and after the proceedings he addressed supporters: 
 
This is our continent; it belongs to us . . . We are not calling for the slaughter of white 
people‚ at least for now… The rightful owners of the land are black people. No white person 
is a rightful owner of the land here in SA and whole of the African continent.210 
 
Malema’s stance is indicative of defining “the people” in ethnic terms (black people in this 
instance). South Africa “belongs” to black people, he argues, and they are the “rightful owners” 
of the country. White people are seen as “foreigners”, not real citizens of South Africa.  
 
 
208 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 11. 
209 We welcome white people, even though it's not their home – Malema, Politicsweb, 
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/we-welcome-white-people-even-though-its-not-
their- (accessed 28 March2018).  
210 Neo Goba and Nomahlubi Jordaan, EFF does not want the slaughter of white people ‘for now’, 
Malema says, Business Day, https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2016-11-07-eff-does-not-
want-the-slaughter-of-white-people-for-now-malema-says/ (accessed 29 May). 
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According to Malema “[the government] must be prepared to expropriate the land of our 
people, which was forcefully stolen from them”.211 In the construction of “our” people he is 
implying the land belongs to black people, and thus they are the true citizens of the country. 
This is further emphasised in his statement that “they” (white people) stole “that land was 
illegally acquired during the colonial era and it is now in the hands of ‘colonial settlers’ and 
‘land thieves’”.212 
 
The ANC (establishment) is seen as being protective of white people and promoting their 
interest. Koekemoer argues the EFF sees the intention of the ANC as “toothless African 
nationalism” that tries “to suppress the black nation in protection of white interests”.213 Despite 
some reconciliatory remarks such as “we want white people, there is no problem with white 
people”214, it is evident that the majority of the party’s statements defines black people as the 
only “people” or true citizens of the country. Koekemoer sees this as the manifestation of two 
nations – black and white215 – but this does not account for the overwhelming exclusionary 
language of the EFF, such as “illegally”, “they”, “thieves” and “rightful owners”.  
 
It’s clear from these statements that Malema views black people as the “true citizens” and white 
people as “foreign” or “visitors”: “We will not chase white people to the sea. We will share the 
land piece by piece. And you can’t own bigger than us… you are a visitor. Visitors must 
behave. They must know that the land belongs to people of South Africa… indigenous people 
of South Africa.”216 This sentiment also manifests itself in the supporters of the EFF, as will 
be indicated in chapter six when discussing the cultural backlash. In this regard anti-
establishment also manifests itself as a demand-side argument. 
 
211 Economics Freedom Fighters, EFF Official Facebook, 
https://www.facebook.com/economicfreedomstruggle/posts/full-speech-of-the-cic-julius-malema-
in-reply-to-sona-in-parliament-18-june-2014/424683854339419/(accessed 29 May 2018). 
212 Anja Koekemoer, “How the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation,” 
(Master’s thesis presented at Stellenbosch University, 2017), 67.  
213 Anja Koekemoer, “How the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation,” 
(Master’s thesis presented at Stellenbosch University, 2017), 67. 
214 Amanda Khoza, There will be no bloodshed over land, whites are as natural to SA as 'trees and 
mountains' – Malema, News24, https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/there-will-be-no-
bloodshed-over-land-whites-are-as-natural-to-sa-as-trees-and-mountains-malema-
20180412 (accessed 29 May 2018). 
215 Anja Koekemoer, “How the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation,” 69. 
216All white people are visitors in SA – Malema, The Citizen, https://citizen.co.za/news/south-
africa/1337702/white-people-are-visitors-in-sa-malema/ (accessed 09 July 2018). 
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Many theorists would rightfully claim that most political parties will appeal to “the people” 
and that they are true representatives of them, but as have been explained before, Müller argues 
that populist leaders claim that a part of the people is the people and that only the populist party 
or movement represents the true people.217 
 
Fighting for the plight of “the people” is not populism per se but fighting for a section of the 
people and only legitimising them as true people, is a sign of populism. This is a way to 
distinguish the morally pure and real people from the immoral people who do not belong. 
Whatever the host ideology is, this moralistic determination is distinctive of how populists 
view “the people”.218 
 
4.1.4 Three interpretations: Criticism 
Applying the three interpretations to the South African context one can understand sovereignty, 
marginalisation and a national community as manifestations of populism. Criticisms of each of 
these interpretations from the EFF are raised below.  
 
It can be construed as disingenuous to claim that the ANC (establishment) does not represent 
“the people”, after all, 53.9% of voters supported the party in the 2016 Local Government 
elections.219 They chose the ANC government and does indeed consider it “a government of 
the people, by the people and for the people” (the first interpretation). The EFF got 8.1% of the 
votes – indeed a minority of “the people”. 
 
Regarding the manifestation of “the people” as the so-called “forgotten” ones, it is the EFF 
who does not consider the successes of the establishment. Even though the pace of 
transformation has been slow and inadequate, there are many examples of black people who 
can indeed not be considered “forgotten” in South Africa.  
 
In 2012 almost 80% of all workers in the public sector were black Africans, with 87% of senior 
management positions filled by the same group. This is a significant turnaround from 1994 
 
217 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, 22-23. 
218 Ibid., 24-25. 
219 2016 Municipal Election Leaderboard, IEC Website, 
https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx (accessed 29 May 2018).  
72 
 
when 95% of positions were occupied by white people. These black people are indeed not part 
of the EFF, nor can they be labelled as “forgotten ones”. 
 
Similarly, in the private sector in 2017, total employment equity placements stood at 56%, up 
from 48.4% in 2016 and 39% in 2015.220 By the end of 2013, one in every four senior managers 
were black.221 Whilst these figures are based on economic status, it does not paint a picture of 
a “forgotten” group.  
 
Whilst our society still has to transform on many levels (economically, socially, culturally) one 
can’t disregard the progress the establishment has made by uplifting millions of black people. 
Surely these citizens can’t all be lumped in with the “forgotten ones” – these are black people 
who do not fit the description of this interpretation of “the people”.  
 
As mentioned, this does not ignore the fact that black people are still disproportionately 
disadvantaged (as will be discussed in the following chapter), but it does have implications for 
defining “the people” exclusively as black people who are excluded from society. A non-
populist appeal would be to acknowledge the challenges still faced by the majority of black 
citizens, but also recognising the black citizens who have overcome the challenges and see 
them as part of “the people”, and not simply an extension of the establishment or elite.  
 
A counter-argument to this interpretation and criticism is that the EFF is often referring to the 
historical and structural disenfranchisement of black people, and not solely focus on the present 
success of black people. Therefore, it can include black professionals in its interpretation of 
“the people” – in this sense it is thus not a materialistic approach, but rather a cultural and 
societal approach. Stated otherwise: The EFF acknowledges that black people can be 
“forgotten” by the establishment even if they are successful.  
 
 
220 Jump in transformation in South Africa’s private sector, Business Tech, 
https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/221797/jump-in-transformation-in-south-africas-private-
sector/  (accessed 09 July 2018). 
221 Ferial Haffajee, What if There Were No Whites in South Africa?  (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 
2015), 10.  
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4.2 Ideational approach: The elite 
As mentioned in the previous section all conceptions of populism encapsulate some aspect of 
this antipathy towards the establishment, in essence pitting “the people” against “the elite”, and 
this determination is based on a moral evaluation. This anti-establishment stance has four 
elements: 
 
• The elite’s power is for their benefit 
• The elite are not “real politicians” 
• The elite is part of the faulty system 
• The elite as foreign  
 
4.2.1 The elite’s power is for their benefit 
As mentioned in chapter two the elite is often portrayed as being in power for their benefit. 
They govern for the few, not the many.  The EFF has viewed the ANC elite as governing for 
their own benefit. “The government is caring only about themselves. They don't care about 
you,” Malema told supporters in 2013.222 In 2018, he accused President Ramaphosa of being a 
person who only took up the presidency of the country “to clinch business deals”. His interest 
“as a billionaire” was “to have access to world leaders to clinch deals with them. Cyril 
Ramaphosa is worth billions. Why is he giving money to where money is? Why is he not 
sharing half of his billions with the poor people of the country?”223 
 
The EFF has also called on the Guptas to leave South Africa, saying the country could not be 
held to ransom by a “corrupt cartel” with “mafia” tendencies.224 They even equated Zuma and 
the Guptas in their lexicon, by amalgamating the two words in “Zupta”. The implication is that 
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As has been shown in chapter two, the critique of the elite excludes those in power who are 
sympathetic to the cause of the populist, and obviously, it also precludes the populist with 
power – they are after all not there for their own benefit, but to represent the will of the people. 
An example of this is Malema’s own lavish lifestyle (expensive cars, watches, clothing) which 
has been in the spotlight many times. To these, he said: “How are you going to inspire them 
when you are also going to stay in a shack?”225 The assumption is that as the leader he is there 
at the benefit of “the people” – he doesn’t live a lavish lifestyle because he wants to (unlike the 
establishment); it’s so that he can successfully execute his job as the leader.  
 
It can be assumed that by having this wealth, they deem it appropriate – unlike the undeserved 
wealth of the establishment these political leaders’ wealth is legitimate, as they represent the 
interests of the people. 
 
Furthermore, after the 2016 Local Government Elections, the ANC did not receive a much-
needed majority in key municipalities such as Johannesburg Tshwane and Nelson Mandela 
Bay. In the first two, the EFF held the balance of power and was dubbed the “kingmakers”; the 
DA needed their support to govern. Even with drastically opposing ideologies, the EFF 
considered the DA the “lesser of two evils” and gave the party its support in council meetings. 
“The ANC will not get a single vote from the EFF,” Malema said during a press conference. 
“We will vote for the opposition because the ANC must be removed from power.”226 Malema 
defended this decision by saying the party has heard the plea of South Africans and will “move 
in that direction”.  
 
It can be argued that this was an unprecedented move in South African politics. Two parties 
whom it seems are worlds apart, worked together to the benefit of “the people”, as an action 
directly opposed to the establishment. This is even more significant when one takes into 
account that the white leaders and voters of the DA are the exact “elite” the EFF is against. At 
this time, they made an active choice against the political elite in favour of the cultural, social 
and economic elite (represented by the white minority).  
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4.2.2 The elite are not “real politicians” 
It would be a misconception that populists are necessarily anti-elitist per se, especially when 
they are part of the elite.227 The distinction here would be that they are the “proper” elite who 
will not betray the trust of the people. Voting for the populist leader or party would be the 
“morally correct” outcome of an election and if this does not happen, the real winners are 
considered illegitimate.228  
 
Later in this discussion, it will be shown how the EFF accused the establishment system of 
being against them and that the votes are rigged. This is an indication that the election outcome 
is considered illegitimate – the implication being the outcome of the vote is not correct as it is 
not morally correct. The party has also called both Zuma and Ramaphosa “illegitimate 
presidents”, even though democratic processes were followed in electing both of them.229 
 
4.2.3 The elite is part of the faulty system 
As mentioned in chapter two, the elite is often being constructed as working against the 
economic interests of the country, and that doing away with the current connection between 
the political and economic elite, is the best way forward. This is not necessarily anti-capitalist; 
they just believe capitalism in its current form is benefiting the few to the disadvantage of the 
people. In this regard, the EFF has stood out.  
 
Malema has accused Ramaphosa on several occasions of being in the pockets of “white 
monopoly capitalists” and has even referred to him as “not black enough and he has done 
everything in his life to please white people”.230 The party has even called the ANC “an 
organisation of black elite”231, implying that the current system is benefiting the few. It’s 
important to distinguish between the party and the system. The EFF believes the system 
endorsed by the ANC is the reason why we have inequality in South Africa.  
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In a statement, the party said it is “the only party in parliament that represents this agenda and 
seeks the socialist overthrow of capitalism through the attainment of economic freedom in our 
lifetime”232, a clear indication that they want to do away with the economic system of 
capitalism.  
 
In the party’s constitution, it is also stipulated that they are proponents of socialism: “The EFF 
is radical, leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialistic . . .”233 
 
Indeed, the EFFs stance is radically different from the current system. As mentioned before 
they support nationalisation of key economic sectors with the state controlling the assets and 
land. They believe the current establishment and the system within which it operates are not to 
the benefit of the people, but the elite. Unlike some other populist leaders such as Donald 
Trump, the EFF does believe in the abolishment of capitalism. There is not a particular version 
of this system that they think can be successful.  
 
4.2.4 The elite as foreign  
Finally, Mudde and Kaltwasser are of opinion that the elites are often not just seen as 
representing foreign power, they are considered to be foreign themselves. In South Africa 
white people are viewed to be foreign by the EFF (as we have seen earlier), but in this regard, 
reference is not made to black people who are grouped with the elite. The black elite might not 
be seen as “real” black people (as seen previously concerning Ramaphosa), but they are still 
considered citizens of the country.  
 
4.3 Outsiders versus mavericks 
Anti-establishment signals a locus extraneous to the mainstream political landscape, but it 
would be imprecise to view the latter as the origin of all populist figures. An outsider, as Barr 
states it, is someone who is truly independent and has entered the arena as an alternative to the 
establishment;234 and a maverick was previously in the nucleus of the establishment but has 
since broken away.235 
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In the South African context, there aren’t any prominent examples of populists who can be 
labelled as true outsiders. Malema and other prominent EFF members such as Floyd Shivambu 
and Mbuyiseni Ndlozi all emerged from the ANC, or rather the ANYL to be exact.  
 
In late 2011 Malema was suspended for five years from the ANC and a few months later he 
was expelled from the party because of his call for the nationalisation of mines and the seizing 
of land from white farmers. 
 
At first, Malema still had loyalty towards the ANC, proclaiming he “will die in the ANC”236, 
but soon that loyalty faded in June 2013 he announced the formation of the EFF, claiming the 
ANC is now “committed to a right-wing, neo-liberal and capitalist agenda which has kept [the] 
majority of our people on the margins of South Africa's economy”.237 
 
This turn away from the ruling party established him as a maverick and Mudde and Kaltwasser 
argues that whilst he previously was a dominant “populist voice of opposition within the 
ANC”, he now continued his rhetoric and policies outside the establishment and claimed they 
are upholding the status quo he is rebelling against.238  
 
4.4 Crisis of representation: Linkages breaking down 
As mentioned in chapter two, Laclau argues established systems often break down when there’s 
a “crisis of representation” – ultimately a significant number of citizens lose their trust in the 
establishment and are available to be swept up by populist parties and movements.239 They 
might opt out of the democratic process, but they are also susceptible to the rhetoric and policies 
of “extra-systemic actors”. The latter claims to be an “outsider” (or as we have learnt, a 
“maverick”); they are not part of the crisis of representation caused by the establishment, thus 
the only true representation of the disillusioned citizens.240 
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Barr’s references to linkages are particularly useful here.241 This is firmly placed within the 
supply-side, but instead of the populist party being implied, the actions of the establishment 
party create an opportunity for the populist party to exploit this and subsequently point out how 
the establishment is responsible for breaking its links with voters.  
 
There are several reasons why the linkage between voters and an established party would break 
down (as discussed in chapter two), but one is of particular relevance to the South African 
context: representational linkage. Before continuing to discuss this, a closer look at the four 
main linkages and how the establishment has worked to maintain them will follow.  
 
Clientelistic linkages (in the forms of social grants) are well-maintained by the establishment 
in South Africa. The ANC government might have faced legal and ethical challenges with 
regards to social grants, but it has always ensured that those who need social grants, get them. 
The number of social grants in South Africa has increased exponentially over the past 23 years, 
from an estimated 4 million in 1994 to more than 17 million in 2017. A report from Child 
Watch has shown that grants (particularly the child grant) mostly reach poor households242 and 
that they have been instrumental in “poverty alleviation over the post-apartheid years”243.  
 
The establishment has also been relatively proactive in maintaining directive linkages, such as 
selective benefits to targeted groups. Research from Arendse and Stack has shown that “there 
is no precedent elsewhere for a policy change that adds a new wealth tax to the estate duty and 
donations that already exist in South Africa” and that our “estate duty and donations tax 
systems compare favourably with similar systems used in several other countries 
internationally”.244 The implication is that substantial tax cuts to wealthy are not on the cards 
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and that we on par with similar economies; a direct taxation benefit to the wealthy is thus not 
a significant breakdown of the linkage.  
 
Similarly, research from Mabugua, Fofanab and Chitiga-Mabuguc has shown that 
“government has committed to increasing economic growth and reducing poverty and 
inequality. Tax policy has been the most important instrument at its disposal to meet these 
objectives.”245 It can also be argued that Zuma’s announcement (and directive) that the 
government will subsidise free higher education for poor and working-class can strengthen the 
link the ruling party has with supporters.  
 
Some researchers such as Isaacs, argue that the VAT increase in 2018 will harm the poor and 
lower income-earners the most.246 This directive might cause a breakdown of the linkage 
between the establishment and some of its supporters, but thus far it has not been measured.  
 
The third linkage, participatory linkage, has been shaky for the most part. One just has to 
consider the tripartite alliance between the ANC, COSATU and the SACP. Murmurings of 
waning workers’ support for the ANC247 have been present for many years and recently the 
SACP broke the linkage by contesting local elections under its own banner.248 The 
establishment has, for the most part, tried to maintain this participatory linkage, by appointing 
alliance members into cabinet positions (Blade Nzimande and Thulas Nxesi) and consulting 
them on changes and policies. During the latter part of the Zuma presidency, the ANC did 
considerable damage to these linkages by axing SACP members from cabinet and not 
consulting them on the changes made.249 This resulted in the SACP withdrawing support from 
the ruling party as mentioned before.  
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The establishment has generally been maintaining electoral linkages and during the 2016 Local 
Government Elections the party spent more than R1 billion on its campaign250 and many 
debates raged about so-called “food parcels for votes”251. It’s more convoluted to give concrete 
evidence for this link, but it can be argued that at least by the perception of circumstantial 
evidence the establishment does seem to maintain electoral linkages.  
 
Whilst all these linkages have played a significant part in maintaining support for the 
establishment, one other linkage, representational linkage, has broken down to such an extent 
that it can be argued it is one of the core reasons why support has been shifting to a populist 
party such as the EFF. As mentioned before performance failures on the part of the 
establishment is a key factor in migrating support towards populist parties.252 Many other 
researchers such as Mudde and Kaltwasser, Halkjelsvik and Moffitt also agree on this 
approach, albeit in different varieties.253 As Roberts put it: “Populism thrives where 
mainstream parties are in crisis, or at least where they exclude or ignore major currents of 
opinion that are denied institutionalised channels of expression.”254 
 
4.4.1 Voter support 
Perhaps the biggest indicator that supporters moved away from the establishment is probably 
the decline in the ANCs election results since its height in 2004 when it stood at 70% to 65.9% 
in 2014. An Ipsos survey in late 2017 showed the governing party’s support dropped to just 
47%.255 According to Everatt the “ANC in Gauteng was sitting on 53% in the polls [in 2014] 
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and won with 54%. Two years later this dropped, catastrophically, to see the ANC with just 
41% of polled Gauteng voter support, just before the 2016 elections.”256 Even if one were to 
compare municipal elections with each other, the ANC received 54% of the 2016 votes, which 
is a considerable decrease from 62% in 2011.257 
 
The party also lost control of key metros in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay. 
Everatt’s research shows three factors were on the minds of voters: the firing of Nhlanhla Nene 
as finance minister, the Constitutional Court ruling on Nkandla; and the corruption charges 
against Zuma.258 The current research will argue that these, in conjunction with the Marikana 
tragedy, an increase in protests and state capture, are all contributing factors that broke down 
the linkages the establishment had with its supporters.  
 
4.4.2 Firing of Nene 
The firing of respectable finance minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015 sent shockwaves 
through the country. Not only did Zuma’s decision to get rid of the finance minister sent the 
markets into turmoil259, but public opinion was also swinging against the establishment.  
 
In an initial online survey 71% of respondents “most strongly disapproved” of the move260, 
and just before the 2016 elections research from Everatt confirmed this: “While a quarter (23%) 
of respondents said this had not affected their decision of which party to vote for at all, firing 
Nene made 41% of voters at least re-think which party they would vote for.”261 
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The ruling party simply “noted” and “respected” Zuma’s decision, but did not agree with the 
public outcry that is was an attempt to “capture” the treasury.262 It’s clear from public opinion 
that the linkage between voters and the establishment broke with this action.  
 
4.4.3 Nkandla  
Security upgrades to Zuma’s private homestead have been a contentious issue in South African 
politics, culminating in the Constitutional Court ordering him to repay R7.8 million for 
upgrades he unduly benefited from.  
 
In an Ipsos survey, more than 42% of South African felt taxpayers should not be held liable for 
the costs and when broken down by political party allegiance, the results showed 67% of DA 
supporters and 56% of EFF supporters were against taxpayers funding Nkandla. Only 34% of 
ANC supporters felt the same way.263 Everatt’s research shows that 54% of Gauteng voters 
reported the Nkandla ruling has an impact on their voting choice.264 With this in mind, the 
argument can again be made that the linkage between the establishment and the voters has been 
broken; indeed, this crisis has caused the establishment to lose support.  
 
4.4.4 Corruption charges against Zuma 
Zuma is facing 18 charges of corruption, money laundering and racketeering and the saga have 
been in-and-out of courts for many years. Everatt’s research shows 38% said it had “some” 
impact and 18% said it had a “significant” impact on their voting choice. That means that in 
total 56% cited the corruption charges as having an impact on their decision of who to vote for, 
thus breaking the linkage between the establishment and its voters.   
 
4.4.5 Marikana 
The Marikana massacre, which took place on 16 August 2012, is widely considered to be the 
most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since 1960. On many 
levels, this indicated a crisis from within the establishment. The most prominent official 
involved was Cyril Ramaphosa, currently president of South Africa. The Farlam report found 
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that he did not play a role in authorising the massacre, but that he could have likely defused the 
situation.265 “Mr Ramaphosa was one of those who used his influence to discourage resolution 
of the dispute through negotiation.”266  
 
Then police minister Nathi Mthethwa was also not completely absolved, but one of the most 
damning findings was that inquiries should be held into the fitness of police leaders, National 
Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega and North West Police Commission Zukiswa Mbombo. 
“The leadership of the police, on the highest level, appears to have taken the decision not to 
give the true version of how it came about that the ‘tactical option’ was implemented on the 
afternoon of 16 August and to conceal the fact that the plan to be implemented was hastily put 
together without [public order policing] inputs or evaluation,” the report found.267  
 
With regard to those members of the South African Police Services, who in firing shots at the 
strikers may have exceeded the bounds of self and private defence and the delay in conveying 
medical assistance ... the failure to stop the operation after scene one and the possible 
liability of senior officers in the South African Police Services, the shooting of strikers by 
various members of the South African Police Services.268 
 
There is strong evidence in the report that the establishment (or at least its extensions in the 
form of the police service) is at least partly responsible for the killings. Gumede argues that 
“the violent explosion at Marikana is an indication that ordinary South Africans are rapidly 
losing faith in the democratic institutions and social contract arrangements that underpin the 
1994 post-apartheid South African democratic social contract . . . and if democratic institutions 
and ‘legitimate’ institutions do not become more responsive, accountable and democratic 
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quickly, ordinary people will increasingly look to new ones, including populists ones, or seek 
answers in violence.”269 
 
Gumede furthermore argues the ANC has experienced a decline in its moral credibility and 
Marikana is the point “where it appears the ANC government’s ‘struggle’ credentials and past 
exemplary struggle record, may no longer be enough to persuade constituencies to follow one 
or the other action”.270 This is significant in light of a Institute of Justice and Reconciliation’s 
(IJR) SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey that showed that there had been a 13% increase in 
the proportion of citizens who believed the government did not care about “people like them.” 
 
Nieftagodien proposes that the Marikana massacre led to the rise of the EFF271 and the party 
acknowledges the political power of this and calls it “a turning point”.272 “The EFF was born 
in the wake of the Marikana massacre,” writes Nieftagodien, “which caused a firm line to be 
drawn between those who were for and against the status quo”.273 
 
4.4.6 Protests  
The presence of protests against the establishment can be seen as an indicator of lost support. 
Research has indicated that the frequency of community protests has increased from 106 in 
2005 to 471 in 2012 and 375 in 2017.274 For the period as a whole, there has been a marked 
decline in the proportion of orderly protests, with a peak of 50% in 2006 and only 17% in 2016. 
Between 2013 and 2016, 90% of civic protests were considered violent and during the first part 
of 2016, that figure reached 95%.275 We are thus not only experiencing an increase in protests 
but also in the turmoil that they cause. 
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Whilst it would be incorrect to deduct that all of these protests were opposing the establishment, 
research from Morudu looked at protests throughout the country’s 234 local municipalities and 
isolated only those protests that were attributed to service delivery.276 It found that “protests 
tend to increase with declining provisions of basic services like housing, electricity, sewerage 
and sanitation, refuse removal, schools and hospitals”. This is a strong, albeit not definitive, 
indication that citizens are dissatisfied with the establishment’s performance.  
 
4.5 Characteristics of populist parties  
Thus far it has been shown that many factors are influencing an anti-establishment attitude 
from voters, but most of these either originate from within the establishment (due to its 
decisions, policies, and attitudes) or within the minds of supporters (generally a loss of 
confidence in the establishment due to crises and hardships). Populist parties, however, also 
promote an anti-establishment stance, sometimes to such a degree that it might even be stronger 
than the effect of the weak performance of the government on voters.  
 
What would the characteristics of such a party be? Hartleb argues populist parties are more 
often defined by what they are not than what they are.277 In chapter two these characteristics 
were outlined and henceforth it will be applied to the South African situation.  
 
Characteristic one: An anti-establishment party constructs “the people” as homogenous and 
a front-line against the political, cultural and economic elites.  
 
Earlier in this chapter, it has been shown that the EFF presents its concept of “the people” 
(namely black South Africans) as homogenous. It does not account for black South Africans 
who do not agree with their policies (from voting percentages, it’s clear that less than 10% of 
voters support their policies and what they stand for).  
 
 
276 Hlabi Morudu and Jamie Halsall, “Service delivery protests in South African municipalities: An 
exploration using principal component regression and 2013 data,” Cogent Social Sciences 3, 1(2017), 
1. 
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Research from Nhlapo, Anderson and Wentzel shows that in 2014, 86% of older Africans and 
83% of young Africans supported the ANC.278 This is far removed from a homogenous 
“people” who are against the establishment; these people indeed support the establishment.  
 
Characteristic two: The anti-establishment party is considered an underdog, leading to the 
notion that they, just like the people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions 
(such as the media). This relates to the so-called ‘silent majority’ whose input is stifled by the 
establishment. 
 
Malema and the EFF frequently present themselves as the underdog and claim as much in press 
statements: “The conditions of the black man remain underdog [sic]”.279 It should be noted that 
claiming to be the underdog and highlighting inequality and the disadvantages faced by black 
people is different from claiming to be excluded from the establishment. The former is raising 
legitimate concerns, whereas the latter implies being stifled by the establishment.  
 
In 2018 the party claimed its leadership has received death threats over its policies, but they 
added the following: “The ruling party is known for internal political killings to suppress its 
own members and activists, and it looks like they now intend to export the political killings to 
other political parties.”280 With this statement, the EFF is directly accusing the establishment 
of (literally) silencing the party and its leaders. Similarly, Malema has claimed that he is under 
attack by the “kleptocratic state” after his email account was allegedly hacked.281 
 
Despite their failure to provide concrete evidence, the party maintained that “the IEC is 
colluding with the ANC to prevent the reality that the ANC might go below 50% in 
 
278 Mosidi Nhalapo, Barbara Anderson and Marie Wentzel, “Trends in Voting in South Africa,” 
Unpublished Report from the Population Studies Centre, (2017).  
279 EFF Statement on the Steve Biko Day Commemorations, EFF Website, 
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280 The Economic Freedom fighters statement on covert plans to assassinate commander in Chief 
Julius Malema, EFF website, https://www.effonline.org/single-post/2018/04/17/THE-ECONOMIC-
FREEDOM-FIGHTERS-STATEMENT-ON-COVERT-PLANS-TO-ASSASINATE-COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF-
JULIUS-MALEMA (accessed 30 May 2018). 
281 Malema: I’m under Attack by kleptocratic state, EWN, http://ewn.co.za/2017/10/24/malema-i-m-
under-attack-by-kleptocratic-state (accessed 29 May 2018). 
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Gauteng”282, and this is the portrayal of the establishment as not only stifling the EFF but 
preventing them from legitimating gaining access to government.  
 
The EFF has also, on numerous accusations, attacked the media as extensions of the 
establishment. In 2018 Malema accused television network ENCA of “perpetuating and 
defending white privilege”283 and that the “white-owned media houses have taken a position” 
on land expropriation284. These statements are indicative of their perception that the 
establishment and the media are in essence “against” the party.  
 
Characteristic three: Anti-establishment parties claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox 
political party (unlike the predictable establishment).  
 
Mbete points out that the EFF “mark themselves as the practitioners of a kind of low politics 
that is opposed to the high politics of the elite”285. This is manifested in their dress code (red 
berets, overalls, and the clothes of domestic workers) and its use of military language from the 
days of the liberation struggle (“Commander in Chief”), which appears to out of place in a 
democratic dispensation.  
 
The party does this consciously to affiliate itself with “the people”. Malema acknowledged as 
much when he was asked about their dress code: “To you proper is white, to you proper is 
European. We are not white; we are going to wear those uniforms. We are defying colonialist 
decorum. We are not English-made. We are workers, and we are going to wear those clothes 
and we are unapologetic about it.”286 
 
282 Election Uproar: EFF accuse IEC of rigging Gauteng results, eNCA, 
https://www.enca.com/elections-2014-south-africa/election-uproar-eff-accuse-iec-rigging-gauteng-
results (accessed 30 May 2018). 
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Guardian, https://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-04-malema-we-are-not-white-we-are-going-to-wear-
those-uniforms (accessed 31 May 2018).  
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Furthermore, their disdain for parliamentary procedures and rules (and even challenging the 
very legitimacy of those rules) is also indicative of the party’s claim to be unorthodox.287 There 
are many examples of them disrupting parliamentary proceedings, and even being violently 
removed from the chambers. It can be argued that the party aimed for this disruptive, 
unconventional strategy and Malema explains it as follows: “This strategy is the one that is 
going to win us votes in 2019 to remove the ANC. A kleptocracy must be removed from 
government and you don't do it by giving it red roses. You remove it through the programme 
of action that will win society over and expose the shenanigans of this kleptocracy.”288 
 
Characteristic four: An anti-establishment party often proposes the simplification or 
trivialisation of more complex issues.  
 
Early in 2018 Malema reacted to a white journalist joining a SABC radio station (an extension 
of the establishment) by saying they must stop “whiteness from taking over the only platform 
of black people before it’s too late”.289 It can be argued that this position simplifies and 
exaggerates the situation: It’s one appointment within an organisation that has transformed in 
many aspects. It’s this oversimplification of a more nuanced picture that characterises an anti-
establishment party.   
 
Some of the EFFs central policies are the expropriation of land without compensation and the 
nationalisation of mines, banks and other strategic sectors. To the party, these issues are not 
intricate with many aspects to it; it refers to these issues as “non-negotiable” in its founding 
manifesto with no discussion on the economic, cultural, or social impact of the issues.290 
 
The party has acknowledged that its policies have been inspired by policies implemented in 
Zimbabwe and Venezuela. The former’s rapid land expropriation without compensation and 
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responds-to-malemas-accusations-of-whiteness/  (accessed 31 May 2018). 
290 EFF statement on land expropriation, voter registration and restoration of the rule of law, EFF 
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the latter’s nationalisation of especially the oil industry helped formed the EFFs own 
policies.291 Whilst Scoones’ research has indicated limited success of the land reform 
programme in Zimbabwe292, the work of many others such as Moyo293, Hawkins294 and 
Sibanda295 indicate that the programme led to many economic hardships. 750 000 jobs were 
lost between 1998 and 2011 and hyperinflation caused the government to desperately print 
money and switch currencies.296  
 
The infrastructure and technologies around the agricultural industry also collapsed, and by 
2006, “there were between 1.9 and 4 million ‘food-insecure’ people. The question is not on 
which side of the debate one stands, but that the topic is not simplistic in nature. There is little 
acknowledgement from the EFF that their economic policy is based on complicated issues with 
a potential colossal impact on the economy.  
 
Characteristic five: The anti-establishment party has an image of a taboo-breaker with the aim 
to polarise issues.  
 
The EFF often portrays itself as a party that does not play by the same rules as the 
establishment, even if it means breaking the law. Malema has repeatedly called on people to 
illegally occupy the land, during so-called “land grabs”.297 “It [land grabs] is what the Freedom 
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Charter says and if any court finds me guilty then it will have to find the Freedom Charter an 
illegal document,” Malema has said on occasion.298 
 
He has also shown disdain for the law by not showing up for court appearances, claiming he is 
“not scared of prison because of the land question”.299 This is an indication of a taboo-breaker, 
a party that does not bow to the conventions, decorum and ultimately laws of the establishment.  
 
Breaking these taboos often lead to polarising issues. The EFF’s national spokesperson 
Mbuyiseni Ndlozi has acknowledged that this is the party’s aim. Polarisation, or put differently, 
the colonial contradiction, must therefore not be monitored or even postponed,” he writes on 
the party’s website. “It must be driven to its logical conclusion, which is the defeat of the 
colonial economisation of blackness.”300 
 
Characteristic six: Anti-establishment parties often show aggression towards political 
adversaries (‘the establishment uses consensus and proper channels, but that is not effective’).  
 
The EFF has, on several occasions, displayed violence against its adversaries, or has threatened 
with violence. Early in 2018, Malema tweeted: “We will never be told by any fool on how to 
fight against our oppression particularly those who have never been at the picket lines. There's 
no formula on how you should fight the oppressor.” This suggests that the party sees violence 
as legitimate and part of their fight against oppression.301 There are many examples of the party 
promoting or engaging in violence: 
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• In an online opinion piece, Ndlozi argues for the use of violence by black people, 
claiming “the path of decolonisation requires nothing less”.302 This followed after 
Malema yelled “fighters attack” during a student gathering where the EFF had 
reportedly not book the venue.  
 
• Early in 2018 party members protested outside a high school over its language and 
admissions policy. The protest turned violent, with police using stun grenades and 
rubber bullets to disperse the crowd. 
 
• The party has also decided to vote to remove Nelson Mandela Bay mayor Athol Trollip 
because he is white. “So, these people, when you want to hit them hard – go after a 
white man,” Malema said after their decision was made public. “They feel a terrible 
pain because you have touched a white man. We are starting with this whiteness. We 
are cutting the throat of whiteness.”303 
 
• In July 2018 Malema posted a video on social media of controversial U.S. activist Louis 
Farrakhan in which he calls on black people to use violence against white people to 
rectify injustices. “There is no freedom without the shedding of blood; I'm sorry to say 
this, nonviolence is not going to bring the land back to us, our unity will keep us from 
having to fire a shot . . .” Farrakhan says in the video, to which Malema responded with 
“amen”.304 
 
Besides these six characteristics, Hartleb is of view that anti-establishment parties often form 
fairly quickly, often without solid leadership structures in place. This is indeed the case with 
the EFF. Merely a year after he was expelled from the ANC, Malema started the EFF.305 He, 
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and other leaders were part of the ANC Youth league but had to suddenly create structures for 
a political party, one that contested in national elections shortly after. It will be a mistake to 
equate the hasty formation of a party as a marker for an anti-establishment party, but this is 
usually, according to Hartleb, accompanied by their ability to “turn markers of exclusion of the 
people into attributes if their supporters”306.  
 
4.6 Conclusion and way forward 
This chapter addressed anti-establishment as a characteristic of populism, especially located 
within the supply-side. The EFF interprets the people as sovereign (and that power resides with 
the elite); the EFF equates “the people” to the forgotten ones in the second interpretation, and 
they also have a racial interpretation of the context of the nation. In contrast, the political ANC 
elite has been described as being there for self-interest and not to the benefit of “the people”.  
 
The establishment’s own failure, and a subsequent crisis of representation, showed that it’s not 
only opposition parties that drive the anti-establishment notion, but often failures from the 
ruling party, lead to an anti-establishment sentiment. Finally, the response to the crisis of 
representation was discussed in connection with the EFF as an anti-establishment party. 
 
Barr’s definitions of the locus of origin helped to frame the role players, linkage research 
contextualised waning ANC support and Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment 
party gave insights into the EFF as a populist party.  
 
4.6.1 Contribution to literature  
In this discussion, it was also refuted that South African politics has a uniquely local 
interpretation of the presence of populism (observation 1 in the literature review). This 
dissertation shows that we do not function in a vacuum and anti-establishment’s theories from 
Mudde and Kaltwasser, Barr and Hartleb were applied to the local context, showing that 
international theory can indeed be applied to populism within South Africa.  
 
It was also shown how this dissertation applies the ideational approach and give attention to 
the much-neglected aspect of anti-establishment (observation 2 in the literature review). The 
 
306 Francisco Panizza, “Populism and Political Parties,” in Christóbal Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina 
Espejo and Pierre Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 415. 
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EFF as a populist party is analysed within this context and Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-
establishment party is applicable – something that has not been done in the local context.  
 
In the final chapter a detailed discussion will be presented, together with a  new consolidated 
framework for understanding anti-establishment theory. It will be shown specifically how the 
practical application of anti-establishment discussed in this chapter fill the gaps in the existing 
research on populism in South Africa.  
 
4.6.2 The next chapter 
In the following chapter, the argument will be broadened even more with a focus on economic 
inequalities. The locus is now shifted to society, thus the demand-side factors. Historically, and 
certainly in the South African context theorists have almost exclusively focused on the supply-
side and how political parties drive populism, but the next chapter will show how economic 






















Chapter 5: Economic inequality 
 
By most measures, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world.307, 308, 309 
More than two decades after the end of apartheid the country still struggles with rising 
poverty310, slow economic growth311 and has been downgraded to credit junk status312.  
 
Research indicates that the injustices of apartheid have created a society in which prosperity is 
directly linked to our efforts to address the lasting and crippling legacy of the system.313 
Reports from Statistics SA has shown that more than 50% of SA’s population is living in 
poverty and the number of people living below the 2015 poverty line of R441 per person per 
month, or in extreme poverty, increased to 13.8 million in 2015.314 It’s striking that for about 
76% of the population poverty is a constant threat in their daily lives.315 
 
Besides a high unemployment rate, which will be discussed later, the labour market is also 
sharply divergent: A small number of people are in the formal sector receive high salaries and 
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a large number of people have employment in the informal sector with extremely low wages 
and income.316 
 
Furthermore, the overall economy slipped into a technical recession during the second quarter 
of 2018, with a 2.6% contraction in the first, and 0.7% in the second quarter.317 In 1995 the 
country’s GDP grew by almost 8% and mostly kept steady after that until the global recession 
hit the country in 2008 and the economy contracted by 6%. Since 2014 the GDP has 
systematically declined, hitting the second-lowest point since 1994.318 
 
Flowing from the abovementioned macro context is an inherent inequality in South African 
communities that’s often traceable to the injustices of apartheid.  
 
As mentioned before, economic inequality is perhaps the most widely-held view of mass 
support for populism.319 The economic inequalities perspective has been applied to both 
developed countries (recently in the USA) and developing countries (Venezuela, Brazil). For 
this theory to be applicable it is not just sufficient to show economic hardships in general, but 
the inequality in economic prospects is key in fuelling populism. 
 
In chapter two, many indicators of economic inequality, such as little or no income and 
unemployment, were mentioned and discussed populism. This chapter will expand on each of 
these concepts and will essentially follow a two-fold process: 
 
• Five aspects of economic inequality will be discussed, namely: income, race, 
unemployment, education and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, 
internet). The local context and manifestation of each of these will be expanded on to 
ultimately understand how prevalent the problem is and the implication and 
ramifications of each indicator.  
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• As mentioned before, it is necessary to show these economic hardships being present 
amongst those who support a populist party. In South Africa, this research will examine 
the economic circumstances of those who support the EFF (“the people”) that is in stark 
contrast to the DA supporters (“the elite”). An explanation of this rationale will follow.  
 
As seen in chapter two, Resnick argues that Malema and the EFF have equated “the elite” with 
white people (race).  Malema’s stance is indicative of defining “the people” in ethnic terms 
(black people in this instance). South Africa “belongs” to black people, he argues, and they are 
the “rightful owners” of the country. In essence, white people are seen as “foreigners”. Even 
the predominantly black leadership of the ANC is seen as representatives of “white monopoly 
capitalism”, thus making them part of “the elite”. 
 
Betz’s320 argument that the economically marginalised often blame ethnic minorities for their 
dire circumstances is applicable in South Africa.  
 
320 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe, 40. 
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If this thesis is to be applied within the local context, supporters of the EFF will fall within the 
“economic have-nots” (or “the people”) category and the ethnic minority into the “economic 
haves” (or “the elite”) category.  
 
What outcome will validate the economic inequality argument as support for populism in South 
Africa? The EFF strongholds will be economically marginalised, and an analysis of the five 
indicators will show their dire circumstances. Antithetically, the DA strongholds with majority 
white citizens will be economically more prosperous with the abovementioned indicators 
forming a stark contrast with those of EFF strongholds.  
 
Why are the DA strongholds with white citizens considered representatives of “the elite”? The 
party’s electoral support mostly comes from racial minorities that tend to be much wealthier 
than the black majority (thus creating inequality). In the 2014 national elections, the DA got 
almost 93% of the white vote321 and only 1% of white people live in poverty322, compared to 
64% of black people and 41% of coloured people respectively.  
 
The DA does have the most diverse voter profile of all the major political parties, but at the 
same time, the party has, by far, the majority of white voters. This conglomeration of white 
voters (within the DA) makes it conceptually comparable to the black majority within the EFF. 
One could also theoretically use the Freedom Front Plus who has almost exclusively white 
voters, but a significant minority of the total white voters compared to the DA. There is thus 
an argument to be made that the comparison is fairer when one compares the DA to the EFF, 
rather than the FF+ to the EFF. The comparison here is thus not so much between the two 
parties per se, but between “the people” (EFF) and “the elite” (DA).  
 
Although coloured people is also considered a racial minority, comprising 9% of the 
population, they are not included in “the elite” in the South African context due to their high 
rate of poverty and indeed they are not included in EFF’s interpretation of “the elite”. White 
people, however, is included in their interpretation and the party has, on many occasions come 
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out against the “white DA”. When comparing the macro environment, one thus has to be 
cautious in one’s analysis. Although DA voters comprise of the vast majority of white people, 
coloured and Indian people (and to a far lesser extent a minority of black people) also vote for 
the party in significant numbers. This has to be considered when analysing inequality in South 
Africa. An even more detailed justification will be included in the micro-level discussion of 
the different wards below – and it will be illustrated how the DA strongholds contain mostly 
white people (“the elite”). 
 
5.1 Indicators of inequality in SA  
As mentioned before there are many indicators of inequality and this research will focus on 
income, race, unemployment, education and resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, 
internet). The relation of each to populist support is as follows: 
 
• income (international theory shows those will less income are likely to support a 
populist party such as the EFF) 
• race (in the USA white people are more likely to support a populist party, but in SA it 
will be shown that is overwhelmingly black people who support the EFF) 
• unemployment (supporters of a populist party are more likely to unemployed, similar 
to populist EFF supporters) 
• education (international theory also shows that those who are less educated are more 
likely to support a populist party such as the EFF) 
• resources (housing, transport, sanitation, water, internet) (supporters of populist parties 
such as the EFF have generally fewer resources) 
 
5.2 Understanding the local context  
It is imperative to understand that South Africa is a complex society and the populist EFF is 
not the party of government. They do not have the majority of the support and thus it would be 
incorrect to look at the bigger picture and not zooming in on the party’s support. For instance: 
The majority of South Africans are black, and the majority of poor South Africans are black. 
They do not, however, support the EFF, but rather the ANC. The same parallel can be drawn 
in other countries such as France. The majority of French citizens do not support the populist 
Front National, but one has to zoom in on the supporters of the party to get a closer picture of 
the reasons for the support of populism.  
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Furthermore, the majority of South African citizens are poor, unlike the majority of French 
citizens. Economic inequality is thus never the only factor influencing support for a populist 
party. If that was indeed the case most of the poor, black supporters of the ANC would rather 
support the EFF. It does, however, indicate a vulnerability of this group to eventually switch 
their support to that of the EFF. Economic inequality is thus not the only factor influencing 
support for populism and it does not exclude future support for populism.  
 
Why the need to raise this argument? The practical application below will indicate that the EFF 
supporters are indeed economically marginalised, and the DA supporters are generally 
economically prosperous.  
 
Indeed, in other countries where populism has taken root, supporters are economically 
marginalised, and systematically more economically vulnerable voters move over to the 
populist side. This is not to say that it will inevitably happen in the SA context, but it does 
indicate the potential for it to happen. One of the reasons why one would study the demand-
side causes of populism is to identify these causes and not to postulate why they have not 
progressed to include all the potential supporters who fit the voter profile.   
 
5.3 Practical application of economic inequality  
In the following section, a practical application of the economic inequality will give insight 
into the support for the populist EFF. First, research from Ipsos into the general supporter 
profiles of the three major parties will be discussed. Special attention will be given to the EFF 
versus the DA supporter profiles to interrogate the economic inequality of their voters.  
 
Whilst this will give a general picture of the supporter profiles and their respective economic 
circumstances, it’s limited in scope and not indicative of the local, micro picture of economic 
inequalities. To achieve an analysis on this level, data from the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) for the 2016 Local Government Elections will be utilised. An analysis of 
the economic environment and specifically the five above-mentioned indicators in respectively 
EFF and DA strongholds will indicate the “economic haves” (DA) and the “economic have-
nots” (EFF), to illustrate that supporters of populist parties (“the people”) are considered 
economically marginalised and “forgotten” compared to those of elitist parties who are 
economically prosperous.  
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5.3.1 Economic inequality: The macro picture (overall party support) 
Research from Ipsos323 shows that there are indeed significant differences in the economic 
composition of respectively EFF and DA voters. This study was conducted on a randomly 
selected sample of South Africans and one should bear in mind that the profile of a typical 
voter for each party is perhaps not the quintessential data of those voters, but it does give a 
general snapshot of the voters. Even with strict scientific rigour lacking in the methodology of 
this study (for example a random sample of 3 564 South Africans were approached, as opposed 
to actual voters), the general information is useful as a genesis from which more detailed data 
will be explored.  
 
According to the study, only 22% of EFF supporters have full-time employment, compared to 
43% of DA supporters. 18% of DA participant supporters are unemployed (with a further 6% 
being discouraged work-seekers) and 40% and 5% of EFF supporters are respectively 
unemployed or are discouraged job-seekers. The highest monthly income group for EFF 
supporters is R2 500 – R4 900 (19%) and R20 000+ for DA supporters (21%). Furthermore, 
18% of DA supporters have tertiary education, compared to 6% of EFF supporters. Lastly, 
about half of DA supporters are white and 99% of EFF supporters are black.  
 
One can note that there are indeed significant economic differences between the supporters of 
the DA and EFF. The typical EFF supporter is black (racial inequality is thus at play), less 
likely to be educated and earn less per month than the average DA supporter. Despite caution 
that must be exerted with the results, an overall picture emerges that supporters of the populist 
EFF are economically worse off than that of “elite”, white DA supporters. In the next section, 
this statement will be explored with more rigour and detail.  
 
5.3.2 Economic inequality: The micro picture (wards)  
There are 278 municipalities in South Africa, comprising 8 metropolitan, 44 district and 226 
local municipalities.324 The metropolitan and local municipalities are further divided into 4 392 
 
323 Mari Harris, The supporter profiles of SA's three largest parties – Ipsos, PoliticsWeb, 
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/the-supporter-profiles-of-sas-three-largest-partie 
(accessed 13 November 2018).  
324 Local Government, South African Government, https://www.gov.za/about-
government/government-system/local-government (accessed 16 November 2018).  
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wards.325 For the purpose of this research, an analysis will be done for the EFF and DA 
strongholds in especially the wards to get a more accurate, micro picture. 
 
The EFF won no municipalities in the 2016 Local Government Elections but the party did 
achieve above 50% support in three wards: ward 26 in Madibeng Local Municipality in North 
West (57.82%), ward 45 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (50.61%) and ward 13 in 
Polokwane Local Municipality (51.18%).  
 
The EFF also gained 40%+ in 18 wards: ward 32 in Madibeng Local Municipality (40.28%) 
in North West; wards 2, 3, 24, 28, 31, 32, 37, and 38 in Rustenburg Local Municipality 
(40.87%, 42.81%, 46.52%, 46.28%, 41.83%, 44.36%, 42.68% and 46.96% respectively); 
wards 3, 100 and 102 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (45.21%, 40.68% and 45.95%); 
and wards 10, 11, 12, 17, 25 and 26 in Polokwane Local Municipality (41.19%, 44.71%, 
40.39%, 40.23%, 44.65% and 45.42% respectively). 
 
All 21 of these abovementioned wards can be interpreted as significant support for the EFF. 
These communities support the EFF quite substantially (both in Public Representative votes 
and Ward Councillor votes). 
 
The DA’s biggest support base is in the Western Cape and in 2016 the party got 63.3% of the 
vote in the province. In the City of Cape Town, the party won 67% of the vote.326 Due to having 
the majority support in the province, the Western Cape will naturally be the focal point as being 
representative of the party’s support, specifically on establishing the “economic haves”, in 
contrast to the “economic have-nots” of the EFF.  
 
Having said that, Gauteng is the party’s second-biggest support base with it achieving 37.23% 
of the 2016 results. Gauteng is considered the economic hub of South Africa327, so it would 
unwise in an analysis of “economic inequality” to avoid this province in the analysis.  
 
325 Marianne Merten, LGE 2016: #Ivoted, the Numbers and the Rules, Daily Maverick, 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-02-lge-2016-ivoted-the-numbers-and-the-
rules/ (accessed 16 November 2018). 
326 City of Cape Town, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/municipality-CPT-city-of-cape-town/ 
(accessed 20 November 2018).  
327 Results for: GDP by province, StatsSA, 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?s=gdp+by+province&pg=17 (accessed 20 November 2018). 
102 
 
It would be a massive undertaking to analyse every ward the DA has received the majority of 
the vote in these two provinces and will certainly be beyond the scope of this research. The 
purpose, after all, is to establish anthesis to EFF wards. The criterium that was used for the 
latter was strongholds of the party. In the context of their support, it could be ascertained that 
it would translate into wards where the party received 40%+ of the support. A fair comparison 
of DA strongholds in the Western Cape would be to look at wards where the party achieved 
95%+ of the support. This may seem like a high threshold, but one has to realise that the DA’s 
support is very strong in the Western Cape and what’s “strong” for the EFF is not necessarily 
“strong” for the DA. In the context of Gauteng, a fair threshold is 88%+ of the support in a 
particular ward.  
 
There are 11 wards in the Western Cape where the DA gained more than 95% of the support 
(both public representative and ward votes). If one were to consider the next bracket of support 
(90%+) 44 wards are to be analysed. That’s more than double the EFF wards that were analysed 
and it could be argued that by adding the 90-94.99% bracket one is not advancing the argument 
of economic inequality significantly. Thus, for the purpose of this research, the 11 wards in the 
Western Cape where the DA achieved more than 95% of the support will be analysed.  
 
The same argument can be presented for Gauteng where the DA has achieved 88%+ in 14 
wards. The next bracket of support (85%+) there would be 42 wards and adding these will 
result in a far more substantial analysis of the DA than the EFF. Therefore the 14 wards in 
Gauteng where the DA gained more than 88% of the support will be analysed. This results in 
21 wards that will be analysed for EFF support and 25 wards being analysed for DA support. 
This seems representative of both parties’ strongholds and is fair in comparison.  
 
The DA strongholds in the Western Cape are wards 5, 21, 70 and 103 in the City of Cape Town 
(95.6%, 95.6%, 95.4% and 95% of the votes respectively); wards 4 and 15 in the Drakenstein 
Local Municipality (95.6% and 96.7% votes respectively); wards 7 and 22 in the Stellenbosch 
Local Municipality (96.7% and 95.6%); and wards 3, 7 and 13 in the Overstrand Local 
Municipality (97.5%, 97.2% and 97% of the votes in each ward). 
 
The DA strongholds in Gauteng are wards 44, 69 and 82 in the City of Tshwane (88.7%, 89.2% 
and 88.9% of the votes respectively); wards 83 and 126 in the City of Johannesburg (88.2% 
and 89% respectively); wards 18 and 21 in Mogale City Local municipality (89.2% and 89.4% 
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of the votes); wards 2, 3 and 14 in Midvaal Local Municipality (90.6%, 91.5%, and 94.7%); 
and wards 18, 19, 27 and 28 in the City of Ekurhuleni (89.6%, 92.8%, 91.9% and 90.5% of the 
votes respectively).  
 
Regarding the DA wards being representative of white people (“the elite”), below is a table 
depicting the percentage of the total population of each DA stronghold that white people 
comprise. It is clear that the majority of all the wards are white people, thus representative of 
the EFF’s interpretation of “the elite”.  
 
Ward White people as % of population 
City of Cape Town ward 5 73% 
City of Cape Town ward 21 86% 
City of Cape Town ward 70 80% 
City of Cape Town ward 103 81% 
Drakenstein Local Municipality ward 4 75% 
Drakenstein Local Municipality ward 15 75% 
Stellenbosch Local Municipality ward 7 85% 
Stellenbosch Local Municipality ward 22 76% 
Overstrand Local Municipality ward 3 82% 
Overstrand Local Municipality ward 7 89% 
Overstrand Local Municipality ward 13 90% 
City of Tshwane ward 44 80% 
City of Tshwane ward 69 83% 
City of Tshwane ward 82 69% 
City of Johannesburg ward 83 76% 
City of Johannesburg ward 126 63% 
Mogale City Local municipality ward 18 84% 
Mogale City Local municipality ward 21 82% 
Midvaal Local Municipality ward 2 81% 
Midvaal Local Municipality ward 3 84% 
Midvaal Local Municipality ward 14 94% 
City of Ekurhuleni ward 18 64% 
City of Ekurhuleni ward 19 69% 
City of Ekurhuleni ward 27 81% 









For the purpose of this analysis data from various instruments were used. Wazimap328, an 
online data collection tool compiled by non-profit organisation Media Monitoring Africa, was 
the key portal for data. The election results of the 2016 Local Government Elections was 
provided by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).329 All other economic data via 
Wazimap had Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) as an origin, with the 2011 Census330 results 
or the 2016 Community Survey331 as a basis.  
 
Addendum A contains the detailed information of the EFF strongholds and addendum B 
contains the details of the DA strongholds. This information will henceforth be discussed in 
relation to the economic situation and the different indicators of inequality.  
 
5.3.1.1 Income 
The average household income provided in Addendum A and B was calculated “finding the 
median income band, and then using the middle of that band's income. For example, if the 
median income band is ‘R153 801 - R307 600’, then we use R230 700 as the average household 
income.”332 This is not a comprehensive indicator of disposable income, but it does provide an 
opportunity for a fair comparison, which falls within the realm of usability for this study. The 
purpose of this research is to provide the contrast between the “have’s” and “have nots” and 
the median household income is thus a suitable measure. Additionally, a breakdown of all the 
income brackets is provided for each ward to get an even more detailed picture.  
 
In graph A, a comparison between the 25 DA strongholds and the 21 EFF strongholds in terms 
of median annual household income, is provided. This provides a visual snapshot of the income 
inequality between the two parties’ strongholds and it’s clear that the DA wards have a 
significantly higher disposable income than the EFF wards.  
 
328 About Wazimap, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/about (accessed 22 November 2018).  
329 Municipal election results, Official IEC Website, 
http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Municipal-elections-results/ (accessed 22 November 
2018). 
330 Statistics South Africa, “Census 2011,” Unpublished report, (2012).  
331 Statistics South Africa, “Statistical Release: Community Survey 2016,” Unpublished report, (2016).  
332 How can I use the ‘Average annual household income’ and ‘Monthly income’ figures?, Wazimap, 





Out of all the EFF wards, the highest annual disposable income is R57 300 (7 wards) with the 
middle being R29 400 (9 wards) and the lowest being R14 600 (4 wards). The average income 
in ward 26 in Polokwane is R2 400, but this outlier can likely be ascribed to the fact that this 
ward is firmly situated in a university context (the University of Limpopo). 48% of households 
have no income and the average age of residents is 22. This fits the profile of young students 
who earn little to no income and it would not be a fair comparison to include this ward.  
 
Contrary to this, the highest income in DA wards is R461 000 (2 wards), the middle group 
earns R230 700 (18 wards) and the lowest income is R115 100 (4 wards). Similar to the EFF, 
the DA has one outlier ward: ward 7 in Stellenbosch. The average household income here is 
R29 400, but this ward is associated with Stellenbosch University and other tertiary institutions. 
The average age is 23 and 43% of residents earn no income. One can thus discard this ward for 
the purposes of the income analysis.  
 
As previously stated, the poorest 10% of households earn less than R10 000 per year with the 
top 10% earning R265 000 per year.333  From these averages, it’s clear the EFF is much closer 
to the bottom 10% of households with R36 205* as an average. The DA is much closer to the 
richest 10% with an average of R230 625**.  
 
333 Neva Makgetla, “Inequality in South Africa,” 15. 
* (R57 300 x 7) + (R29 400 x 9) + (R14 600 x 4) = R724 100 / 20 wards = R36 205 




Looking at the more detailed income break-down, DA strongholds have at least 1% of 
households in each ward who earns more than R2.5 million per household per year. This figure 
is indicative of economic prosperity, compared to the EFF wards where no households were 
earning above R2.5 million annually. 
 
In graph B the averages of the different income groups are presented. Almost 26% of the 
households in EFF strongholds earn R40 000 – R75 000 annually, whilst 21% of DA 
strongholds earn R300 000 – R600 000 annually. A further 18.1% of EFF households earn only 
 R20 000 – R40 000 per year, whilst an average of 12% of DA households earn R600 000 – 
R1.2 million annually.  
 
It’s thus fair to deduct that Inglehart and Norris’s hypothesis that supporters of populism 
generally have a lower income, can indeed be applied to the South African context. From the 
above analysis, the wards where the EFF has strong support are earning significantly less than 
the wards with strong DA support. This illustrates the “haves” versus the “have-nots” and the 
“elite” versus “the people”, concepts that were discussed before.  
 
 
5.3.1.2 Race and inequality  
Race is still an important barometer for inequality in the South African context. Now that the 
income inequality in EFF and DA strongholds has been established, it’s imperative to indicate 
the racial make-up of these strongholds. 
 
It’s clear from graph C that the majority o EFF strongholds (98.3%) consist of black people 




latter might be more diverse, but the polarity of the support base of the two parties is quite 





If one is to look at the Makgetla’s research presented earlier that the median household income 
in 2015 was R2 900 (R34 800 annually) for black people and R20 000 (R240 000 annually) 
for white people, the current data (R36 205 for EFF wards and R230 625 for DA wards) 
supports the national trend that black people earn significantly less than the white minority.334 
 
According to Stats SA, whites earn 5 times more than black South Africans.335 In this instance 
the average household in a DA ward (which is 78% white) earns 6.4 times more than the 
average EFF ward (which is 98% black), outstripping the Stats SA figure by 1.4 times.  
 
It is thus logical to conclude that supporters of the populist EFF (the “people” or “have-nots”) 
are mostly poor and black, and the supporters of the DA (the “elite” or “haves”) are mostly 
economically prosperous and white. Contrary to the USA and many European countries with 
strong populist parties where white people are often seen as “the people”, the forgotten ones 
who are economically marginalised336, the local context shows a similar division along racial 




334 Neva Makgetla, “Inequality in South Africa,” 15. 
335 Whites earn 5 times more than blacks in South Africa: Stats SA, BusinessTech, (accessed 13 
November 2018). 
336 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15. 
Graph C Graph D 
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5.3.1.3 Unemployment  
Unemployment remains an important driver of economic inequality. As mentioned before, an 
estimated 30% of the black workforce is unemployed, but actively looking for a job, compared 
to just 6.7% of the white workforce.337 Black people are disproportionately disadvantaged and 
comparing EFF and DA strongholds, this trend is discernible. In graph E it’s clear that the 
employment rates in DA wards are significantly higher than those of EFF wards.  
 
The highest employment rate in an EFF stronghold is 59.6% in ward 32 in Rustenburg, whilst 
the highest employment rate in a DA stronghold is 79.5% in ward 126 in the City of 
Johannesburg. This is an almost 20% difference in the employment rate.  
 
Disregarding ward 26 in Polokwane (EFF stronghold) and ward 7 in Stellenbosch (DA 
stronghold), for reasons discussed earlier, the lowest employment rate in an EFF stronghold is 
28.5% in ward 28 in Rustenburg, whilst the lowest employment rate for a DA ward is 47.3% 
in ward 3 in Overstrand. Again, disregarding the abovementioned predominantly student 
wards, the average employment rate of an EFF stronghold is 46.24% and 67.4% for a DA 
stronghold, that’s a 21.16% difference in averages.  
 
 
337 Ramaphosa right about ‘big difference’ between black & white unemployment in SA, AfricaCheck, 





In graphs F and G respectively, the unemployment and discouraged work-seeker rates are 
visually presented. The employed rate mentioned earlier is important to gage economic status, 
but this does not give an indication of the unemployment rate (for example, the elderly 
receiving pensions are not included in the employment rate, but it also does not mean that they 
do not get an income). 
 
The highest unemployment rate in an EFF stronghold is 34.4% in ward 100 in the City of 
Ekurhuleni and the highest unemployment rate for a DA stronghold is 6.1% which is ward 13 
in Overstrand. Similarly, the highest rate of discouraged work seekers is 7.4% for the EFF in 
ward 11 in Polokwane and 1.7% for the DA in ward 3 in Midvaal. The average unemployment 





With the national unemployment rate standing at 27.5%, the EFF strongholds are much closer 
to this than the DA strongholds and with the EFF wards being 98%+ black and the DA wards 
78%+ white, the narrative of the economically marginalised “have-nots” versus the 
economically prosperous “haves” comes to the foreground. The theory that supporters of 




As mentioned before, Inglehart and Norris argue that populist supporters are generally less 
educated – something that is closely related to economic prosperity.338 Just over 3.3% of blacks 
aged between 18 and 29 attended university in 2016, compared to more than 17% of whites.339  
In the current research, this theoretical perspective is confirmed. From graph H one can see 
that DA strongholds have significantly more university education, compared to the relatively 
low numbers in EFF wards. The highest and lowest rates of university education in DA 
strongholds are 54% (ward 22 in Stellenbosch) and 11% (ward 3 in Midvaal) respectively, with 
the EFF being 24% (ward 12 in Polokwane) and 0% (several wards). The average DA ward 
has 30.83% university-educated residents and the average EFF ward has only 4.4% of 
university-educated residents.  
 
338 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 12-15. 
339 Alex Mitchly, Racial disparities persist at universities – StatsSA, News24, 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/racial-disparities-persist-at-universities-statssa-




Similarly, those who have completed a grade 9 or higher in DA strongholds are significantly 
higher than those in EFF wards (see Graph I). The average percentage of people who have 
completed grade 9 or higher in a DA stronghold is 88.68% and 64.08% in an EFF stronghold.   
 
Conversely, this implies that 11.32% of residents in DA strongholds do not have an education 
higher than grade 9 and 35.92% of residents in EFF strongholds do not have an education of 
grade 9 or higher.  
 
Another possible indicator of education status is the percentage of school-aged children being 





gateway to tertiary education and ultimately the job market. On average 86.59% of school-
aged children in EFF wards are in school and 89.51% of school-aged children in DA 
strongholds are in school.  
 
The lowest and highest level of this measure in an EFF stronghold is 61.5% (ward 38 in 
Rustenburg) and 97.9% (ward 12 in Polokwane) respectively and in a DA stronghold 52.7% 
(ward 4 in Drakenstein) and 95.4% (ward 69 in the City of Tshwane). Ward 4 in Drakenstein 
Local Municipality is likely an anomaly; when one looks closer at the data provided by Stats 
SA, 42.8% of people in the ward did not indicate this measure, and only 4.5% of school-aged 
children were reportedly not in school. A possible speculatory explanation could be that data 
gathering was problematic in this ward in this regard, as all other economic indicators are 
consistent with patterns we have seen thus far for DA strongholds.  
 
In summary, the data from the education status of EFF and DA strongholds is an affirmation 
of the theoretical perspective that supporters of populist parties are generally less educated and 
this, in turn, has an adverse effect on economic status.  
 
5.3.1.5 Resources  
Lastly, material resources such as housing, transport, water and sanitation and internet access 
are important indicators of inequality in South Africa. It’s impossible to provide a detailed 
account of all resources in this research, but key differences (or in rare instances, similarities) 
will be pointed out.   
 
According to statistics cited earlier, the vast majority of white South Africans (99%) live in 
formal housing and only 76% of black people live in formal housing. It is visually striking in 
graph J that there is virtually nobody in DA strongholds who live in informal settlements, 
compared to very scattered results for EFF strongholds. The highest rate of people living in 
shacks in an EFF stronghold is 98.3% (ward 38 in Rustenburg) and 1.8% in a DA stronghold 
(ward 22 in Stellenbosch). The average for EFF wards is 30.733% and 0.496% for DA wards.  
This difference is prodigious and indicative of the economic inequality between support for a 




Similarly, DA strongholds own more houses (either fully paid or in the process of being paid 
off). An average of 62.42% of DA wards in this study own houses, compared to an average of 
27.41% of residents in EFF wards (see graph K for a breakdown). Homeownership is an 
important indicator of economic wealth, so one can deduct that EFF supporters in strongholds 
are economically worse off than DA supporters in their strongholds.  
 
Access to reliable and affordable transport is essential for economic prosperity, with 





fewer motor vehicles than white people, resulting in them a.) having less economic 
opportunities and b.) spending more on public transport that is generally unreliable. 
 
In this research, an average of 87.62% of residents of DA strongholds own a motor vehicle, 
whilst only 17.25% of residents of EFF strongholds own a motor vehicle. Graph L provides a 
visual representation of car owners and it’s clear that residents in DA wards own more cars and 
it would be logical to deduct that they have significantly more economic opportunities.    
 
In a global, digital context, access to the internet, is an important economic driver. An average 
of 73.02% of residents of DA strongholds have access to the internet, whilst only 30.49% of 
residents of EFF strongholds have internet access. This can have several implications: Besides 
knowledge about work opportunities, internet access allows people to gain access to jobs, to 
do research, to advance your economic situation, and to connect to communities around the 
country and the world. Graph M provides a visual representation of internet access in DA and 





Access to a flush toilet and refuse removal are indicative of the level of service delivery, but 
economically prosperous citizens can often afford to pay for their own services when 
government fails. It is for this reason that access to these basic services can be an indication of 
economic prosperity. With regards to this, the current research shows the following: 
 
• On average, 97.63% of residents in DA wards and 57.26% of residents in EFF wards 
have access to a flush toilet. The lowest rate for an EFF stronghold is Ward 38 in 
Rustenburg Local Municipality, with only 0.5% of residents who have access to a flush 
or chemical toilet. Ward 13 in Overstrand Local Municipality, a DA stronghold, is the 
lowest of that party with 93.1%. 
 
• On average, 96.72% of residents in DA wards and 68.47% of residents in EFF wards 
have access refuse removal. The lowest rate for an EFF stronghold is Ward 10 in 
Polokwane Local Municipality, with only 0.6% of residents who have access to refuse 
removal. Ward 22 in Stellenbosch Local Municipality, a DA stronghold, is the lowest 
of that party with 86.4%. 
 
It is thus fair to add the inequality in resources to the weight of the argument that supporters of 
populist parties are economically worse off than the “elite”. In the local context, the EFF 





5.4 Conclusion and the way forward 
This chapter aimed to ascertain whether supporters of populist parties are economically 
marginalised, compared to the “elites”. A detailed analysis was done of 21 EFF strongholds 
and 25 DA strongholds in terms of analysis of five economic indicators: income, race and 
inequality, unemployment, education and resources.  
 
Overwhelmingly, all indicators show that supporters of the EFF are economically worse off 
than DA supporters. Supporters from EFF strongholds earn significantly less, they are mostly 
black, face more unemployment, are less educated and have fewer resources than mostly white 
DA supporters, thus the elite. 
 
5.4.1 Contribution to literature 
In terms of the shortcomings of the existing research, it is evident that this chapter on economic 
inequality focusses on a neglected aspect of economic inequality and realises the relevance of 
it (observation 3 in the literature review). Similarly, it also utilises a demand-side approach 
(observation 2 in the literature review) and incorporate international theory from especially 
Inglehart and Norris (observation 1 in the literature review). A more detailed approach will 
follow in chapter seven, with a precise analysis of how this research on economic inequality 
fills the gaps in the current literature.  
 
It is, however, important to note that there are shortcomings with the methodology of this 
research. In the ideal world, one would sit down with every EFF voter and get a detailed 
account of their economic situation. This would be contrasted with gathering information from 
every “elite”, white voter (mostly DA voters, but surely there are white voters from other 
parties as well). Instead, this is limited to strongholds of the two parties.  
 
If one is to look at the DA strongholds, only wards with 88%+ support were used, but the 
threshold for EFF wards were 40%+. This decision has been explained before, but it still casts 
a shadow over the remaining voters in each of these wards. In 18 of the 21 wards, the EFF did 
not get the majority of the vote, yet the economic indicators for the entire ward were utilised.  
 
Despite these challenges, it’s fair to deduct that Inglehart and Norris’s economic inequality 
argument as a cause for populism, stands in the South African context. Our history might be 
different and the causes for this inequality might not be the same as a developed country such 
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as the USA, but the existence of this inequality is sufficient to conclude that supporters of the 
populist EFF are economically marginalised.  
 
5.4.2 The next chapter 
In the following chapter the phenomenon of a “cultural backlash” will be examined. In 
conjunction with economic inequality, the cultural backlash falls within the realm of demand-
side explanations for populism. The theory set out in chapter two will be applied to the local 
context.  
 
According to Norris the cultural backlash thesis described by Inglehart is mainly present in 
developed countries, but “cultural protectionism” is more common than economic approaches 
and is present in nearly every country with radical or populist support.  In essence, this 
explanation centres around a social-psychological phenomenon: the regression of values and 
the erosion of cultural identity. The two main characteristics of the cultural backlash are a 
hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and anxiety that 
the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms. Betz argues that the reaction to racial minorities 
is often expressed in the form of a.) xenophobia or b.) open racism. 
 
In South Africa, the anxiety of the cultural erosion process is expressed in an aversion to so-
















Chapter 6: A cultural backlash 
 
Economic inequality is an important driver of support for populist parties, but Inglehart and 
Norris argue it is by no means an exclusive or exhaustive explanation.340 The rise in populism, 
they argue, can in large part be seen as “a reaction against progressive cultural change”.  
 
This backlash is an extension of, what Inglehart calls the “silent revolution”. In 1977 in his 
seminal work The Silent Revolution, he postulated that the post-war era had high levels of 
existential security that ultimately “led to an intergenerational value shift among Western 
publics”.341 A more detailed description of this will follow in the next section of this chapter.  
This “value shift” and “reaction against culture change” can be seen as the “cultural backlash”. 
According to Inglehart and Norris, there are two main characteristics of the cultural backlash:  
 
1. a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities; and  
2. anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.342 
 
Betz343 argues that the reaction to racial minorities is often expressed in the form of a.) open 
racism or b.) xenophobia. Bustikova suggests that this hostile attitude can be attributed to 
resentment against minorities that have managed to extract policy concessions.344 
 
Furthermore, Inglehart and Norris note there are four important demographic indicators of 
populist supporters: Age, education, gender, religion, and ethnicity.345 There is “a large body 
of empirical evidence” to indicate that post-war developments have triggered a cultural 
backlash among: 
 
• the older generation; 
 
340 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 2. 
341 Pippa Norris, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019), 1. 
342 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15. 
343 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe, 40. 
344 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 15. 
345 Ibid., 16. 
119 
 
• predominantly men; 
• the less educated sectors; and 
• the ethnic majority in a country.346 
It's imperative to note that whereas this general cultural backlash theory might not entirely be 
relevant for every society (including South Africa), some form of the cultural backlash thesis 
is present in most theories examining the causes of populism. The cultural backlash thesis 
described by Inglehart is mainly present in developed countries, but “cultural protectionism” 
is more common than economic approaches and a manifestation of this is present in nearly 
every country with radical or populist support. Inglehart and Norris argue that “cultural values, 
combined with several social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent and 
parsimonious explanation for voting support for populist parties”.347 
 
In this chapter, a more detailed account of the cultural backlash theory will be given, 
specifically on the characteristics and “measuring” of the phenomenon within the local context. 
Theory from Inglehart and Norris will be applied to the South African situation.  
 
Given the research topic, it is important to show that the cultural backlash is strongest among 
populist supporters. It will be argued that the demographic profile indicators of Inglehart and 
Norris apply to the local context, but the manifestation will be different: Supporters of the 
populist EFF will generally be younger (antithetical to Western democracies), black men who 
are less educated. Data from EFF strongholds will be used for this demographic detail. 
 
In South Africa, it will be argued that there is indeed a hostile or intolerant attitude towards 
migrants (especially citizens from other African countries) and ethnic and racial minorities 
 
346 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 3. 
347 Ibid., 4.  
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(specifically white and Indian people who are portrayed as the “other”). It will also be shown 
how there is an anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms (“African culture” 
versus “European culture” and a sense of alienation).  
 
Measuring the cultural backlash is no straightforward task. In the ideal research scenario, one 
would gather all the supporters of populist parties and interview each person extensively to 
gauge the extent to which the cultural backlash is present. Unfortunately, this is realistically 
and practically not possible, and a different method must be utilised to come as close as possible 
to determining the presence of a cultural backlash.  
 
One possible method is to interview a representative sample of populist supporters and after 
thorough content analysis of the interviews, one could extrapolate the presence of a cultural 
backlash. This would, however, limit the research to the practicalities of a.) sourcing subjects 
(sampling) and b.) ensuring reliability and validity. At best this would be a segmentation of the 
backlash and a more holistic picture will be required.  
 
Instead, this research will follow a complex method that is by no means without bias and errors, 
but it does attempt to give a more holistic picture within the spirit of qualitative research. The 
main argument will be built around existing research, media reports and social media 
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comments on Twitter, and this will be entrenched and reinforced by first-person comments 
(more on this below). The contribution of each resource in building this argument will thus be:  
 
6.1.1 Existing research  
As mentioned before there is virtually no research about the presence of the cultural backlash 
in the South African context. There is, however, research on the different characteristics of the 
cultural backlash: a hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial 
minorities; and anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding cultural norms.348 
 
Racism against ethnic minorities, particularly white and Indian people, is present in the local 
context, and research from the Institute of Race Relations, Nyar, the Human Sciences Research 
Council, and others will be used to form the cultural backlash argument. Media reports will 
then be added to indicate the presence amongst EFF supporters and this will further be 
entrenched by first-person comments (as discussed below). 
 
Similarly, there is ample research on xenophobia in South Africa and inputs from Claassen, 
Dumani, and Solomon and Kosaka will amongst others be applied. The reasons for xenophobic 
incidents will be prominent in the discussion, especially those relevant to the cultural backlash 
theory.  
 
Social media posts form Twitter indicating xenophobia from the supporters of the EFF will be 
incorporated. Lastly, first-person comments will be added for context to indicate xenophobia 
on a personal level and how it is reflected in the narrative.  
 
It’s no easy task to indicate, present and explain the anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding 
cultural norms in South Africa, but this research will attempt to establish the presence of this 
amongst supporters of the EFF – there is a fear or anxiety that African culture is eroded by the 
pervasive minority cultures from especially white and Indian South Africans. This results in 
the latter groups not being seen as South African and the “us” versus “them” narrative is a 
strong indicator of this phenomenon.  
 
 
348 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 14-15. 
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It’s important to distinguish between legitimately wanting your culture to be included and 
experiencing a cultural backlash. There’s little disagreement amongst theorists that years of 
apartheid and colonialism pushed Western culture and ideals to the foreground in South Africa, 
and that reform is needed in this regard. It is unsustainable to have minority cultures as the 
dominant ones without trying to advance the culture of the majority.  
 
However, where the culture of minorities is seen as “foreign” and where the anxiety and anger 
towards the minorities are prominent, it’s indicative of a cultural backlash. In this chapter 
research from Heleta349, Bazana and Mogotsi350 and others will indicate the need for reform of 
especially the higher education sector. This will establish the presence of legitimate concerns 
over the continued dominance of Western culture.  
 
However, many people have expressed anger towards especially the white minority because of 
the presence of a dominant Eurocentric, Western culture. A selection of these opinions will be 
weaved into the discussion and comments from EFF supporters on Twitter indicating the 
cultural backlash will form the backbone of this section. It will be shown that the cultural 
backlash is especially strong amongst supporters of the EFF and comments from the supporter 
website (as discussed below) will add to the personal narrative.  
 
6.1.2 Media coverage 
Understandably, the media tends to report the happenings of political leaders more than that of 
its supporters. In this section, the focus must, however, be on the supporters, as the subject at 
hand is a cultural backlash from within society (demand-side argument).  
 
Two tools were used to analyse media coverage of populist supporters: The search function of 
Google News351 and the search function of PressReader352. The former is an aggregator of 
 
349  Savo Heleta, “Decolonisation of higher education: dismantling epistemic violence and 
Eurocentrism in South Africa,” Transformation in Higher Education 1, 1(2016), 1-8. 
350 Sandiso Bazana and Opelo Mogotsi, “Social identities and racial integration in historically white 
universities: A literature review of the experiences of black students,” Transformation in Higher 
Education 2, 0(2017), a25. 
351 Google News, https://news.google.com/?hl=en-ZA&gl=ZA&ceid=ZA:en (accessed 10 December 
2018). 
352 PressReader, https://www.pressreader.com/ (accessed 10 December 2018).  
123 
 
online news and the latter is an aggregator of print news. The latter included community 
newspapers across South Africa to get a more community orientated, micro approach.  
 
Twitter was also used extensively to determine the presence of a cultural backlash. All of the 
comments used to substantiate the argument came from supposed supporters of populist 
parties. There are concerns about the validity and reliability of these online comments with the 
central question being the actual authenticity of a so-called “supporter”. How can one be sure 
the comments are indeed made by supporters? Several measures were taken to ensure the 
comments utilised in this argument are made by supporters of the EFF, namely:  
 
• All comments used in this research were in reply to a tweet by a political party or figure 
and is thus not likely to be unelicited or irrelevant  
• The profile of each user was scrutinised to find evidence for support of the political 
party. Some profiles had a very clear indication in the description that person x is a 
supporter of or activist for the specific party, other had explicit support in the language 
used in the tweets and such significant, implicit support (wearing regalia, constantly 
retweeting and showing support, etc.) that they could be included in the discussion.  
 
The limitations of using Twitter comments are considered: There’s anonymity on social media 
and no certainty that comments are made by actual supporters. Twitter has a limited number of 
users in South Africa and, likely, many supporters of populist ideologies are not present on this 
platform. The advantage, however, is that it is possible to search for relevant comments.  
 
There is immediate evidence of the specific aspect under investigation and it is possible to 
gauge many different opinions – significantly more than what would have been possible during 
in-person interviews.  
 
6.1.3 First-person comments 
The above-mentioned resources will essentially provide a solid argument for the presence of a 
cultural backlash, but it does allude to the personal narrative. To fill this need, this research 
will look at first-person comments made on an EFF supporter website, 
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www.economicfreedomfighters.org.353 This website describes itself as “not the official EFF 
website, it is a supporter website”354, and can thus be seen as a conversation platform for 
supporters of the party. “Comment and express your feelings on issues around EFF,” it urges 
readers. 
 
The website has almost 1 000 comments on all the different pages, has almost 22 000 people 
liking its Facebook page355 and 8 000 people following it on Twitter356. One can thus deduct 
that the website does have a substantial following and it would give a general snapshot of the 
conversation EFF supporters has.  
 
For this research, an analysis will be done on relevant comments expressed on the website. 
Some of the comments were simply praising the EFF or seeking help to set up structures on 
the ground and these were not considered for this research. The comments that are used to build 
the argument is presented in addendum C. A total of 31 comments were selected and will 
selectively be used in the argument.  
 
It is crucial to understand that these comments are used to supplement and strengthen the 
argument, not to be the nucleus of it. Existing research and media reports can often, due to the 
nature of it, not account for personal narrative, and comments from EFF supporters can add 
immense value to indicating the presence of the cultural backlash.  
 
It should be noted that there are intrinsically many errors with this method. There is no 
guarantee that the comments are indeed made by populist supporters or that it is made by a 
person. In the era of artificial intelligence, some accounts are automated to propagate a certain 
agenda357 and one should be cautious of this phenomenon when interpreting the data. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of EFF supporters are not present on this website, nor do they 
 
353 About, Official EFF Website, http://www.economicfreedomfighters.org/about-eff/ (accessed 12 
December 2018). 
354 Ibid.   
355 Facebook Page of the EFF, Facebook, 
https://www.facebook.com/EconomicFreedomFightersEFF (accessed 12 December 2018). 
356 EFFNewsDaily, Twitter, https://twitter.com/EFF_Supporters (accessed 12 December 2018).   
357 Zoey Chong, Up to 48 million Twitter accounts are bots, study says, CNET, 
https://www.cnet.com/news/new-study-says-almost-15-percent-of-twitter-accounts-are-
bots/ (accessed 10 December 2018).   
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comment on it. The number of comments and the substantial following on social media does, 
however, indicate it to be of value.  
 
An advantage of this tool is that it does allow a personal narrative to surface, without dealing 
with all the practical, logistical, and theoretical implications of interviews. Even though it is 
not scientifically vigorous, it indicates the presence of the cultural backlash, which is the aim 
of this chapter. On its own, it is definitely not sufficient to establish the presence of the cultural 
backlash, but in conjunction with the existing research, media reports, and tweets it is a 
valuable tool to achieve this goal.   
 
6.2 Cultural backlash in SA 
As mentioned in chapter two, the cultural backlash theory essentially explains the socio-
psychological phenomenon of regression of values and erosion of cultural identity. This 
indicates a time when one’s culture was not under threat and higher levels of existential 
security. Essentially, “existential security” refers to the feeling that survival is secure enough 
to be taken for granted.  
 
Globally, the era post-WWII was essentially characterised by a threefold process of existential 
security: 
 
• materialist values were eroded; 
• economic and physical security was a priority; and  
• individual free choice and self-expression were given a primary place in the decision-
making hierarchy.358 
Norris argues that this “rise of Postmaterialist values is just one indicator of a much broader 
cultural shift that has brought greater emphasis on environmental protection, peace movements, 
sexual liberalization, democracy and human rights, gender equality, cosmopolitanism, and 




358 Pippa Norris, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, 1.  
359 Ibid.  
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This generational shift in values has, however, triggered a “counter-revolutionary retro 
backlash, especially among the older generation, white men, and less educated sectors, who 
sense decline and actively reject the rising tide of progressive values, resent the displacement 
of familiar traditional norms, and provide a pool of supporters potentially vulnerable to populist 
appeals”.360 Norris cogently explains the manifestation of this phenomenon in the USA as 
follows:  
 
For many older people, same-sex marriage, women in authority, and an African-American 
President were disorienting departures from the norms they had known since childhood; they 
felt they had become strangers in their own land. The process of cultural change was 
reinforced by largescale immigration, rising educational levels and urbanisation. And the 
pace of cultural change can be accelerated or weakened by period effects associated with 
shifts in economic conditions and population migration.361 
 
In essence, the group experiencing the cultural backlash is more likely to feel like “they have 
become strangers from the predominant values of their own country”.362 In a Western context 
this group is older white men who were the cultural majority during the 1950s and 1960s and 
now “their dominance and privilege [has] eroded. The silent revolution of the 1970s appears 
to have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today.” 
 
Today, the cultural shift is more prominent than ever before: A nostalgic reaction from those 
who feel forgotten and left behind by the so-called progressive cultural tides.  This part of the 
electorate has traditional values and norms and tend to feel overlooked in their yearning for 
belonging to their group. In a multicultural, postmodern society, identity is paramount for them 
and retaliation is often seen as the only way to confront these seismic changes.  
 
An application to the local context will follow, but it will also be illustrated how convoluted 
the South African scenario is. Similar to some other developing countries, we do not follow 
 
360 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 3. 
361 Pippa Norris, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, 2. 
362 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 3. 
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the same pattern as many Western countries. In Venezuela (a developing country), for example, 
there is a cultural retaliation against Eurocentric values, beliefs and groups.  
 
Contrary to Western countries, and even many developing countries, South Africa has a 
complex history with race. Apartheid and colonialism have created an extremely unequal 
society and has led to the white minority not only leading the economic sphere but also 
dominating the cultural environment. It is thus not a straightforward task to indicate the 
presence of a cultural backlash.  
 
In the USA for example, black people (the minority) was marginalised, enslaved and 
oppressed, whilst the white majority held an economic, social and cultural dominance. The 
successes of the civil rights movement (an organised effort by mostly black Americans to end 
racial discrimination and gain equal rights under the law) changed society fundamentally.  
 
Equal rights, minority rights and liberalism prevailed to such an extent that Barack Obama 
became the first African American president of the USA in 2009. As discussed earlier many 
older white men, who are generally uneducated and conservative retaliated against the cultural 
changes and this led to the cultural backlash.  
 
In SA, the majority of citizens were oppressed, marginalised and dehumanised by the minority. 
Especially during apartheid (1948-1994) the so-called “white culture” was dominant and it can 
be argued that some people are experiencing a backlash against the continuation of the 
dominance of Western, white, Eurocentric culture. In our context, it’s not as clear-cut as to say 
that any retaliation against the dominant culture is evidence of a cultural backlash. Many South 
Africans feel democracy brought freedom, but not economic, social and cultural freedom. 
Attempts to transform the dominant culture can thus be indicative of restitution.  
 
A cultural backlash is however present in the local context where there are racism and 
xenophobia. These are not phenomena that are associated with a normal restoration of cultural 
balance. These phenomena are aimed at the minority groups (white people, Indian South 
Africans and foreigners) who are portrayed as “they” – their cultures and even presence is not 
included in the conception of a South African identity. Instead of building the dominance of 
the “forgotten” culture (and thus decreasing the prominence of the minority cultures), the very 
presence of the minority cultures is seen as a threat to “our” way of life. It is because these 
128 
 
cultures are dominant and present that the majority is not advancing economically, socially and 
culturally.  
 
Malema encapsulated this sentiment when he said: “This country is still in the hands of the 
colonial masters. This country is still in the hands of white people. This country is controlled 
from London. White minorities be warned.”363 
 
6.3 Application: Demographics 
As mentioned before, research has shown that in Western countries the cultural backlash is 
strongest “among the older generation, white men and less educated sectors”364. As the 
manifestation of the cultural backlash is different in South Africa (and indeed in many other 
countries), supporters of the populist EFF will generally be younger (antithetical to Western 
democracies), black men who are less educated.  
 
A closer look at the research from Ipsos365 shows that 67% of EFF supporters are male, 
compared to 51% of the DA supporters and 48% of the South African population. A more 
nuanced version of the data from Wazimap366 shows that on average 56.7% of EFF strongholds 
are males, compared to 48.08% of DA strongholds. This goes accord with the international 
theory that populist supporters experiencing the cultural backlash are generally men. 
 
Similarly, Ipsos’s research indicates that 34% of DA supporters are 35-49 years old, with 19% 
being between 50 and 59-years-old. On the contrary, 44% of EFF supporters are 18-24 years 
old and 29% are 25-34 years old. According to Wazimap the average age for an EFF stronghold 
is 27.4 years old and 37.4 for a DA stronghold.  
 
In the previous chapter, it was already shown that EFF supporters are generally less educated. 
The average DA stronghold has 30.83% of university-educated residents, compared to only 
 
363 Giordano Stolley, Malema not calling for the slaughter of whites, for now, IOL, 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/malema-not-calling-for-the-slaughter-of-whites-for-now-
2087713 (accessed 19 December 2018). 
364 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 3. 
365 Mari Harris, The supporter profiles of SA's three largest parties – Ipsos, PoliticsWeb, (accessed 13 
November 2018). 
366 Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/ (accessed 12 December 2018).  
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4.4% for EFF strongholds. Furthermore, 98.3% of EFF strongholds were black residents, 
compared to 12.3% of DA strongholds.  
 
In the local context, it is thus fair to extrapolate that populist EFF supporters who generally 
experience the cultural backlash are generally young, black men who are less educated.  
 
Inglehart and Norris argue that “value change is strongly predicted by birth cohort, education, 
and sex. If the cultural backlash thesis is true, then the argument predicts that the strongest 
support for populist parties will be among the older [white] generation, men, those lacking 
college education…”367 
 
Considering the age and race inversions, the South African scenario follows the international 
theoretical context of the demographics of the populist supporters experiencing a cultural value 
change and is thus evidentiary of the cultural backlash.  
 
6.4 Application: Hostile attitude towards minorities 
A hostile or intolerant attitude towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities is a key 
component of the cultural backlash. Betz368 argues that the reaction to racial minorities is often 
expressed in the form of a.) open racism and b.) xenophobia.  
 
6.4.1 Open racism 
Previously in this chapter an interpretation was given of the cultural backlash in the local 
context and henceforth “racism” will be addressed as a manifestation of the cultural backlash. 
It is imperative to realise that this discussion is not a general discussion of racism in South 
Africa; rather it is one of racism towards minorities. There’s ample research369 to suggest that 
there’s still institutionalised racism towards the majority – but that falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. It is therefore not a denial of the existence of racism in the general context, but 
rather homing in on a specific aspect to establish relevance to the topic at hand.  
 
 
367 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots 
and Cultural Backlash,” 16. 
368 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe, 40.  
369 South African Human Rights Commission, “Research Brief on Race and Equality: 2013-2017,” 
Unpublished report, (2017).  
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The Institute of Race Relations’ 2018 annual report on the state of race relations in the country 
reveals that “61% of black respondents now agree that South Africa is a country for blacks 
rather than whites, while only 38% disagree”.370 According to the report, this suggests that 
“ANC and EFF rhetoric castigating whites and demanding a major shift in the ownership and 
management of the economy may be having a significant impact on black opinion”. When 
asked the question of whether they have ever experienced racism, 53% of white people 
answered “yes”, compared to only 23% of black people.  
 
In the same study, 23% of black people also said they don’t believe that, even with better 
education and more jobs, differences between the races will disappear, indicating the root of 
racism is not exclusively situated in the economic domain, but rather in the social and cultural 
domain. In comparison, 16% of white people and 1% of Indian people feel the same way. The 
report effectively concludes quite strongly that: 
 
There are many ideologues in the ruling party and the EFF with a vested interest in playing 
up racial incidents and portraying the repugnant words or conduct of the few as 
representative of the many. These ideologues also seek to identify white racism – and the 
white privilege this supposedly sustains – as the key reason for persistent poverty and 
inequality within the country. This perspective is politically useful, of course, because it 
distracts attention from the ANC’s many policy failures over the past 24 years.371 
 
Research from the Human Sciences Research Council372 affirms these findings from the 
Institute of Race Relations. Their annual South African Social Attitudes Survey shows that “in 
contrast to black adults, white and Indian adults were found to be less optimistic about race 
relations”. Only 7% of black South Africans feel that race relations had worsened in the country 
in the time leading up to this 2016 study, compared to 40% of white people and 32% of Indian 
South Africans.  
 
 
370 Institute of Race Relations, “Race Relations in South Africa: Reasons for Hope 2018,” Unpublished 
report, (2018), 8. 
371 Institute of Race Relations, “Race Relations in South Africa: Reasons for Hope 2018,” Unpublished 
report, (2018), 11.  
372 The longer walk to freedom: making sense of attitudes towards race relations in South Africa, 
Human Sciences Research Council, http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/media-briefs/general/longer-walk-to-
freedom (accessed 15 December 2018).  
131 
 
Interestingly, many participants in this survey showed concern that their racial group is under 
threat from other racial groups. 61% of the participants believe that people of other race groups 
“were trying to get ahead economically at the expense of their own group” and 53% that “the 
traditions and values that are important to people of their race group are under threat because 
of the influence of other races”. This can be indicative of a cultural backlash – there is a fear 
that other races are eroding your values, creating the “us” versus “them” construct.  
 
Similarly, according to research from Nyar, the “post-apartheid context has paradoxically seen 
a deepening of anti-Indian racism” and “popular sentiment and discourse often see Indian 
South Africans singled out for blame particularly in terms of causing suffering and harm to 
black Africans”.373 She further argues: “Along with other vulnerable minority groupings such 
as migrants and ‘foreigners’, Indian South Africans tend to serve as scapegoats for the socio-
economic ills.”  
 
Nyar’s findings are affirmed by research from the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation374 that delved 
into the experiences of Indian South Africans in the form of semi-structured interviews. One 
of the key themes emerging from the interviews is “the widespread and multi-faceted nature of 
anti-Indian racism. Indian South Africans emerged as a singular focus of hatred and resentment 
from the majority of the focus groups. Indian South Africans were broadly interpreted by focus 
group participants as being racist, resistant to integration, and not ‘real South Africans’ i.e. not 
belonging to South Africa.”375 
 
Resulting from this overarching research it’s clear that white and Indian South Africans 
experience racism that makes them feel like South Africa is not their country, that they do not 
belong. They experience more racism and are less optimistic about race relations in the country. 
This is a strong indication of the presence of the cultural backlash. In general, there’s hostility 




373 Annsilla Nyar, “A critical Examination of Anti-Indian Racism in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 
(Doctoral Thesis presented at the University of Witwatersrand, 2016), 11. 
374 Fiona Anciano-White and Johnny Selemani, “Rethinking Non-Racialism: Reflections of a Selection 
of South African Leaders,” South African Journal of Political Studies 39, 1(2012), 149-169. 
375 Annsilla Nyar, “A critical Examination of Anti-Indian Racism in Post-apartheid South Africa,” 160. 
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The next step in affirming the element of racism within the cultural backlash thesis is looking 
at media coverage of, especially EFF supporters. The methodology of this was discussed earlier 
in this chapter. To be relevant to the central focus of this research it must be shown that the 
supporters of populist parties have this hostile attitude towards the racial minorities. There are 
many examples of EFF supporters displaying racist and hostile attitudes towards minorities:  
 
• In 2013, during the launch of the EFF in Marikana, supporters showed banners 
portraying slogans such as “a revolutionary must become a cold killing machine 
motivated by pure hate”, “honeymoon is over for white people in South Africa” and 
“we need to kill them like they killed us”.376 Cameron Modisane, an EFF supporter, 
said these banners were paid for by local branch members. “Our greatest enemy within 
EFF is white monopoly capital.” 
 
• Luvuyo Menziwa, an EFF Student Command member, posted racially inciteful 
comments on social media in 2016377. In the post on Facebook, Menziwa listed five 
reasons why he hated white people – white privilege, dominance, monopoly capital, 
arrogance, and superiority. He said: “F*ck white people. Just get me a bazooka or AK-
47 so I can do the right thing and kill these demon-possessed humans.”  
 
• In January 2018 EFF supporters protested outside a Johannesburg school and chanted 
“white man you must die” and “shoot to kill the Boer (farmer)”.378 
 
• On Human Rights Day in 2018, EFF councillor Mampuru Mampuru reportedly posted 
on social media that black people should unite‚ because “there are less than five million 
 
376 EFF 'killing' banner causes outrage, News24, https://www.news24.com/southafrica/news/eff-
killing-banner-causes-outrage-20131014?cpid=1 (accessed 14 December 2018). 
377 Lerato Tshipe, EFF student leader suspended after 'kill whites' post, IOL, 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/eff-student-leader-suspended-after-kill-whites-post-
2062924 (accessed 14 December 2018). 
378 Afriforum wants EFF to answer over alleged anti-white chants, IOL, 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/afriforum-wants-eff-to-answer-over-alleged-anti-
white-chants-12785728 (accessed 14 December 2018). 
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whites in South Africa vs 45 million of us. We can kill all these whites within two 
weeks.”379 
 
• In June 2018, Malema has lashed out against South African Indians380 saying the 
majority of them are racist. “The majority of those Indians see us as subhuman,” he 
said. Subsequently, EFF supporters agreed. “Majority of Indians are racist, they will 
get a distinction when it comes to racism,” said EFF supporter @EFFexplained on 
Twitter. “Indians are the worst pay masters of them all.  I know what am talking,” 
another supporter (@CaiphusMkhize) tweeted.  
 
• In late 2018, and active EFF member threatened Adriaan Basson, editor of News24 on 
Twitter calling for the slaughter “white animals” and to kill “people like” Basson.381 
 
A closer look at supporter website comments shows several instances of racism and intolerance 
towards racial minorities. Some examples are: 
 
• Comment 3: “This is Africa, for Africans, not for Basterds!” – concerning white 
people. 
 
• Comment 18: “White monopoly capital that captured South Africa State of governance 
since the arrival of the Whites led by the world-known Criminal, a Jan van Riebeek.” 
 
• Comment 20: “The whites still run everything… like dirty puppet masters.” 
 
 
379 Nico Gous, EFF councillor ‘loves’ his white friends and would never call for their genocide, 
TimesLive, https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-03-21-eff-councillor-loves-his-white-friends-
and-would-never-call-for-their-genocide/ (accessed 14 December 2018). 
380 ‘Indeed the majority of Indians are racist’ – Malema sticks to his guns, CityPress, 
https://city-press.news24.com/News/indeed-the-0majority-of-indians-are-racist-malema-sticks-to-
his-guns-20180625 (accessed 14 December 2018). 
381 EFF member threatens to kill Adriaan Basson in ‘support’ of Mngxitama, Citizen, 
https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/social-media/2048978/eff-member-threatens-to-kill-
adriaan-basson-in-support-of-mngxitama/ (accessed 14 December 2018). 
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• Comment 28: “Don’t fear white people when they get angry for you criticising them, 
they are pretenders. White people have no conscience. White people try to feed of your 
self-esteem because they have no credibility as humans.” 
 
• Comment 29: “You white people are Evil, you are Satan himself, and you are the 
reason why there is no peace in the world” 
It is clear from the above-mentioned research, media reports and supporter comments that there 
is evidence of Betz’s concept of “open racism” 382 against minorities – both white and  Indian 
South Africans.  
 
Several of the opinions expressed by EFF supporters go beyond the notion of a “hostile or 
intolerant attitude” – calling for the killing of white South Africans (explicitly expressed in 
many of the media articles and comments) is indeed open racism bordering on hatred for this 
racial group. Some comments eluded to white people not “belonging” in South Africa (which 
will be expanded on later in this chapter) and being “evil” with “no credibility as humans”.  
 
Similarly, Indians are perceived as “racist” and “the worst paymasters”. Other instances of 
open racism include: “F*ck white people”, “demon-possessed humans”, “Basterds” and “dirty 
puppet masters” 
 
It is thus fair to conclude that there is open racism towards white and Indian South Africans as 
racial minority groups. This is characteristic of some EFF supporters, proving that the cultural 
backlash thesis is partially (at least for now) applicable in the local context. 
 
6.4.2 Xenophobia  
As Betz has stated, xenophobia is the second manifestation of the hostile or intolerant attitude 
towards migrants and ethnic and racial minorities. In the discussion below, it will first be shown 
how xenophobia is present in the South African context and then how it arises from especially 
supporters of the populist EFF.  
 
 
382 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe, 40. 
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According to Solomon and Kosaka, xenophobia is “the fear or hatred of foreigners or 
strangers” that is often embodied in “discriminatory attitudes and behaviour” and it often 
results in “violence, abuses of all types and exhibitions of hatred”.383  
 
Claassen is of opinion that South Africa is “one of the most hostile destinations in the world 
for African migrants”.384 In May 2008 a total of 62 people were killed in widespread attacks 
targeting foreigners, and in 2015 tensions flared up again and seven people were killed.385  
 
The 2008 attacks started in Alexandra township in Johannesburg when locals attacked migrants 
from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, killing two people and injuring 40 others.386 Soon 
after the violence spread to other Gauteng settlements such as Diepsloot where “a Mozambican 
man was burned alive while bystanders laughed”387, and the xenophobic violence reached 
KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape, and the Western Cape.  
 
The 2015 attacks started in Durban and spread to Johannesburg, after which it cropped up 
across the country. Local looted foreign-owned shops (including those of citizens from 
Pakistan and Bangladesh) and attacked immigrants in general. Hundreds of people had to 
relocate to police stations and the Malawian authorities subsequently “began repatriating their 
nationals”388, similarly to the Kenyan government’s actions.  
 
Research from Claassen has shown that these attacks were not caused by “small bands of 
provocateurs or criminals”, but rather “widespread participation” for violence against 
 
383 Hussein Solomon and Hitomi Kosaka, “Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, Narratives and 
Recommendations,” Southern African Peace and Security Studies 2, 2(2017), 5. 
384 Christopher Claassen, “Explaining South African Xenophobia,” Unpublished Paper by 
Afroborometer, (2017), 1.  
385 David Sim, South Africa xenophobia: Anti-immigrant violence in Durban and 
Johannesburg, IBTimes, https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/south-africa-xenophobia-anti-immigrant-
violence-durban-johannesburg-photo-report-1496588 (accessed 14 December 2018). 
386 South African mob kills migrants, BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7396868.stm (accessed 14 December 2018). 
387 Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe and Eric Worby, (eds.), Go Home or Die Here, (Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press, 2008), 1.  
388 Ibid.  
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foreigners.389 Dumani concurs that we are “a highly xenophobic society […] which does not 
naturally value human rights of non-nationals”390. 
 
A national survey conducted in 2007 indicated that more than 80% of South African citizens 
feel the government should “severely limit immigration into the country from troubled African 
countries.”391 Almost 10 years later, research from Afrobarometer showed “more than one in 
five South Africans would like the government to deport all foreigners, irrespective of their 
legal status”.392 
 
Following xenophobic violence in Rustenburg in 2018, the Human Science Research Council 
released data that indicated that “62% of the adult population agreed with the statement that 
immigrants increased crime in 2008, and in 2016, 66% of the general public agreed with the 
statement”.393 
 
Why are we so violent towards foreigners in South Africa? Several theorists have attempted to 
answer the question and in general, it eludes to a cultural backlash being present in the South 
African society.  
 
Claassen394 lists six reasons that could explain xenophobia in the local context: resource 
competition (such as access to jobs and housing); poverty (poverty is linked to outgroup 
aggression); relative deprivation (rising expectations of one’s circumstances); frustrations with 
government (insufficiency of government to provide basic services); mobilisation (the extent 
to which individuals are connected to the community); and a symbolic threat (fear that cultural 
and national identity might be changed).  
 
Both Claassen and Dumani395 refer to the term “scapegoating” in explaining xenophobia in the 
local context. This refers to the phenomenon when one turns your anger about hardships (such 
 
389 Christopher Claassen, “Explaining South African Xenophobia,” 1. 
390 Nomsa Dumani, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” Unpublished CERS Working Paper, (2015), 4.  
391 Shireen Hassim, Tawana Kupe and Eric Worby, (eds.), Go Home or Die Here, 3. 
392  Matthias Krönke, “Trends in attitudes toward foreigners in South Africa, 1997-2011,” 
Unpublished Paper by Afrobarometer, (2015). 
393 Are South Africans xenophobic?, HSRC, http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-jan-march-
2018/are-south-africans-zenophobic (accessed 14 December 2018). 
394 Christopher Claassen, “Explaining South African Xenophobia,” 3-5.  
395 Nomsa Dumani, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” Unpublished CERS Working Paper, (2015), 3. 
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as unemployment, lack of resources, or government’s performance) towards foreigners and 
make them the primary cause of your problems. Solomon and Kosaka argue scapegoating is a 
global phenomenon that is prominent in many countries undergoing transitions post-
colonialism.396 It is often associated with the politics of the dominant groups following 
independence [and has] to do with a feeling of superiority”. 
 
In the local context, South Africans would thus feel frustrated by poor economic circumstances, 
poverty, unemployment, lack of resources, government ability to deliver services, etc. and this 
is manifested into xenophobia. These concerns do not need to be substantiated by facts and 
often the facts point to the opposite scenario.397,398 The mere perception is enough to cause 
retaliation and backlash against foreigners.  
 
Apartheid’s legacy can also not be ignored. The system’s extreme focus on boundary 
maintenance has probably affected people’s ability to tolerate differences399 and with the 
abolishment of apartheid, South Africans were suddenly exposed to the “previously unknown”, 
as there was no history of incorporating “others” into “our” society. 
 
A common thread through all the reasons is the fear of “the other”. The hostile, intolerant and 
often violent attitude towards migrants is almost always accompanied by a dislike for or hate 
of foreigners.  This is prevalent in the cultural backlash thesis.  
 
It is very challenging identifying South Africans who express xenophobia. As shown earlier a 
significant portion of South Africans hold xenophobic views. Claassen’s research has shown 
that 37% of Asian South Africans oppose foreigners moving into their neighbourhood, 
compared to 34% of black people and 26% of white people. 37% of black people are also 
opposed to foreigners operating a business in the area, with 31% of white and 26% of coloured 
 
396 Hussein Solomon and Hitomi Kosaka, “Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, Narratives and 
Recommendations,” 6. 
397 Kate Wilkinson, ANALYSIS: Are foreigners stealing jobs in South Africa?, AfricaCheck, 
https://africacheck.org/2015/04/17/analysis-are-foreigners-stealing-jobs-in-south-africa/ (accessed 
15 December 2018). 
398 Kate Wilkinson, ANALYSIS: Are foreigners stealing jobs in South Africa?, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/south-africa-xenophobic-violence-migrants-
workforce (accessed 15 December 2018). 
399 Nomsa Dumani, “Xenophobia in South Africa,” Unpublished CERS Working Paper, (2015), 10. 
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reporting the same. Although coloured residents express less xenophobia than other races, 
levels of xenophobia are consistently high amongst all races.400 
 
Since xenophobia is characteristic of the cultural backlash, this research from media reports, 
social media and the EFF supporter website will show that the supporters are indicative of the 
cultural backlash being present in our society: 
 
• In 2014 the United Nations’ Displaced and Migrant Persons Support Programme laid 
the blame for xenophobic attacks at the door of EFF supporters in Mamelodi. The 
agency provided evidence that supporters of the party are behind the attacks on Somalis 
and their shops.401 
 
• In the EFF supporter website comments, comment 7 can be construed as xenophobic: 
“I would like the EFF to help us as greater Gauteng business forum in our fight to 
reclaim our economic rights. we want foreign nationals like Ethiopians, Somalis, 
Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis to stop operating tuckshops and wholesales and return to 
refugee camps or home of origin and leave the wealth of RSA to South Africans.” 
 
This is indicative of the cultural backlash thesis as a manifestation of hostile or intolerant 
attitudes towards migrants. As seen before, xenophobia present amongst all South African 
races, and this hostile attitude is often embraced by the supporters of the EFF, albeit less than 
open racism. 
 
Together with the research on racism, it would be fair to suggest that there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that the first manifestation of the cultural backlash is indeed present in our local 
context. In the next section, there will be a focus on the anxiety that the pervasive culture is 




400 Christopher Claassen, “Explaining South African Xenophobia,” Unpublished Paper by 
Afroborometer, (2017), 16. 
401 Ntando Makhubu, EFF behind Mamelodi attacks – UN agency, IOL, 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/eff-behind-mamelodi-attacks-un-agency 
1708293#.U7PLtVJZqUk (accessed 15 December 2018). 
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6.5 Application: Anxiety around pervasive culture 
As discussed before, research from Inglehart and Norris suggests that the cultural backlash is 
present when there is an anxiety that the pervasive culture is eroding the cultural norms of the 
majority. In South Africa it can be argued that it manifests itself as a backlash against Western 
values. The latter is seen as a threat to “our” way of living. Not only is minority culture seen 
as different, but as foreign and not part of “us”.  
 
As mentioned, there is a fear or anxiety that African culture is eroded by the pervasive minority 
cultures from especially white and Indian South Africans. This results in the latter groups not 
being seen as South African and the “us” versus “them” narrative is a strong indicator of this 
phenomenon.  
 
In a country with black people being the majority, one would naturally expect their culture to 
be the dominant one, but many years of oppression under first colonialism and then apartheid 
created a space where black people’s culture is indeed significantly less prominent that Western 
culture, embodied by white South Africans.  
 
Before continuing with the discussion, it is perhaps sagacious to consider the semantic 
implications of the term “black culture”. There is by no means an assumption that there is a 
universal “black culture” in South Africa that is the dichotomy of “white culture”. Furthermore, 
there is a difference between “self-identity” and cultural identity”402. The former can be seen 
as the traits and characteristics that define who you are and the latter “identification with 
specific values and, in this way, at least, partial membership in the groups representing these 
values”403. Hauser successfully argues that cultural identity is not fixed, but rather fluid on a 
continuum.  
 
It is for these reasons that the complexities of “black culture” are acknowledged and by no 
means is there a suggestion that black people have a uniform culture; similarly, there’s no 
implication that white people have a uniform culture. It is, however, relevant to this research 
to point out the alienation of cultures. The Constitution gives freedom to all cultures present in 
 
402 Sandiso Bazana and Opelo Mogotsi, “Social identities and racial integration in historically white 
universities: A literature review of the experiences of black students,” a25. 
403 Robert Hauser, “Cultural Identity in a Globalised World? A Theoretical Approach Towards the 
Concept of Cultural Identity,” Unpublished Working Paper, (unknown), 8. 
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South Africa, but the anti-backlash thesis would proclaim that “white culture” and “Indian 
culture”, are not seen as South African by populist supporters.  The perceptions of white and 
black cultures are thus at play and a detailed analysis of complexities of culture falls outside 
the scope of this research.  
 
There are legitimate concerns about decolonising South African society and institutions. Heleta 
has shown that “whiteness” is a common lived experience of the black majority, and that it is 
understandable that activists want to disrupt this “whiteness in society, the economy, and at 
universities. The whiteness they are trying to disrupt has been imposed since colonial times as 
a ‘symbol of purity’ and has defined ‘what it means to be civilised, modern and human’. This 
whiteness is still engaged in daily open and/or subtle racism and marginalisation of black 
people.”404 
 
Considering the presence of white culture dominating, there has been a shift in South Africa to 
transform society. Dladla’s research alludes to this change:  
 
This can be seen in a recent rise of movements which have come into being to challenge the 
prevailing marginality of African philosophy – both in the university and in society, as well 
as the polity. Examples of such movements include the Economic Freedom Fighters’ party... 
 
Significantly, Dladla mentions the EFF. Whilst the need for reform has been indicated 
supporters of the EFF have been very vocal in not only promoting “African philosophy” but 
alienating “white philosophy” and viewing it as foreign.  
 
However, Nyamnjoh is of opinion that “social movements often face the danger of becoming 
the very thing they are fighting against”405. She argues that during the #RhodesMustFall 
movement, for instance, white students were seen as “illegitimate voices” and this 
“withholding of recognition from whites can lead to a “one-sided recognition [that] excludes 
the other.”406 This leads to a sense of alienation and ultimately self-alienation.  
 
404 Savo Heleta, “Decolonisation of higher education: dismantling epistemic violence and 
Eurocentrism in South Africa,” 1-8. 
405 Anye Nyamnjoh, “The Phenomenology of ‘Rhodes Must Fall’: Student Activism and the 
Experience of Alienation at the University of Cape Town,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 39, 
1(2017), 256-277. 
406 Ibid., 268. 
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Unfortunately, some groups like AfriForum and trade union Solidarity have canvassed their 
message of a “white genocide” on the world stage.407 These conservative groups have 
propagated that especially white farmers are targeted and killed in South Africa, even though 
the facts portray a different picture.408 Van Zyl-Hermann refers to these attempts as national 
populism aiming to “create spaces in which white privilege, power, and identities are 
maintained”.409 
 
Amid this false narrative, it is thus understandable that the legitimate cultural backlash has 
been lost in the discussion of populism in South Africa. It is important to discern between 
conservative efforts disinformation and unnecessary panic, and the cultural backlash that is 
present in society.  
 
Thus far it has been illustrated how a cultural backlash is present in the general South African 
society, but to be relevant to this research is must be shown that it is present amongst supporters 
of the populist EFF. Henceforth social media comments and first-person comments from the 
supporter website will be utilised to affirm the presence of the cultural backlash, specifically 
pertaining to the anxiety that the dominant culture is eroding black culture and thus creating a 
“us” versus “them” narrative.  
 
In September 2018 the EFF tweeted from its official account: “DP @FloydShivambu 
responding to AfriForum in Parliament. He told them that the fact of the matter is that white 
people came into South Africa as colonial settlers.” Some of the responses to this from 
supporters were: 
 
• “They are foreigners, this is not their Land, No White was African, Africa belongs to 
Blacks (K*ff*rs) that's what they call us, but they came and lived with k*ff*rs, the time 
will come for them to reap what they soar.” – @MathewsLebogan1 
 
407 Farouk Chothia, South Africa: The groups playing on the fears of a 'white genocide’, BBC News, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45336840 (accessed 19 December 2018). 
408 Kate Wilkinson, FACTSHEET: Statistics on farm attacks and murders in South 
Africa, AfricaCheck, https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-statistics-farm-attacks-murders-
sa/ (accessed 19 December 2018). 
409 Danelle, van Zyl-Hermann, “Make Afrikaners great again! National populism, democracy and the 




• “That's nothing but the truth. They came here to oppress us.” – @BKgaedume 
 
• “That white kid is bluffing if it's a war they want let's give it to them, I am not a violent 
person and I don't promote violence but if I have to apply my skills I will for free # 
highly trained assassin.” – @Raymond65554926 
 
In March 2018 the party tweeted:” Malema: Chinese are like Indians. They think they're close 
to whiteness. When they practice racism they even become worse than whites. There are even 
Blacks who mimic whiteness. All of this needs to be confronted. #MalemaOnTouchHD.” Some 
of the responses included:  
 
• “That's true keep on talking Juju until our sisters stop using creams and fake accents.” 
– @LungaAuthor 
 
• “That's true, CIC, Chinese are racist, they exploit, black people. I really don't know why 
focus is only on whites...” – @Tobela22561604 
 
• “Indians are the worst. They need to be dealt with urgently.” – @ka_madesi 
 
• “They think they r better than us.” – @BhekiNt55904883 
 
Some general, relevant comments from EFF supporters on Twitter are also collated: 
 
• “That's all you know because you want to kill African culture which will never happen 
and replace it with European one which will never be allowed ... You can go back to 
Europe and display your Caucasian mentality of undermining other people's culture... 
Not here...” – @GENNOTO  
 
• “Before the 'White Man' arrived, #Africa had a thriving culture & an interlinked trade 
network North South East & West. Not only did the White Man take the Land they 




• “I do support what @EFFSouthAfrica is doing. Black people are tired. We’ve been 
conforming to white culture. Letting racists get to us. Viva EFF.” – @DearBheki 
 
• “Show me a country in Africa which the white man didn't destroy, they destroy people's 
culture, languages, etc. @EFFSouthAfrica” – @MoraAfrika 
 
In these comments made by EFF supporters, it is evident there’s an anxiety that the dominant, 
minority culture is eroding the majority culture. There is clearly frustration with a foreign 
culture and a yearning to write “our own history”, and this in turn elicits a return to being 
“proud to be black”. True to the cultural backlash thesis, some comments portray white people 
as foreigners (“they are foreigners”, “no white was African” and “our country”). As mentioned 
before the alienation is also present in the language: “them respect us”; “they are here to oppress 
us” and “that white kid”. This created the “us” versus “them” narrative.  
 
It’s not only the white minority who are the adverse subjects of the cultural backlash thesis; 
minorities such as Indians and Asians also experience the effects of this alienation. It especially 
surfaces in the divisive language: “they need to be dealt with urgently”, “they exploit black 
people” and “they think they are better than us”. It’s evident that the retaliation against 
minorities is not limited to white people and this goes accord with the open racism explained 
earlier in this chapter.  
 
Lastly, one also sees the presence of a pure cultural retaliation against racial minorities in the 
comments from EFF supporters. The “white man” is accused of wanting to “kill African 
culture”; they should rather “go back to Europe” and not “undermining other people’s culture”. 
This anxiety experienced over the dominant culture is manifested in the yearning for a time 
“before the white man arrived” when black people had “a thriving culture”. Now, white people 
have “destroyed African culture” and “black people are tired” of simply “conforming to white 
culture”. 
 
These sentiments are also expressed in the first-person comments from EFF supporters: 
 




• Comment 2: “Try reading the history of these people, (whites) and you will get a better 
understanding of these Euros.”  
 
• Comment 3: “Immorality and hatred are what your pink skin (called themselves 
whites) does to our people and economy. Ignorant is they devil deeds they’ve brought 
and enforced into our land. Stop coming with your Holandirism in here, “this is Africa, 
for Africans, not for Basterds!” 
 
• Comment 5: “Do you know how blacks are still treated and undermined in corporate 
by whites. don’t just commend to protect your stay in SA.” 
 
• Comment 12: We must get back our land! These Europeans came to our country and 
stole the land, cattle, and raped our women! They need to pay reparations! They 
NEVER brought cattle and land to our beautiful country. They brought their corrupted 
bible and tricked us into accepting nonsense.” 
 
• Comment 25: “They have robbed us our culture, land, identity, made us be inferior to 
our own complexion e.g. where there is a black person something must go wrong, they 
taught us to say that when one of us fails in their shit-stem. We have to emancipate 
ourselves from mental slavery e.g. speaking EngliSHIT with a shit-stem ascent and 
down looking our brother and sisters who can speak EngliSHIT It’s a revolution time 
EFF is a vanguard of Azania. Amandla we are not going to be slaves in our fathers 
land.” 
 
• Comment 28: “We must catch these white people and confront them on international 
laws. Let us expose them and make them deal with the truth, according to African Law.” 
 
• Comment 29: “Look, lie to yourself all you want, but Africa, belongs to Africans, that 
you can never change, you are the only settler in Africa our land, ok??” 
 
There is a cultural backlash present amongst supporters of the populist EFF. The overarching 
implication is that South Africa exclusively belongs to black people and not ‘the white man’ 
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(comment 1). The “us” versus “them” construction come to the foreground in many first-person 
inputs: “these Euros” in comment 2; “our land” and “Bastards” in comment 3. 
 
Comment 25 explicitly encapsulates the essence of the cultural backlash. There is a sense of 
“us” versus “them” (“they”) who have taken away “our” culture (“robbed us of our culture”). 
Besides the implicit alienation, there is a more direct attempt to create distance and imply that 
white people are foreign to South Africa: “This is Africa, for Africans, not for Basterds!” in 
comment 3; “don’t just commend to protect your stay in SA” (comment 5); and “Africa, 
belongs to Africans” and “you are the only settler in Africa our land” in comment 29.  
 
6.6 Conclusion and way forward 
In this chapter, it was shown that there is indeed a manifestation of a cultural backlash present 
amongst supporters of the EFF in South Africa. It was illustrated how supporters of the EFF 
are expressing open racism against racial minorities, the groups at which their retaliation is 
aimed at. similarly, they also feel “foreign” in their own country and blame the dominant 
culture of minorities for eroding their culture. The process through which these cultures became 
dominant is perhaps of less significance to the argument; the only necessity is the presence of 
cultural protectionism encompassed in a backlash against this dominance, and the wanting a 
return to a time when the majority felt valued and that their culture was indeed recognised and 
in a prominent space.  
 
Unlike Western supporters of populist parties, it is not the same people who experienced 
cultural dominance and subsequently retaliation in our local context. In the USA, for instance, 
older white Americans who felt their cultural values promoted during the 1950s and 1960s, are 
the very same people who retaliated against the progressive cultural tides in the 1970s and 
ultimately ended up supporting populist politicians in the 2000s. The children of this group 
would also have grown up within this environment and immediate contact with their family 
frustrations makes it significant that there is consistency in the group who experienced both 
the dominance and subsequent retaliation.  
 
In South Africa, it is impossible to have a similar situation. The people who experienced 
cultural dominance in a pre-Colonial era are certainly not alive anymore and many generations 
have come and gone since that period. What is important is the recalled memory or even 
implied memory of that period.  
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Even though South Africans who support the EFF were not alive during a time when their 
cultural values dominated, they feel an intimate association with their forefathers who did 
experience this dominance. The fact that it can be counted in centuries, rather than decades, 
probably makes the retaliation even stronger; this is inter-generational anger, frustration, and 
retaliation that is manifesting. Even though there is no certainty on the feeling and cultural 
stance of the pre-Colonial cohort of South Africans, the impression of cultural dominance is 
important to the current cohort.  
 
This impression might be attributed to a few factors. Firstly, it is possible that it is passed along 
through family history and that there is still a recollection of the once-dominant culture of black 
South Africans. Secondly, through education one can deduct that many black citizens learnt 
about the time predating Colonialism and thus feels a cultural affiliation with that period.  
 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the current black youth of South Africa is frustrated with 
democracy not bringing them economic, social, or cultural freedom. They are either old enough 
to have experienced the injustices of apartheid, or the effects are very visible in their families 
and everyday lives. It is evident that white, minority culture was dominant during apartheid 
and the dawn of democracy brought the promise of a reversal of this dominance. This promise 
has not realised, and it is highly likely that this cultural protectionism and backlash is fuelled 
by the frustration of a lack of change. In this instance, it is not so much an association with a 
pre-Colonial time-period of cultural dominance, but rather the implied memory of a time when 
black people did not feel like foreigners in their own country.  
 
This is accompanied by instances of xenophobia. As pointed out, foreigners are often seen as 
scapegoats for economic and cultural frustrations, and this group is thus amalgamated with 
white and Indian South Africans into being the focus of the cultural retaliation. In this chapter, 
it was shown how supporters of the EFF display xenophobic tendencies. The blame for a lack 
of cultural dominance is also placed on the shoulders of immigrants, and not just those of racial 
minorities.  
 
Anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko famously remarked that “joint culture” is possible in South 
Africa. “Sure it [the joint culture] will have European experience because we have whites here 
who are descended from Europe. We don’t dispute that. But for God’s sake, it must have 
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African experience as well.”410 He also famously suggested that “a country in Africa, in which 
the majority of people are African must inevitably exhibit African values and be truly African 
in style”.411 These statements from Biko encapsulates the frustrations experienced by those 
exhibiting the cultural retaliation, but instead of working to find solutions within a multiracial, 
human rights-centred and culturally accommodating setting, the frustrations, anger, and 
anxiety are so extreme that a cultural backlash portraying open racism, xenophobia and a sense 
of disowning cultures are seen as the only viable solution to establish cultural relevance and 
rightful dominance.  
 
6.6.1 Contribution to literature 
Addressing the gaps in the existing research, it was shown that supporters of EFF display the 
cultural backlash (observation 1 in the literature review), thus applying the international theory 
of Inglehart and Norris to the local context.  
 
The presence of the cultural backlash in South Africa is also indicative of demand-side factors 
(observation 2 in the literature review). The current research does very little to acknowledge 
relevant demand-side factors, but this dissertation shows that there is a cultural backlash that’s 
present within society.  
 
Lastly, it was indicated how the current research on open racism and xenophobia can be 
relevant and incorporated into cultural backlash theory (observation 3 of the literature review). 
This again illustrates how this dissertation fills the gaps in the current research, thus 
incorporating relevant factors (such as open racism and xenophobia) into the theory of 
populism. A more detailed explanation of the contribution to the literature will follow in the 
next chapter.  
 
 
410 How racially divided South Africans can find their common humanity, The Conversation, 
https://theconversation.com/how-racially-divided-south-africans-can-find-their-common-humanity-
57136 (accessed 20 December 2018). 
411 Simpiwe Sesanti, Ask what is African, not who is an Africa, IOL, 
https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/opinion/ask-what-is-african-not-who-is-an-african-




6.6.2 The next chapter 
In the last chapter, a comprehensive precis of anti-establishment, economic inequality and a 
cultural backlash will be given in connection to support for populism amongst the EFF in South 
Africa. The goals, hypothesis, and observations set out in the first chapter will be revisited and 
it will be shown how this research is confirmation of the theoretical perspectives set out in the 






























Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Throughout this research dissertation, it has been emphasised that populism is a complex, thin-
centred ideology that can manifest itself in a multitude of ways. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s 
definition was instrumental in guiding the argument in the local context and Inglehart and 
Norris’ theoretical work on the causes of populism cemented a deeper understanding of the 




The main aim of the dissertation was to show that populism in on the rise within the EFF due 
to anti-establishment (chapter four), economic inequality (chapter five), and a cultural backlash 
(chapter six). The last two phenomena illustrated the demand-side causes of populism in South 
Africa, whereas the anti-establishment sentiment is mostly present in the political party sphere, 




This conclusion will present the main insights gained from each of these research areas and 
how it does indeed relate to the crux of the current research question. The central, basic 
question of this dissertation, as stated in chapter one, is: 
 
Why is populism on the rise in the form of the EFF for the years 2013-2018? 
 
After addressing this question, recommendations for future research will be made and it will 
be shown how the roadmap set out in chapter one was threaded through the research.  
 
7.1 Key insights: Anti-establishment  
In chapter four it became evident that anti-establishment politics coincides with the rise of 
populism and that the EFF indeed position themselves as anti-establishment. Returning to 
Mudde and Kaltwasser’s412 central definition of populism, it is imperative to understand that 
there is a divide or separation between “two homogenous and antagonistic camps”, namely 
“the people” and “the elite”, with the latter being equated to the establishment and its 
extensions. 
 
7.1.1 Mudde and Kaltwasser 
This ideational approach from Mudde and Kaltwasser was central for the analysis of anti-
establishment: Essentially, opposition parties claim they are for “the people” and against “the 
elite” and that this is an expression of the “general will”. 
 
7.1.1.1 The people 
Three concepts of “the people” were applied: sovereignty, marginalisation, and a national 
community.  
 
Firstly, the EFF often employs the “people as sovereign” construct with the claim that the 
current establishment is not governing for the people; this is not a government where the people 
are in charge, but one where the establishment governs for the benefit of “the elite”.  
 
The EFF also utilises the second interpretation that “the people” are “forgotten” and 
“marginalised” In chapter four it was demonstrated that the EFF equates “black people” to “the 
 
412 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
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people” (thus a racial interpretation of “the people”) and from the statements provided it was 
clear that the party and its leaders frame black people as “being conquered”; they are the 
“rejected” ones who are considered to be “subhuman”. 
 
The last interpretation of “the people” refers to the national community of a political context, 
but as we have seen it is more convoluted than simply regarding the population living within a 
particular region as “the people”. Malema and the EFF have repeatedly referred to black people 
as the only true citizens and emphasising that the country is not the home of white people.  In 
essence, white people are seen as “foreigners”, not real citizens of South Africa.  
 
7.1.1.2 The elite 
These concepts of “the people” are pitted against “the elites”, thus creating the anti-
establishment stance. The determination as to who belongs in which category is often based on 
a moralistic judgement. Furthermore, “the elite” is presented as homogenous and the economic, 
cultural, and media elite are seen as extensions.   
 
The EFF views the ANC elite as governing for their own benefit. Their interest is “to have 
access to world leaders to clinch deals with them”. The EFF has also called on the Guptas to 
leave South Africa, saying the country could not be held to ransom by a “corrupt cartel” with 
“mafia” tendencies.413 The implication is that the state is captured – it’s looted to the benefit of 
those in power. This critique of the elite excludes those in power who are sympathetic to the 
cause of the populist, and obviously, it also precludes the populist with power – they are after 
all not there for their own benefit, but to represent the will of the people.  
 
Another interpretation is that the EFF sometimes sees the elite ANC government as 
illegitimate. The party has also called both Zuma and Ramaphosa “illegitimate presidents”, 
even though democratic processes were followed in electing both of them.414 
 
The elite is also often being constructed as working against the economic interests of the 
country, and that doing away with the current connection between the political and economic 
 
413 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410 (accessed 14 July)  
414 Makhosandile Zulu, EFF calls Ramaphosa’s election ‘illegitimate’, The Citizen, 




elite, is the best way forward. In the local context, the EFFs stance is radically different from 
the current system. They support the nationalisation of key economic sectors with the state 
controlling the assets and land and believe the current establishment and the system within 
which it operates are not to the benefit of the people, but the elite. Unlike some other populist 
leaders such as Donald Trump, the EFF does believe in the abolishment of capitalism. There 
is not a particular version of this system that they think can be successful. 
 
Lastly, Mudde and Kaltwasser are of opinion that the elites are often not just seen as 
representing foreign power, they are considered to be foreign themselves. In South Africa 
white people are viewed to be foreign by the EFF (as we have seen earlier), but in this regard, 
reference is not made to black people who are grouped with the elite. The black elite might not 
be seen as “real” black people (as seen previously concerning Ramaphosa), but they are still 
considered citizens of the country. 
 
7.1.2 Barr (“outsider” versus “maverick”) 
In chapter four it was also shown how one does not need to originate from outside the 
establishment to be considered anti-establishment. An “outsider”, as Barr states it, is someone 
who is truly independent and has entered the arena as an alternative to the establishment; and 
a “maverick” was previously in the nucleus of the establishment but has since broken away. 
Malema and other EFF leaders originated from within the establishment ANC, thus making 
them mavericks.  
 
7.1.3 Barr (crisis of representation)  
As mentioned in chapter four, Laclau argues established systems often break down when 
there’s a “crisis of representation” – ultimately a significant number of citizens lose their trust 
in the establishment and are available to be swept up by populist parties and movements. There 
are several reasons why the linkage between voters and an established party would break down 
(as discussed in the previous chapter), but one is of particular relevance to the South African 
context: representational linkage.  
 
It was argued that representational linkage (the notion that government is performing well and 
representing you as a citizen), has broken down to such an extent that it is perhaps one of the 
core reasons why support has been shifting to a populist party such as the EFF. As mentioned 
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before performance failures on the part of the establishment is a key factor in migrating support 
towards populist parties.  
 
There were several “crises of representation” that led to the breaking down of the 
representational linkage:  
 
• a decline in support for the ANC;  
• the firing of the respected Finance Minister Nene;  
• Zuma’s homestead in Nkandla; 
• the corruption charges against Zuma; 
• the Marikana massacre; and  
• service delivery protests flaring up countrywide.  
 
7.1.4 Hartleb 
In chapter four it was shown how the EFF is the only party that is populist in its nature and not 
just certain aspects of it. It is therefore the only party that applies anti-establishment sentiments 
at the core of its political framework and not isolated applications of some characteristics of an 
anti-establishment party. Hartleb’s characteristics of an anti-establishment party were used and 
applied to the EFF in the local context.  
 
The first key-finding is, as an anti-establishment party, the EFF constructs “the people” as 
black South Africans who are homogenous and a front-line against the political, cultural, and 
economic elites (ANC, “white monopoly capital”). 
 
Secondly, the EFF positions itself as an underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like “the 
people” are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media). This relates 
to the so-called “silent majority” whose input is stifled by the establishment. The ANC, the 
media, and other sectors of “the elite” are pitted against the EFF. 
 
The EFF also claims to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable 
ANC establishment). They are unapologetic about not being “proper” like the “white, 




Furthermore, as an anti-establishment party, the simplification or trivialisation of more 
complex issues is also characteristic of the EFF. 
 
The anti-establishment EFF also has an image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise 
issues. They don’t play by the rules and even encourage their supporters to break the law (land 
grabs for instance).  
 
Lastly, the EFF often show aggression towards political adversaries (“the establishment uses 
consensus and proper channels, but that is not effective”). Many examples of the EFF 
portraying violence against the establishment were provided in chapter four and is indicative 
of the aggression towards political adversaries.  
 
7.1.5 A coherent anti-establishment theory 
In chapter four anti-establishment theory was discussed in relation to the local context. As 
can be seen from the aforementioned discussion, several theorists (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 
Barr, and Hartleb) were incorporated. Subsequently, this dissertation aims to form a coherent 
anti-establishment framework when discussing a populist party. This can be utilised in future 
research. The outline below is not new per se as it builds on the work of previous theorists, 
but it does provide a coherent framework, something that is missing from the current 
literature.  
 
Populism is a complex phenomenon and anti-establishment is a strong supply-side argument 
for the presence of it. The process that can essentially be followed to discuss the anti-
establishment sentiment include: 
 
1. Identify the role players 
2. Apply the ideational approach  
3. Identify the crises of the establishment  
4. Illustrated how the populist party exploit the crises  
 




7.1.5.1 Identify role players  
Firstly, it might be apt to identify the role players when looking at anti-establishment as a 
supply-side argument for the presence of populism. The two central questions one should ask, 
are: 
 
i. Who is the populist party?  
ii. Who is the establishment?  
 
Determining the populist party is no easy task, but Mudde and Kaltwasser’s definition can be 
used as a guideline. A party that promotes this definition of populism, is likely to be a 
populist party.  
 
A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the 
people.415 
 
What would constitute the establishment is no easy task. As we have seen, the establishment 
is not simply the governing party – in fact, it might not be the governing party at all. Mudde 
and Kaltwasser’s characteristics of the elite can be applied here: 
 
1. The elite’s power is for their own benefit  
2. The elite are not real politicians 
3. The elite is part of the faulty system  
4. The elite is foreign   
 
It is important to note that the establishment is not simply those within the political 
establishment, but also those in the cultural, economic, and media establishment.  
 
Lastly, Barr’s definitions of an “outsider” and “maverick” should be applied to determine the 
perspective of the populist party: 
 
 
415 Cas Mudde and Christóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 6. 
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1. Outsider: A populist leader who is completely independent of the establishment and 
is seen to have originated from outside the parameters of the establishment.  
2. Maverick: A populist leader who has originated from within the establishment but has 
since turned against the establishment.  
 
7.1.5.2 Apply the ideational approach  
Now that the key elements (a populist party and the establishment) have been identified the 
central concepts of Mudde and Kaltwasser’s ideational approach must be applied. Pitting “the 
people” against “the elite” is an essential part of anti-establishment.  
 
In this theoretical approach three interpretations of “the people” can be applied: 
 
1. The people as sovereign  
2. The people as a group that is forgotten  
3. The people as a nation  
 
These can then be juxtaposed to those belonging to the elite or establishment, as has been 
discussed before.  
 
7.1.5.3 Identify the crises of the establishment  
It’s imperative to realise that populist parties are not simply anti-elitist: There’s almost 
always a breakdown of linkages/bonds between the establishment and their supporters. The 5 
linkages that Barr identifies are: 
 
1. Clientelistic linkages: in the form of aid such as social grants 
2. Directive linkages: such as selective benefits to targeted groups 
3. Participatory linkages: providing a chance to be part of structures 
4. Electoral linkages: rewards during an election time 
5. Representation linkages: the extent to which voters feel they are adequately 
represented 
 
A significant break-down in any of these linkages would constitute loss of support and an 
opportunity for a populist party to use in their anti-establishment stance. An analysis of each 
of these must thus be done to determine the extent of the crises.  
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7.1.5.4 Illustrated how the populist party exploit the crises  
In conclusion, after the crises have been determined it can be illustrated how the populist 
party utilises and exploits the crises to ultimately position themselves as for “the people”, 
compared to the establishment that is against “the people”. Hartleb’s characteristics of an 
anti-establishment party are particularly useful in this regard.  
 
1. the construction of “the people” as homogenous and a front-line against the political, 
cultural and economic elites; 
2. an image of being the so-called underdog, leading to the notion that they, just like the 
people are excluded from the establishment and its extensions (such as the media); 
3. a claim to be an unconventional, unorthodox political party (unlike the predictable 
establishment);  
4. the simplification or trivialisation of issues that are often more complex than relates to 
the establishment; 
5. often a claim to represent the “silent majority”, the people who input are stifled by the 
establishment; 
6. the image of a taboo-breaker with the aim to polarise issues – “we are exactly the 
opposite of the establishment” notion; and 
7. aggression towards political adversaries (“the establishment uses consensus and proper 
channels, but that is not effective”).  
  
The abovementioned framework hopefully provides a new, coherent theory in identifying 
anti-establishment as a reason for the rise in populism.  
 
7.2 Key insights: Economic inequality  
The aim of chapter five was to ascertain whether supporters of populist parties (“the people”) 
are economically marginalised, compared to the “elites”. A detailed analysis was done of 21 
EFF strongholds and 25 DA strongholds in terms of five economic indicators: income, race 
and inequality, unemployment, education, and resources. These indicators originated from 
Inglehart and Norris’s theory of economic inequality.  
 
Overwhelmingly, all indicators show that supporters of the EFF are economically worse off 
than DA supporters. Supporters from EFF strongholds earn significantly less, they are mostly 
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black, face more unemployment, are less educated, and have fewer resources than mostly white 
DA supporters. 
 
Concerning income, EEF supporters earn significantly less than DA supporters. Concerning 
the strongholds analysed during this research, almost 26% of the households in EFF 
strongholds earn R40 000 – R75 000 annually, whilst 21% of DA strongholds earn R300 000 
– R600 000 annually. A further 18.1% of EFF households earn only R20 000 – R40 000 per 
year, whilst an average of 12% of DA households earn R600 000 – R1.2 million annually. 
 
We have seen race also plays a big part. According to this research, the majority of EFF 
strongholds (98.3%) consist of black people and as seen in graph D the majority of DA 
strongholds (78.1%) consist of white people. The latter might be more diverse, but the polarity 
of the support base of the two parties is quite striking and noteworthy. Income is thus still 
unequal amongst different race groups. 
 
Furthermore, unemployment is an important driver of economic inequality. Black people are 
disproportionately disadvantaged and comparing EFF and DA strongholds, this trend is 
discernible. The employment rates in DA wards are significantly higher than those of EFF 
wards. The average unemployment rate of an EFF stronghold is 21.13% and 3.5% for a DA 
stronghold. 
 
Another important indicator is education. DA strongholds have significantly more university 
education, compared to the relatively low numbers in EFF wards. The average DA ward has 
30.83% university-educated residents and the average EFF ward has 4.4% of university-
educated residents. 11.32% of residents in DA strongholds do not have an education higher 
than grade 9 and 35.92% of residents in EFF strongholds do not have an education of grade 9 
or higher. 
 
Lastly, material resources such as housing, transport, water and sanitation, and internet access 
are important indicators of inequality. There is virtually nobody in DA strongholds who live in 
informal settlements, compared to very scattered results for EFF strongholds. The average for 
EFF wards is 30.733% and 0.496% for DA wards. Similarly, DA strongholds own more houses 
(either fully paid or in the process of being paid off). An average of 62.42% of DA wards in 
this study own houses, compared to an average of 27.41% of residents in EFF wards. Lastly, 
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in this research, an average of 87.62% of residents of DA strongholds own a motor vehicle, 
whilst only 17.25% of residents of EFF strongholds own a motor vehicle. 
 
These economic differences between the two parties are prodigious and indicative of the 
economic inequality between support for a populist party and the economic “elite”. It’s not 
surprising that economic inequality is perhaps the most widely held reason for the support of 
populism and the thesis can indeed be applied to our local context. Not only do EFF supporters 
experience severe economic hardships, but the contrast with white DA supporters is striking. 
The latter is by far more economically prosperous and conjures up the “haves” versus the 
“have-nots”.  
 
7.3 Key insights: Cultural backlash 
The cultural backlash theory essentially explains the socio-psychological phenomenon of 
regression of values and erosion of cultural identity. In chapter six it was shown how a cultural 
backlash is present in the local context and is manifesting itself as a hostile or intolerant attitude 
toward ethnic minorities or foreigners (in the form of open racism and xenophobia 
respectively), and anxiety, and perhaps even anger, that the dominant culture of the minority is 
suppressing the culture of “the people”.  
 
These phenomena are aimed at the minority groups (white people, Indian South Africans and 
foreigners) who are portrayed as “they” – their cultures and even presence is not included in 
the conception of a South African identity. Instead of building the dominance of the “forgotten” 
black culture (and thus decreasing the prominence of the minority cultures), the very presence 
of the minority cultures is seen as a threat to “our” way of life. It is because of these cultures –
that the majority is not advancing economically, socially, and culturally. 
 
Furthermore, Inglehart and Norris’s theory provided an analysis of the demographics of the 
group who usually experiences a cultural backlash. These indicators were adopted for the local 
context.  
 
7.3.1 Demographics  
EFF supporters who experience the cultural backlash are generally young, black men who are 
less educated. Considering the age and race inversions, the South African scenario follows the 
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international theoretical context of the demographics of the populist supporters experiencing a 
cultural value change.  
 
7.3.2 Hostility towards minorities 
Inglehart and Norris showed that hostility is often felt towards racial minorities and this 
manifests itself as open racism and xenophobia, according to Betz.  
 
7.3.2.1 Open racism  
The evidence presented in chapter six found that there is evidence of Betz’s concept of “open 
racism” 416 against minorities – especially white and Indian people. Several of the opinions 
expressed by EFF supporters go beyond the notion of a “hostile or intolerant attitude” – calling 
for the killing of white South Africans (explicitly expressed in many of the media articles and 
comments) is indeed open racism bordering on hatred for this racial group. Some sentiment 
eluded to white people not “belonging” in South Africa and being “evil” with “no credibility 
as humans”.  
 
7.3.2.2 Xenophobia  
Xenophobia is present amongst an array of supporters from the EFF.  This is indicative of the 
cultural backlash thesis as a manifestation of hostile or intolerant attitudes towards migrants. 
Together with the research on open racism, it would be fair to suggest that there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the first manifestation of the cultural backlash is indeed present in our 
local context.  
 
7.3.3 Anxiety against the dominant culture 
It is also evident that especially EFF supporters experience anxiety that the dominant, minority 
culture is eroding the majority culture. There is clearly a frustration of a foreign culture and a 
yearning to write “our own history”. True to the cultural backlash thesis, some comments 
portray racial minorities as foreigners – reiterating the “us” versus “them” narrative.  
 
7.4 Analysis: Tying it all together 
It’s imperative to understand that these three causes – anti-establishment, economic inequality, 
and the cultural backlash – do not function within a vacuum with each silo having a different 
 
416 Hans-Heorg Betz, Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe, 40. 
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outcome. Instead, an amalgamation of the three causes examined in this research creates a 
fertile breeding ground for the rise of populism.  
 
A citizen might incorporate the cultural backlash in his or her own decision making, rhetoric, 
and practices, but their comfortable middle-class existence (and thus economically being much 
closer to the economic elite), might not convince them (whether consciously or unconsciously) 
to vote for a populist party such as the EFF. Likewise, a poor South African might be won over 
by an anti-establishment argument and the presence of these two factors (economic inequality 
and anti-establishment) might be enough to sway his support to a populist party such as the 
EFF.  
 
Populism is indeed a complex phenomenon and it would trivialise the research from many 
respected analysts if one were to provide a universal approach. The best argument one could 
potentially make is that: 
 
1. The more economically marginalised South Africans feel, the more they are likely to 
support the EFF.  
2. The stronger the presence of a cultural backlash with the feelings of resentment and 
anxiety, the more susceptible a citizen is to the populist rhetoric of the EFF.   
 
Each setting will thus unfold differently. Just like there is no infallible profile of someone who 
will support fascism or socialism, there is no uncontested profile of all the supporters of a 
populist party. At best one can allude to a typical supporter of an ideology. Whilst there will 
always be individuals and groups who, for a platitude of reasons, do not fall into the typical 
profile, it is fair to deduct that the majority of supporters will suit the profile.  
 
7.4.1 Key findings  
The anti-establishment stance of a populist party such as the EFF should be closely monitored. 
It has been shown that they are not simply criticising the government but is anti-establishment 
in their stance. Like in so many contexts across the globe, the establishment is presented as 
“the elite”, that’s essentially “evil” and not on the side of “the people”. Political parties should 
take more care with their rhetoric and actions – in no society is it healthy to present the 
government (and its extensions such as the media and parastatals) as “the other”. The ANC has 
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experienced many crises and there is legitimate cause for concern but pitting “the people” 
against them in an attempt to create “the other” is a vivid sign of populism.  
 
One of the key deductions that can be made from this research is to focus on demand-side 
factors in society. Populism can only thrive if society is susceptible to populist rhetoric, 
policies, and tendencies from political parties.  
 
Economic inequality is also deeply concerning in our society and the rise of populism will 
probably not dissipate until the inequalities are addressed. The difference in economic wealth 
and resources between some black and white South Africans is striking and the divide is more 
than simply materialistic: It inherently drives a cultural separation that is proving to be very 
strong. It’s not difficult to understand the frustrations felt by many South Africans turning 
towards populism. The ANC government has been in power for more than 20 years and the 
representational linkage between it and the voters has broken down significantly. Turning 
towards the “alternative” who does not “fit the system” and is a “taboo breaker” can be seen as 
a desperate attempt to gain relevance and to improve your economic wellbeing.  
 
Open racism towards minorities has become toxic and should be addressed. Too often it is 
disguised under the “transformation” umbrella (correcting the injustices of apartheid and 
colonialism), but as we have seen from the current research, these ethnic minorities are often 
seen as foreigners in South Africa. Apartheid and colonialism have led to grave injustices and 
there is legitimate cause to address these injustices. However, as a society, we should recognise 
the legitimate transformation attempts from the attempts to ostracize racial minorities.  
 
The cultural backlash is particularly strong in the local context with not only racial minorities 
in South Africa being seen as “the other” but also foreigners. In a democracy, the rights of 
minorities are protected, and populism can be seen as a danger to these rights.  
 
7.5 Research aims 
In chapter one the hypothesis of this research was set out as:  
 
Populism in on the rise pertaining to the EFF, mainly because of an anti-establishment 
stance, economic inequality amongst supporters, and a cultural backlash that is present in 
society. These reasons were present in the years 2013-2018. 
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This hypothesis is testable because it can indeed be seen if these factors are present in the 
context of the EFF (both internally and externally). These reasons are not foreign to the existing 
research (thus testable) and are not concepts that can’t be examined. The hypothesis is also 
falsifiable: One can, for instance, indicate that the supporters of the EFF are not economically 
worse off than the elite if the indicators point out there is no economic inequality. Lastly, this 
hypothesis identifies the variables that can be measured: anti-establishment, economic 
inequality, and a cultural backlash.   
 
Following the preceding discussion, it is clear that the hypothesis was proven to be valid. This 
was a theoretical case study to affirm the presence of these three phenomena and subsequently, 
the method was successful in validating the hypothesis and answering the central research 
question: 
 
Why is populism on the rise in the form of the EFF for the years 2013-2018? 
 
Answers to the secondary questions that were also provided: 
 
1. How prominent is opposing the ruling party a factor in the rise of populism within the 
EFF? It was shown extensively in this dissertation that there is indeed a strong anti-
establishment stance within the EFF.  
 
2. Are there conditions in society – specifically the economic circumstances of supporters 
and hostile attitude and anxiety towards minorities – that can lead to support for the 
populist EFF? Economic inequalities and a cultural backlash are emanating from 
within the society and it leads to support for the populist EFF. This argument was made 
extensively in this and previous chapters.  
 
7.6 Contribution to the current literature 
In the first chapter, three observations regarding the current literature on populism in South 
Africa were made and discussed, to address these shortcomings. During each of the themes 
(anti-establishment, economic inequality and a cultural backlash) it was shown how the 
particular chapter addressed these observations, and as a precis, this is how this research as a 




Observation 1: The current research lacks relevant international context 
 
The current research doesn’t account for the complexities of the local context and how parallels 
can be drawn between different international theories and the South African situation. Most 
arguments exist in a vacuum. With the exception of brief mentions of the work from 
international scholars, local theorists attempt to analyse the manifestation of populism as a 
phenomenon that is almost unique to our context. There is very little attempt to apply 
international theory, creating the impression that South African conceptions about populism is 
unique and voided from the global context.  
 
The dissertation argued that populism in South African not only follows international trends, 
but theories of populism can indeed be applied to the local context. Theoretical concepts of 
anti-establishment, economic inequalities and a cultural backlash can be used as a map to 
analyse the local context. In chapter two and four, it was shown how the ideational approach 
fit the local context with Mudde and Kaltwasser’s definition and the expansion thereof 
applying to the South African context. Barr’s concepts of “outsider” versus “maverick” were 
applied, together with reasons why there is a crisis of representation; with reasons why the 
ANCs linkage to the voters have broken down were cited. Lastly, Hartleb’s characteristics of 
an anti-establishment party were discussed and applied to the EFF.  
 
In chapter five, theory from Inglehart and Norris were applied to the local context to show that 
economic inequality is indeed present in the SA situation. The general voter profiles and a 
micro ward breakdown of EFF strongholds were done in terms of 5 key indicators to show that 
populist supporters are part of the “have nots”, compared to the elite establishment who are the 
“haves”. 
 
In chapter six, Inglehart and Norris’s cultural backlash theory was applied to supporters of the 
EFF. This chapter showed that open racism and xenophobia are indicative of a hostile attitude 
towards racial minorities and that supporters of the populist EFF experience and anxiety 
towards the pervasive culture.  
 
The international theories concerning the reasons for populism thus proved to be useful and 




Observation 2: The current research has a limited theoretical orientation 
 
The vast majority of the current research focusses on supply-side arguments to explain 
populism within the South African context, but this is by no means a full account of the causes 
of the phenomenon. With the exceptions of brief mentions, none of the South African research 
acknowledges the demand-side factors, especially that of economic inequality and a cultural 
backlash.  
 
Populism is found in societies across the political spectrum, even without the presence of a 
populist leader. This dissertation showed in chapters five and six that demand-side factors are 
not only relevant but essential in understanding populism in South Africa. Economic inequality 
and a cultural backlash are two of the most prominent causes of populism worldwide and this 
dissertation illustrated its relevance in our context.  
 
Observation 3: The research fails to recognise, integrate and discuss relevant factors 
 
 It has already been established that the current research is selective in its approach and there 
are several neglected areas that this dissertation delved into, one being the cultural backlash in 
society (chapter six). This is a key aspect of several international theories and it is virtually 
non-existent in local research.  
 
Ample research exists on xenophobia and racism, but chapter six took it a step further. It 
illustrated how these concepts and phenomena can’t be studied in isolation but are symptomatic 
and causally linked to the rise of populism within the political opposition. Similarly, none of 
the current theorists explicitly linked economic inequalities to populism – as was done in 
chapter five. This research recognised and integrated these factors in international theory and 
applied it to the local context.  
 
7.6.1 Addition to research: Anti-establishment theory  
Previously, in this chapter, it was indicated what a coherent anti-establishment theory would 
potentially look like. Whilst this still needs refinement, this dissertation adds to the current 
literature by providing a coherent theory of anti-establishment. None of the current local or 
international research has presented the theory of anti-establishment in a coherent fashion that 
can be a blueprint for a local context.  
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Indeed, this framework consists of the work of many theorists, but alone they only address a 
part of the anti-establishment stance. This current dissertation wanted a more holistic picture 
and saw the potential to amalgamate different theories. Future research can dissect this 
framework even more and can advance our understanding of anti-establishment.  
 
7.7 Future research  
There is little question that more in-depth research about populism in South Africa is needed. 
Substantial focus should be placed on demand-side factors, specifically the cultural backlash. 
There is an opportunity to examine how this backlash starts and how it manifests itself on a 
personal level. Structured interviews with a representative sample would be of immense value.  
 
An important follow-up study would also look at how the EFF is dominating the narrative and 
policy of the ruling ANC. In what way is the EFF “forcing” ANC to become more populist? 
How big of danger is it if a substantial number of ANC voters have populist tendencies and 
attitudes?  
 
The meso and micro contexts also require analysis and these spheres are often neglected, not 
just in the local context, but also in the bigger international context. What contribution do 
organisations such as the church and community centres play in fostering populist support? 
Also, what individual personality type would typically support a populist party, and what 
would contribute toward such support?  
 
One can also look at the impact of populism on our democracy. In the introduction to this 
research, it was shown that populism is inevitably a danger to democracy and a study of the 
local context would shed light on this aspect. Is populism hurting our democracy and, if so, in 










Addendum A: EFF strongholds 
 
Ward 26 in Madibeng Local Municipality (North West)417 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R57 300 R29 400 
Employed 51.8% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 86%  68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 48% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 16.7% 31.86% 
University education 0% 4% 
School-aged children in school 65.9% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 83.5% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 22% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 93% 86% 
Computer 2% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 77.9% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 13.1% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 3.9% 48.09% 




417 Madibeng ward 26, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63702026-madibeng-ward-
26-63702026/ (accessed 19 November 2018). 
168 
 
Ward 32 in Madibeng Local Municipality (North West)418 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R57 300 R29 400 
Employed 54.5% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 91% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 64.2% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 32% 31.86% 
University education 2% 4% 
School-aged children in school 88% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 37% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 28.9% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 90% 86% 
Computer 6% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 84.7% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 15.1% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 16% 48.09% 






418 Madibeng ward 32, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63702032-madibeng-ward-
32-63702032/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 45 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)419 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R57 300 R29 400 
Employed 38.4% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 77% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 43.3% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 21.6% 31.86% 
University education 0% 4% 
School-aged children in school 80.8% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 37.5% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 16% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 93% 86% 
Computer 7% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 85% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 57.7% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 84.3% 48.09% 






419 Rustenburg ward 45, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703045-rustenburg-ward-
45-63703045/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 2 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)420 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R29 400 
Employed 47.8% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 85% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 62.9% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 30.9% 31.86% 
University education 1% 4% 
School-aged children in school 91.6% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 29.2% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 37.5% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 86% 
Computer 9% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 91.3% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 8.9% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 95.9% 48.09% 






420 Rustenburg ward 2, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703002-rustenburg-ward-
2-63703002/#service_delivery (accessed 19 November 2018).  
171 
 
Ward 3 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)421 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R57 300 R29 400 
Employed 48.3% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 83% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 47.8% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 24.8% 31.86% 
University education 1% 4% 
School-aged children in school 88.6% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 11.8% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 16.4% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 92% 86% 
Computer 7% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 81% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 13.3% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.3% 48.09% 






421 Rustenburg ward 3, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703003-rustenburg-ward-
3-63703003/ (accessed 19 November 2018). 
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Ward 24 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)422 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R57 300 R29 400 
Employed 39.6% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 92% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 40.6% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 15.4% 31.86% 
University education 0% 4% 
School-aged children in school 77.4% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 42% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 4.4% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 94% 86% 
Computer 2% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 70.1% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 81.9% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 66.7% 48.09% 





422 Rustenburg ward 24, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703024-rustenburg-ward-




Ward 28 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)423 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R14 600 R29 400 
Employed 28.5% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 68% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 56.6% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 29.4% 31.86% 
University education 1% 4% 
School-aged children in school 90.9% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 28.9% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 11% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 91% 86% 
Computer 11% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 93.6% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 32.2% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 98.1% 48.09% 






423 Rustenburg ward 28, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703028-rustenburg-ward-
28-63703028/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 31 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)424 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R29 400 
Employed 54.7% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 80% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 53% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 19.3% 31.86% 
University education 0% 4% 
School-aged children in school 80.6% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 48.6% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 17.1% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 89% 86% 
Computer 3% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 63.6% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 30.2% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 16.1% 48.09% 






424 Rustenburg ward 31, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703031-rustenburg-ward-
31-63703031/ (accessed 19 November 2018).   
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Ward 32 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)425 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R57 300 R29 400 
Employed 59.6% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 82% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 63.8% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 33% 31.86% 
University education 3% 4% 
School-aged children in school 86.1% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 29.7% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 17.4% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 93% 86% 
Computer 12% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 63.8% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 73.7% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 61.1% 48.09% 






425 Rustenburg ward 32, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703032-rustenburg-ward-
32-63703032/ (accessed 19 November 2018). 
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Ward 37 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)426 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R29 400 
Employed 48.6% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 76% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 60.5% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 26.4% 31.86% 
University education 1% 4% 
School-aged children in school 75.6% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 32.3% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 14.8% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 90% 86% 
Computer 5% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 95.2% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 78.2% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 58.9% 48.09% 






426 Rustenburg ward 37, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703037-rustenburg-ward-
37-63703037/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 38 in Rustenburg Local Municipality (North West)427 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R29 400 
Employed 57.3% 37.12% 
Formal sector workers 83% 68% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 39.5% 56.94% 
Completed matric or higher 7.9% 31.86% 
University education 0% 4% 
School-aged children in school 61.5% 89.22% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 98.3% 20.5% 
Household fully owned or paid off 11.4% 50.7% 
Resources 
Cell phone 83% 86% 
Computer 0% 14% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 0.4% 73.63% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 0.5% 46.16% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 5% 48.09% 






427 Rustenburg ward 38, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-63703038-rustenburg-ward-
38-63703038/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 13 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)428 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R14 600 
Employed 40.8% 27.41% 
Formal sector workers 75% 66% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 72.6% 59.37% 
Completed matric or higher 48.9% 30.93% 
University education 8% 6% 
School-aged children in school 88.4% 94.53% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 2.7% 5.09% 
Household fully owned or paid off 60.8% 56.49% 
Resources 
Cell phone 94% 88% 
Computer 20% 12% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97.7% 62.89% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.3% 23.04% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 98.8% 19.86% 






428 Polokwane ward 13, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504013-polokwane-ward-
13-93504013/ (accessed 19 November 2018). 
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Ward 10 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)429 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R14 600 R14 600 
Employed 34% 27.41% 
Formal sector workers 67% 66% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 70.3% 59.37% 
Completed matric or higher 35.5% 30.93% 
University education 3% 6% 
School-aged children in school 96.3% 94.53% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 20.7% 5.09% 
Household fully owned or paid off 30% 56.49% 
Resources 
Cell phone 92% 88% 
Computer 10% 12% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 49.4% 62.89% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 2.8% 23.04% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 0.6% 19.86% 






429 Polokwane ward 10, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504010-polokwane-ward-
10-93504010/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 11 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)430 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R14 600 
Employed 47.2% 27.41% 
Formal sector workers 73% 66% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 85.7% 59.37% 
Completed matric or higher 58.1% 30.93% 
University education 12% 6% 
School-aged children in school 97.1% 94.53% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 10.1% 5.09% 
Household fully owned or paid off 52.8% 56.49% 
Resources 
Cell phone 97% 88% 
Computer 25% 12% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.8% 62.89% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 86.2% 23.04% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.9% 19.86% 






430 Polokwane ward 11, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504011-polokwane-ward-
11-93504011 (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 12 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)431 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R57 300 R14 600 
Employed 49% 27.41% 
Formal sector workers 81% 66% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 86.7% 59.37% 
Completed matric or higher 68.9% 30.93% 
University education 24% 6% 
School-aged children in school 97.9% 94.53% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 1.8% 5.09% 
Household fully owned or paid off 65.8% 56.49% 
Resources 
Cell phone 96% 88% 
Computer 42% 12% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 96.1% 62.89% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.5% 23.04% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.7% 19.86% 






431 Polokwane ward 12, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504012-polokwane-ward-
12-93504012 (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 17 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)432 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R14 600 
Employed 44.6% 27.41% 
Formal sector workers 71% 66% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 83% 59.37% 
Completed matric or higher 60.2% 30.93% 
University education 17% 6% 
School-aged children in school 95.5% 94.53% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 7.9% 5.09% 
Household fully owned or paid off 57.6% 56.49% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 88% 
Computer 30% 12% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.2% 62.89% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 91.4% 23.04% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 94.5% 19.86% 






432 Polokwane ward 17, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504017-polokwane-ward-
17-93504017/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 25 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)433 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R14 600 
Employed 35.7% 27.41% 
Formal sector workers 73% 66% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 82.2% 59.37% 
Completed matric or higher 62.2% 30.93% 
University education 18% 6% 
School-aged children in school 95.8% 94.53% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 5.8% 5.09% 
Household fully owned or paid off 50.6% 56.49% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 88% 
Computer 28% 12% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.8% 62.89% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 85.2% 23.04% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 94% 19.86% 






433 Polokwane ward 25, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504025-polokwane-ward-
25-93504025 (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 26 in Polokwane Local Municipality (Limpopo)434 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R2 400 R14 600 
Employed 15% 27.41% 
Formal sector workers 88% 66% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 49.6% 59.37% 
Completed matric or higher 43.7% 30.93% 
University education 10% 6% 
School-aged children in school 96.6% 94.53% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.8% 5.09% 
Household fully owned or paid off 11.6% 56.49% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 88% 
Computer 42% 12% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.2% 62.89% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.3% 23.04% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 99.4% 19.86% 






434 Polokwane ward 26, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-93504026-polokwane-ward-
26-93504026/ (accessed 19 November 2018).   
185 
 
Ward 3 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng)435 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R29 400 
Employed 49% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 80% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 80.7% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 46.7% 50.82% 
University education 1% 11% 
School-aged children in school 86.9% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 54% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 16.2% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 93% 
Computer 8% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 95% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 80.5% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 90.6% 89.9% 






435 Ekurhuleni ward 3, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700003-ekurhuleni-ward-3-
79700003/ (accessed 19 November 2018).   
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Ward 100 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng)436 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R14 600 R29 400 
Employed 47% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 86% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 76.8% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 43.3% 50.82% 
University education 3% 11% 
School-aged children in school 90.8% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 5.7% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 12.6% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 88% 93% 
Computer 6% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 92.3% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 84.2% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 87.8% 89.9% 






436 Ekurhuleni ward 100, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700010-ekurhuleni-ward-
10-79700010/ (accessed 19 November 2018).  
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Ward 102 in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng)437 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R14 600 R29 400 
Employed 48.4% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 76% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 77.9% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 42.2% 50.82% 
University education 1% 11% 
School-aged children in school 86.3% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 57.1% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 20.7% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 93% 93% 
Computer 6% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 91.7% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 70.5% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 73.3% 89.9% 









437 Ekurhuleni ward 102, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700102-ekurhuleni-ward-
102-79700102 (accessed 19 November 2018). 
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Ward 5 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)438 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 60.8% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 85% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 82.2% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 62.2% 40.79% 
University education 17% 7% 
School-aged children in school 93.3% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.2% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 75.3% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 94% 88% 
Computer 73% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.1% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.8% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 98.7% 90.59% 




438 City of Cape Town ward 5, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100005-city-of-
cape-town-ward-5-19100005/ (accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 21 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)439 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 71.1% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 86% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 94% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 95.4% 40.79% 
University education 41% 7% 
School-aged children in school 93.3% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.4% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 69.1% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 97% 88% 
Computer 84% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.7% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 99.1% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 98.9% 90.59% 






439 City of Cape Town ward 21, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100021-city-of-
cape-town-ward-21-19100021/ (accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 70 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)440 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R461 000 R29 400 
Employed 70.6% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 90% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 91.7% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 85.1% 40.79% 
University education 48% 7% 
School-aged children in school 92.4% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.4% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 67.3% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 97% 88% 
Computer 84% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 95.9% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.6% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.5% 90.59% 






440 City of Cape Town ward 70, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100070-city-of-
cape-town-ward-70-19100070/ (accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 103 in City of Cape Town (Western Cape)441 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 76.8% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 86% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 93.8% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 79.3% 40.79% 
University education 24% 7% 
School-aged children in school 88.8% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.9% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 57.9% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 97% 88% 
Computer 75% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.6% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.2% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 99% 90.59% 






441 City of Cape Town ward 103, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-19100103-city-of-
cape-town-ward-103-19100103/ (accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 4 in Drakenstein Local Municipality (Western Cape)442  
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R115 100 R29 400 
Employed 59.2% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 82% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 85% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 75% 40.79% 
University education 33% 7% 
School-aged children in school 52.7% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.3% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 45.3% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 89% 88% 
Computer 65% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97.1% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.7% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.9% 90.59% 







442 Drakenstein ward 4, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10203004-drakenstein-
ward-4-10203004/ (accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 15 in Drakenstein Local Municipality (Western Cape)443 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 70.2% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 76% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 91.9% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 80.3% 40.79% 
University education 34% 7% 
School-aged children in school 90.4% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.4% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 57.4%  50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 88% 
Computer 73% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 95.7% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 96.5% 90.59% 






443 Drakenstein ward 15, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10203015-drakenstein-
ward-15-10203015/ (accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 7 in Stellenbosch Local Municipality (Western Cape)444 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R29 400 R29 400 
Employed 42.6% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 86% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 89.8% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 87.5% 40.79% 
University education 54% 7% 
School-aged children in school 77.1% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.2% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 34.8% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 98% 88% 
Computer 90% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98.8% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 99.1% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 99.6% 90.59% 






444 Stellenbosch ward 7, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10204007-stellenbosch-
ward-7-10204007/ (accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 22 in Stellenbosch Local Municipality (Western Cape)445 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 59.1% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 80% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 86% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 79.1% 40.79% 
University education 54% 7% 
School-aged children in school 90.9% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 1.8% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 65.1% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 96% 88% 
Computer 81% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 94% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.8% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 86.4% 90.59% 






445 Stellenbosch ward 22, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10204022-stellenbosch-
ward-22-10204022/ (accessed 21 November 2018).   
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Ward 3 in Overstrand Local Municipality (Western Cape)446  
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 47.3% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 82% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 76.4% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 69% 40.79% 
University education 33% 7% 
School-aged children in school 91.2% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.1% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 64.9% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 92% 88% 
Computer 74% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 93.3% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 99% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 93.7% 90.59% 






446 Overstrand ward 3, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10302003-overstrand-ward-
3-10302003/ (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 7 in Overstrand Local Municipality (Western Cape)447  
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R115 100 R29 400 
Employed 62.1% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 82% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 89.4% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 72.1% 40.79% 
University education 18% 7% 
School-aged children in school 91.9% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.1% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 59.6% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 92% 88% 
Computer 66% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 93.8% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 95.3% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 94% 90.59% 






447 Overstrand ward 7, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10302007-overstrand-ward-
7-10302007 (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 13 in Overstrand Local Municipality (Western Cape)448  
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R115 100 R29 400 
Employed 57.7% 50.06% 
Formal sector workers 80% 78% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 90% 69.5% 
Completed matric or higher 78.1% 40.79% 
University education 35% 7% 
School-aged children in school 87.6% 87.2% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.7% 17.43% 
Household fully owned or paid off 64.7% 50.29% 
Resources 
Cell phone 90% 88% 
Computer 68% 33% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 92.5% 91.15% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 93.1% 89.58% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 92.9% 90.59% 






448 Overstrand ward 13, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-10302013-overstrand-ward-
13-10302013 (Accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 44 in the City of Tshwane (Gauteng)449 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 74.8% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 80% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 91.2% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 83.8% 50.82% 
University education 46% 11% 
School-aged children in school 95.3% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.4% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 61.7% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 96% 93% 
Computer 74% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 95.8% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.3% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.1% 89.9% 






449 City of Tshwane ward 44, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79900044-city-of-
tshwane-ward-44-79900044/ (accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 69 in the City of Tshwane (Gauteng)450  
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R461 000 R29 400 
Employed 77.2% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 83% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 93.1% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 84.6% 50.82% 
University education 41%  11% 
School-aged children in school 95.4% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.6% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 64.4% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 96% 93% 
Computer 74% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97.9% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.3% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 98.3% 89.9% 






450 City of Tshwane ward 69, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79900069-city-of-
tshwane-ward-69-79900069 (Accessed on 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 82 in the City of Tshwane (Gauteng)451  
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 55.8% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 80% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 77.6% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 72.3% 50.82% 
University education 45% 11% 
School-aged children in school 84.9% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.3% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 49.2% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 97% 93% 
Computer 75% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.3% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.7% 89.9% 






451 City of Tshwane ward 82, Wazimap,  https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79900082-city-of-
tshwane-ward-82-79900082 (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 83 in the City of Johannesburg (Gauteng)452 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 73.6% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 80% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 91.7% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 76.7% 50.82% 
University education 29% 11% 
School-aged children in school 92.8% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.4% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 66.9% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 94% 93% 
Computer 69% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97.3% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.7% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 98.2% 89.9% 






452 City of Johannesburg ward 83, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79800083-city-of-
johannesburg-ward-83-79800083 (Accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 126 in the City of Johannesburg (Gauteng)453 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 79.5% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 82% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 92.6% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 80.3% 50.82% 
University education 34% 11% 
School-aged children in school 92.9% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 1.4% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 64.4% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 96% 93% 
Computer 76% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 96.2% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.5% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.7% 89.9% 






453 City of Johannesburg ward 126, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79800126-city-of-
johannesburg-ward-126-79800126 (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 18 in Mogale City Local Municipality (Gauteng)454 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 69.5% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 80% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 91.1% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 74.1% 50.82% 
University education 22% 11% 
School-aged children in school 85% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.3% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 60.2 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 93% 
Computer 64% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 96.8% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.7% 89.9% 






454 Mogale City ward 18, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74801018-mogale-city-
ward-18-74801018 (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 21 in Mogale City Local Municipality (Gauteng)455 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 63.3% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 78% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 77.5% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 65.7% 50.82% 
University education 23% 11% 
School-aged children in school 94% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.4% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 64.2% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 94% 93% 
Computer 65% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 98% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.3% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 98.5% 89.9% 






455 Mogale City ward 21 Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74801021-mogale-city-
ward-21-74801021 (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 2 in Midvaal Local Municipality (Gauteng)456  
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 67.3% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 84% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 88.4% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 69.3% 50.82% 
University education 22% 11% 
School-aged children in school 93.7% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.7% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 67.3% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 93% 
Computer 60% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 83.9% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 94.7% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 96.7% 89.9% 






456 Midvaal ward 2, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74202002-midvaal-ward-2-
74202002 (Accessed on 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 3 in Midvaal Local Municipality (Gauteng)457 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R115 100 R29 400 
Employed 60.7% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 89% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 89.7% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 60.2% 50.82% 
University education 11% 11% 
School-aged children in school 87.7% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.5% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 57.9% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 94% 93% 
Computer 52% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 96% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 95.4% 89.9% 






457 Midvaal ward 3, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74202003-midvaal-ward-3-
74202003 (Accessed on 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 14 in Midvaal Local Municipality (Gauteng)458 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 68.1% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 82% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 93.1% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 70.8% 50.82% 
University education 19% 11% 
School-aged children in school 94.8% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.3% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 65.9% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 93% 
Computer 64% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97.2% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.7% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.9% 89.9% 






458 Midvaal ward 14, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-74202014-midvaal-ward-14-
74202014 (Accessed on 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 18 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)459 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 75.5% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 80% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 90.7% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 77.8% 50.82% 
University education 28% 11% 
School-aged children in school 92.2% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.3% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 59.8% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 96% 93% 
Computer 71% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97.4% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 98.2% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.9% 89.9% 






459 Ekurhuleni ward 18, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700018-ekurhuleni-ward-
18-79700018 (Accessed 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 19 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)460 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 73.3% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 79% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 89.9% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 76.2% 50.82% 
University education 30% 11% 
School-aged children in school 93.5% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.5% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 59.6% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 96% 93% 
Computer 70% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 97.1% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.7% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 97.4% 89.9% 






460 Ekurhuleni ward 19, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700019-ekurhuleni-ward-
19-79700019 (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Ward 27 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)461 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 72.1% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 80% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 89.8% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 73.3% 50.82% 
University education 25% 11% 
School-aged children in school 92.6% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.2% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 67% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 93% 
Computer 68% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 96.9% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.8% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 96.1% 89.9% 






461 Ekurhuleni ward 27, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700027-ekurhuleni-ward-
27-79700027 (Accessed on 21 November 2018).  
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Ward 28 in the City of Ekurhuleni (Gauteng)462 
Indicator Info Province 
Income 
Annual household income R230 700 R29 400 
Employed 73.3% 50.59% 
Formal sector workers 84% 77% 
Education 
Completed grade 9 or higher 90.4% 77.27% 
Completed matric or higher 76.9% 50.82% 
University education 28% 11% 
School-aged children in school 93.4% 90.35% 
Housing 
Living in informal dwellings (shacks) 0.6% 17.77% 
Household fully owned or paid off 65.5% 41.59% 
Resources 
Cell phone 95% 93% 
Computer 70% 30% 
Water from a regional or local service provider 96.4% 93.52% 
Access to flush or chemical toilets 97.4% 85.69% 
Refuse disposal from local authority or private company 96.4% 89.9% 










462 Ekurhuleni ward 28, Wazimap, https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79700028-ekurhuleni-ward-
28-79700028 (Accessed 21 November 2018). 
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Addendum C: Comments from supporter website 
http://www.economicfreedomfighters.org/  
 
1. thamsanqa says: 
July 30, 2013 at 10:04 am 
Economic Freedom Fighters might actually be what black south Africans need. The question 
that remains to be seen is how is the organisation planning to address issues pertaining to 
land redistribution. how are they planning to ensure that south Africa is returned to the black 
man including wealth, land and other resources raging from agriculture to mining including 
manufacturing and technology. our land still belongs to the white man including its wealth 
and economy. What is the organisation political ideology… 
 
2. henry ltaylor says: 
August 9, 2014 at 1:03 am 
I would say amen to your statement ALLY,that is what we call in America demonization, it is 
to make Malema look like the bad guy. try reading the history of these people,(whites)and 
you will get a better understanding of these Euros. 
 
3. Andrew S Seleke says: 
June 2, 2014 at 2:03 pm 
As a foreigner as you’d just discribed yourselfie, why didn’t you uses those foreign mind in 
your foreign_country, cause we Azanians/ZA we fully believes in him(Malema) and in what 
he says. Imorality and hatred is what your pinkskin(called ’emslves-whites)does to our 
people and economy. Ignorant is they devil deeds they’ve brought and enforced into our land. 
If you say Malema is nor different fro’ your capitalist broers, why he’ve been expelt together 
with other fighters fro’ your capitalists’ favour policies of the anc – Stop coming with your 
Holandirism inhere, “this is Africa, for Africans, not for basterds! 
 
4. Andrew S Seleke says: 
June 2, 2014 at 2:04 pm 
As a foreigner as you’d just discribed yourselfie, why didn’t you uses those foreign mind in 
your foreign_country, cause we Azanians/ZA we fully believes in him(Malema) and in what 
he says. Imorality and hatred is what your pinkskin(called ’emslves-whites)does to our 
people and economy. Ignorant is they devil deeds they’ve brought and enforced into our land. 
If you say Malema is nor different fro’ your capitalist broers, why he’ve been expelt together 
with other fighters fro’ your capitalists’ favour policies of the anc – Stop coming with your 
Holandirism inhere, “this is Africa, for Africans, not for basterds! 
YES, I SAID SO!!! 
 
5. Jeremia Maraba says: 
June 5, 2014 at 3:53 pm 
If you don’t know wht to say just shut up, EFF if for sophisticated and educated people of 
this land. A person who claims to be educated but uninformed wil comend lk u do. Do you 
know how blacks are stil treated and undermined in corporate by whites. don’t just commend 
to protect your stay in SA. 
 
6. nu_sa says: 
August 24, 2018 at 11:13 am 
We are dreaming if we think we will get any land back. White privalge will always use thier 
connections to make sure it never happens. 
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Lodged this week in the High Court of Cape Town was a reply to the Eviction Application by 
the City of Cape Town to have a coloured man and his family of 5 evicted from thier home in 
the nice ‘white neighbourhood’ of Devils Peak. It seems clear that the City are acting on 
behalf of his neigbour a Verwoerd. The City of Cape Town allege he built a house and didn’t 
follow the proper process but his reply clearly shows he did and also shows how his 
Verwoerd neighbour has used her friends at the city of Cape Town to bring an applciation to 
have him evicted from her ‘nice white area’ using Taxpayers money. 
So as much as I dream and the EFF talk of a day when we can really call this country our 
own, it won’t happen in my lifetime because we are still being oppressed by Verwoerd long 
after the evil man himelf is dead. His legacy is kept alive by his family. I know because I 
work for the family. They are POWERLESS to stop the still POWERFUL Verwoerds and the 
City of Cape Town. I was a DA voter but after this I am now EFF! 
 
7. KALUSHI JOHANNES MOSEHLA says: 
July 22, 2013 at 9:23 pm 
i would like the EFF to help us as greater gauteng business forum in our fight to reclaim our 
economic rights. we want foreign nationals like ethiopians,somalis,pakistanis and 
bangladeshis to stop operating tuckshops and wholesales and return to refugee camps or 
home of origin and leave the wealth of RSA to south africans. fear not to contact us on 011 
039 5163/084612 0600 to arrange a proper meeting. 
 
8. ally says: 
October 9, 2013 at 7:42 pm 
Taylor,I think your opinion would add value to your people in your native land since you 
know better about rightiousness.I never heard CIC Malema speaking a language of 
discrimination and self enrichment to the nation.Perharps hearing aid could help 
you…Malema and EFF are not discriminative to anyone but he tells the truth which some of 
you doesn’t wanna hear because you’re benefiting from the corrupt monopolious governance 
of the ruling party. Truth need to be told that as much as you come here RSA to sneeze that 
kind of mucus of”I’m better than South Africans” I personally hate your tendency cos EFF is 
an antidode of the gashing wounds we suffered from those two crocodiles you consider 
government. One last thing we don’t need your opinion keep it in your bag,pack it and go 
back to your native country to heal them because it looks more like you ran away from home 
or you were hired to open that big chimney of yours to insult our commander and the intire 
south africans for the benefit of your country men,agh sies uyanyanyisa.Viva EFF viva 
Malema Viva 
 
9. lukhanyo Nqothole says: 
December 29, 2013 at 11:56 pm 
I hereby imploring you not to make suggestions without facts,most of EFF members are 
educated and not as you say it without substance.You are a foreiner i will advise you to keep 
your oppinions to yourself,because you are just enjoying this country for free and what are 
you contributing to our soceity. 
Let me tell you Malema will be supported by many of us and those who want their stolen 
land back,so that we will try and reverse what colonisation and appartheid done to our land 
and nation. 
You have no vision and lack knowledge ofd what we endure during those years,if South 
Africans or government don’t change the way,they operate.South Africa would look the same 
as other african countries.Listern,See are you deaf and blind can”t you hear the cries of the 
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masses.I think you should be ready to run because,we will not back down until justice is 
served.ALUTA!CONTINUA! 
 
10. Lukhanyo Nqothole says: 
November 4, 2013 at 11:31 pm 
Fighters,youth and middle age come in all your masses let’s rally with Malema and stop this 
monopoly syndrome none-sense vote EFF change is necessary and essential.It is imperitive 
for us to decide for our future taking our land back from the hands of the FOWLERS.Zim has 
done it,so we can too and if we need to be hungry to get it so beit in any case we are in 
hunger nothing new but we can change that ma-Afrika join EFF or if you scared – you can be 
aswell a secrete voter for EFF and those who not scared like me lets parade with pride 
because we mean business and enough is enough(How long shall we struggle and be label in 
our own land).Viva!EFF!Viva!Phambili!Commissar Malema!Phambili!Lizaduduma lidlule-
the bones of our fore fathers are shaking now seeing what they died for will materialise and 
those who are still dreaming of a banana country must forget or vanish and this shall come to 
pass, we the government in waiting is REALLITY. Warning to the cowards or Softies 
NEVER STAND BEFORE THE WHEEL OF REVOLUTION(UNGAMI PHAMBI 
KWEVILI LOMZABALAZO AND ABABUKELI BASENGOZINI)Viva!. 
 
11. Howard says: 
August 25, 2014 at 1:46 pm 
Reply to Mary: from Mr. S. Ebrahim. [Mary Blige [mary blige (bible@live.co.za) ]] 
E-mail of the 14th Dec 2008. 
A response to your stupid accusations: 
Mary, there is no other way that I may address you! If I do it in any other way, then it will be 
a grievous sinful act to address any offspring of the evil Christian invaders of my country. It 
is sad to state that there is no way that I could become part of the ignorant fools who were 
under duress, who had the audacity to make an agreement without my consent and let the 
invaders who murdered hundreds of thousands of indigenous people of my country, and 
raped our women, and stole our land and properties and are still today in possession of it, and 
made them illegally free from punishment they so badly deserve! That includes every 
European and British subjects that enjoys pleasure in the blood of my people, in my country! 
Then you have the audacity to tell me that you are a person who is ‘someone who thinks’ 
I regard it a righteous deed to inform my people of the contents of the evil book called the 
Bible. You must understand that it was Constantine who created the Bible so that his subjects 
will suppress all other peoples who do not follow his ideology as stated in his fabricated 
book. It is his followers who invaded my country to suppress my people. 
 
12. howard says: 
September 15, 2016 at 6:05 pm 
We must get back our land! These europeans came to our country and stole the land, cattle 
and raped our women! They need to pay reparations! 
They NEVER brought cattle and land to our beautiful country. They brought their corrupted 
bible and tricked us into accepting nonsense. 
 
13. Bathandwa says: 
September 2, 2018 at 10:03 pm 
Fighters 
I thought EFF would be dead by now but instead it grows by leaps and bounds. because of 
the fact that it breaks away from ANC like cope and others, but it is build on the strong 
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foundation. I used to be a PAC member I voted for the party in 2004, 2009 and in 2014 I 
voted DA, I would love to join EFF and vote for them come 2019. I live in Vredenburg. I 
support the land expropriation without compensation. I would return to my home town 
Mount Ayliff EC. I always hatred ANC with passion I new deep down that they are sell outs. 
Malema exposes them more clearly because he himself was raised and breed by the Got them 
party. The man speak my language, he remains me of the black consciousness leaders the 
likes of Steve Biko, Robert Mangaliso Sobukhwe. 
I would like to wear the red shirt and actively canvass for the real liberation 
Viva Fighters VIVA 
Inform me 078 189 2423 
 
14. Mokgethi says: 
June 6, 2018 at 7:46 am 
There is a place in Northern Cape Province called ASKHAM. This place need EFF to come 
and put this white people here in their place. There is too much racism here. There are still 
place where black or coloured are not allowed to go to. 
Please EFF we need you here. 
 
15. Fred says: 
February 23, 2018 at 11:41 am 
Wow sir you are worst than a white racist ignorance is the Lord’s biggest sin. 
 
16. SalaGahle says: 
August 27, 2018 at 9:16 am 
Thing is Simon. What do you think that is going to translate into?. Malema’s may just be the 
voice. But the masses he speaks to carry out the will of that voice. Whether he is saying 
genocide or not, the racial thing is becoming so sensitive at the same time – that is exactly 
what is going to happen. Genocide of some sort…. Because ‘white’ African technology and 
knowledge was more worldly than the tribal ‘black’ African society way back in the past. 
The people with the lesser quality knowledge became bullied. While it was not genocide – 
apartheid was a very ‘incorrect’ regime and did not help South Africa. Apartheid has not 
been abolished. It exists now in the form of BEE. Against whites. While it was originally 
introduced to correct the ‘headstart’ white people had gained through an apartheid regime. It 
is now becoming something more and I don’t think we will ever see the end of it. Even then 
that is not enough. The inactivity of the ANC and the bad service they have been giving SA 
in all forms is being blamed on the colonial era and therefore the ‘white’ Africans. This 
whole land expropriation thing has also run out of control. The ignorant masses seem to think 
that with the death of all the white farmers they will just get hand-outs of free land. To 
anyone who thought they were going to get ‘free’ low cost houses – ask them how many 
bribes they had to pay to get themselves on the list for low cost housing and then actually get 
into the house without someone else having taken it first. Do they really think the land is 
going to be handed out for free? 
 
17. Kyra says: 
January 1, 2018 at 4:07 pm 
Hi 
I just love this forum and today I would like to throw something in the works…controversial. 
fortunately in EFF land ‘controversial’ is acceptable. I was out on the streets in April with 
posters in regard “The Guptas must go” but I have been thinking lately…..who is really 
behind the Gupta saga. When the FBI or the CIA get involved I go Whoa! what is going on 
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here, they are the worst and now they are trying to fit the saviour shoe by ‘investigating’ the 
Guptas….think again. I asked myself the question “If I was tjommies with the President’s son 
and I could see opportunities towards self-enrichment, what would I do?” and if I am brutally 
honest with myself, I may have taken that opportunity. The Guptas never had an agreement 
with us to uphold governance with integrity – ZUMA and the ANC did and they failed us 
abysmally! Should they be held accountable – YES but more so the ANC. What I am seeing 
lately is a massive ‘attack’ on the Guptas only, and the ones who really failed us are still in 
office with the FBI investigating, and Peter Hein stepping in as another saviour. Companies 
are closing their doors to the Guptas but still sing to the ANC. There is such a thing as a 
white minority monopoly that has nothing to do with race or colour, it has to do with a global 
elite that is very alive in this country who couldn’t care less about the people of South Africa 
or Africa for that matter, the same people who have been the global puppetmasters for 
centuries. I just feel we might be taken hostage by the Gupta – Scapegoat saga while the real 
enemy continues to manipulate and control. Who introduced the Guptas to Bell Pottinger? 
We have to take back control of our country, for us and our children sake and we are not the 
only ones….Palestine….Hawaii and many more, who didn’t have Guptas but strangly 
enough our paths are similar. They have been regarding us as them (apart from, collateral 
damage) for too long, it is time for us to take the fight to them! But we have to take off 
blinkers and see them for what they are! We see the Guptas, we see the ANC but somehow 
we don’t see the massive elephant in the room – the hidden agendas. 
 
18. Tsekane says: 
January 1, 2018 at 5:22 pm 
Yes, true, the hidden Agenda’s white monopoly capital that captured South Africa State of 
governance since the arrival of the Whites led by the world known Criminal, a Jan van 
Riebeck. We have resources they do not have, therefore will attack Africa and get concerned 
about South Africa and Nigeria more so Zimbambwe that gave them a middle finger years 
ago. Over above all of this, we should be aware that if they get a weak leadership which 
seeks to wine and dine with them on the expense of Africans then we will fall and remain 
captured by one or another group continuously as Zuma and cronies did then brainwash our 
minds with false non existent belief that we are busy with Radical Economic Transformation 
while we are not. 
If Zuma and the Guptas were indeed on Radical Economic Transformation Agenda – What 
was the GUPTA WEDDING GUESTS DOING BY LANDING ON OUR REVERED 
STRATEGIC MILITARY SAFETY POINT in WATERKLOOF AIR BASE? AS ATUL 
GUPTA RESPONDED IN HIS WORDS “We only wanted the best for our child marriage 
day” 
Treating SA as Thrash – then Zuma and cronies still with these guys calling them His 
friends! 
 
19. matshaya says: 
September 4, 2014 at 4:25 pm 
you people of Azania you must recall where do we come from, that means the agendar of the 
eff is beyond these people who thought a revolution is to proctect these individuals who are 
looting state resources because you are benefiting on that you keep having non-sense 
comments,here we facing a battle of having 13percent of land, having 5percent of wealth, 
87percent of land white minority belonging, 95percent wealth is in their hands why? ask your 





20. sam says: 
October 22, 2013 at 4:44 pm 
I am an indian…my family started the first cooperative for black people in sophiatown. It 
was successful and many people benefited…when verwoerds bstards took leadership…they 
dissolved it and took everything…today large multinationals are on our land..as a family we 
never recovered..we were reduced to poverty.the banks prey on the poor…today govt cuts 
our services…they would never dare do that to white people…i see in my industry…the 
whites still run everything…like dirty puppet masters…my vote will go EFF…I will sign 
up…things must change… 
 
21. TSIETSI MOKHOEEA says: 
April 29, 2016 at 3:10 pm 
Radical economic transformation is the solution to S A ,and only the EFF can lead us truly 
.Ruling party cannot be trusted ,they sold the revolution. 
 
22. sthembele mgala says: 
August 30, 2013 at 12:22 pm 
I fully support radical changes in South Africa if EFF can bring back the needs of masses of 
this country more special for those who were disadvange by the system of white minority 
Phambili EFF!!!! 
 
23. Lavhelesani Dangale says: 
April 19, 2018 at 12:00 pm 
good day, i feel that the ruling party picked up where the apartheid regime left off by failing 
black people from earning the same salary as white people mostly in private sectors. a black 
graduates are so much exploited, i’m bagging the EFF to look into this matter. the reason 
why salary is confidential, is because whites dont want us to see how much they are paying 
them selves. 
i beg the one and only part i can trust EFF to look into this matter 
 
24. Makgwale says: 
December 11, 2013 at 10:44 am 
I am not surprised at your sentiments, they are motivated buy selfishness, freedom to you 
means that you should remain comfortable and advantaged while the rest of the majority 
remains at the bottom, freedom to you means that I should ignore that your forefathers 
policies put my black people in unbearable conditions, freedom to you means that you should 
keep dictating terms to me, and forever have dominance on me, the thought of us being par 
with you on all levels, to you does not mean freedom. I suggest you rethink your motives, 
introspect, and ask yourself what motivates you, and next time do not use demeaning words ( 
we don’t think ) to address us. 
 
25. oeketsi Eric Maseko says: 
September 17, 2013 at 7:13 pm 
Sons and daughter of Azania let us not be confused more than we are, nb: they have robbed 
us our culture, land, identity, made us to be inferior to our own complexion e.g where there is 
a black person something must go wrong , they taught us to say that when one of us fails in 
their shit-stem. 
We have to emancipate ourselves from mental slavery e.g speaking EngliSHIT with a shit-
stem ascent and down looking our brother and sisters who can speak EngliSHIT 
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It’s a revolution time EFF is a vanguard of Azania .Amandala we are not gonna be slaves in 
our fathers land. 
 
26. East Afrika says: 
September 8, 2018 at 11:34 pm 
Capitalism is the white fantasy mentality of replacement of the way the individual Afrikan 
Human & even the white resurrected primate & virus animated corpse is created to think of 
self and of reality, with Colonization Mutant Primate Virus thought of itself and reality. So 
capitalism is the colonial self optimism and colonial self love of the Mutant Primate Virus, 
about resources and values, land, water, food, women, self validated in colonial thought and 
using Higher Emotion of colonial self-aggression to get it. This means the Mutant Primate 
Virus Races will be violent to you then cause you to think violent of each other and portray 
you as violent and in need of colonial validation logic education. So, what White Races teach 
as economics even in their universities is the justification of sociopathic behaviors of robbery 
with violence and the starvation, military aggression, deprivation, sexual exploitation and 
enslavement of victims of the robbery. This is a belief Virus gives the Mutant Primate and 
they identify themselves as emotionally validated intellectually by this sociopathic and 
dissociated behavior called capitalism. 
Capitalist Currency 
In the colonial mindset of the virus, the Mutant Neanderthal prints paper then by emotional 
validation to colonize it violently identifies itself as owner of all resources & existence by the 
printed paper through self love and self optimism as the only logic curriculum that it’s 
victims must acquire and demonstrate as a value, in order to share in the currency it printed. 
So to the White Races, printed and other currencies are permission to exist that the White 
Mutant Primate Virus gives to Afrikans and it’s own kind, if Afrikans agree to be encoded 
logically into colonial self identification. 
 
27. East Afrika says: 
October 16, 2018 at 1:56 am 
Black people have a Free Will right of identification with the land and with whatever needs 
they have and with production of those needs. White people don’t have any power, they just 
want to distract you from believing in yourselves and in what you can do independently. 
They want you to fear going against them. The son’s and daughters of Shaka and the Khoisan 
cannot be made to fear ignoring whites. Afrikans do not owe white people a living. A white 
run country was and with their black puppets, is, absurd, illogical, impossible, unreal, 
unusable, unworkable and useless to Afrikans. 
 
28. East Afrika says: 
November 10, 2018 at 2:04 am 
The white man wants to be protective in the sense that he does not feel that badly if he 
offends black people. The white man is pleasantly deceptive. When criticized, he tells 
himself and others, “It is black people,not me.” The White man is deflecting, projecting, 
externalizing and feeling relieved of the black problem. White people want to convince 
relevant parties themselves that their offenses against black people on land and historical 
injustice is justified, non-existent or that they are the victim rather than the perpetrator, they 
try to escape responsibility. White people turn their envy into arrogance, so that they cannot 
feel inferior. In the short run, it works pretty well. In the long run, they leave a trail of 
deception that needs to be investigated. We must catch these white people and confront them 




Don’t fear white people when they get angry for you criticising them, they are pretenders. 
White people have no conscience.White people try to feed of your self esteem because they 
have no credibility as humans. by pretending to be confident they think they are organized 
and safe. Afrikans, never be attracted to white people and their charisma which is fake. 
 
29. wiseman says: 
November 12, 2018 at 5:06 pm 
wow, so much food for thought,I couldnt agree more on most of what you just said, but i hate 
to bring this news flash, to you, that notion about land belonging to the khoi san? mate?where 
is the proof? the one you white people created and fed to the ignorant black people? Look, lie 
to yourself all you want, but Africa, belongs to Africans, that you can never change,you are 
the only settler in Africa our land, ok?? now get that in to you head, secondly, the great 
inventors you just wrote about, how many of them had companies again? my point is, yes, 
they did invest stuff, right?but that alone wasn’t and still isn’t enough for trade to take place, 
that is my point, or maybe i should give you an example with tomas edison the thief, (dont 
care about misspelling his name) what the hell did he do?by the mere fact that he was a 
business man we know him, he sold peoples ideas, to the rest of the world that is, now you 
need to understand the fact that, it is through such transactions money goes around, not by the 
mere fact of creating something, secondly,I dont care about who invented what,when, and 
why, all i care about is having this white people taking us for a ride on the expense of our 
minerals and our land, that Mr, I care about, you white people are Evil, you are Satan 
himself, and you are the reason why there is no peace in the world, you are the reason there is 
global warming, earthquakes, and guns,and wars, you, white people are the people who are 
trying by all means to destroy our planet.all those inventions, what greater good where they 
for?? global warming? 
 
30. Marang waga Mananyetso says: 
November 19, 2013 at 11:02 pm 
Thank you for a friday, the 15 Nov 2013 professional seminar. i wasnt sure about policies 
and values of EFF, But now im going to cast my vote next year by voting for this party 
“Party ya batho”. EFF is going to rule until the people of SA are free from this white 
monopoly. 
 
One more thing – Please start intruducing or branding EFF with new faces(front leaders) not 
only of Commander in Chief. We need to show the people that EFF doesnt belong to Mr. 
Malema only but the people of SA. 
Amandla ma fighters 
 
31. ITANI RASTAMAN says: 
August 7, 2014 at 9:07 am 
PLEASE GIVE A BLACK MAN WHAT IS BELONG TO HIM BEFORE IS TOOO LATE 
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